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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is an examination of Aleksandr Dugin’s The Foundations of 
Geopolitics, of which I have translated important sections into English and these 
are included as an appendix. Despite the importance of Foundations of Geopolitics 
to Russian strategic thought there has not been a translated edition published in 
English. This work was published in 1997 and has been quite influential for Russian 
political and military leadership. I strive to provide context for the setting in which 
Foundations of Geopolitics was created through an analysis of the social and 
political conditions that existed in Russia while the text was being written, as well 
as how and why it came to achieve such influence. This is followed by an analysis 
of the text itself. Finally, I examine the ways in which the strategic precepts offered 
by Dugin in Foundations of Geopolitics have been adopted and employed by the 
Kremlin in foreign and domestic policy. Additionally, I reveal the direct and 
indirect links connecting Dugin and his fascist Neo-Eurasianist ideology to the 
leaders and ideologues of fascist, far-right, xenophobic, and often racist 
movements. This has created a network of like-minded movements advocating for 
the reclamation of a traditional identity domestically, but looking to Moscow for 
international leadership and guidance in foreign policy. The origins of these 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
«Рукописи не горят» 
(Manuscripts Don’t Burn) 
-Mikhail Bulgakov from The Master and Margarita 
 
Figure 11
                                                




Over the past twenty years, the star of Aleksandr Dugin has rapidly 
ascended; he has gone from obscurity to serving as a shadowy advisor to Russian 
political figures and taking the position of the leading ideologues of neo-fascism, 
not just in Russia, but globally. Dugin has given his ideological framework several 
names, ‘Eurasianism,’ ‘Fourth Political Theory,’ and ‘National Bolshevism;’ 
however, these differences are strictly superficial and the ideological principles he 
espouses in The Fourth Political Theory (2009) are consistent with those from his 
seminal work, The Foundations of Geopolitics (1998). Foundations of Geopolitics 
remains untranslated in English, but I have translated important sections to help 
rectify this. According to John Dunlop, a leading scholar of the Russian far-right:  
There probably has not been another book published in Russia during the 
post-communist period that has exerted an influence on Russian military, 
police, and statist foreign policy elites comparable to that of Aleksandr 
Dugin's 1997 neo-fascist treatise, Foundations of Geopolitics.2 
 
For a self-proclaimed traditionalist and an Old Believer, Dugin has 
demonstrated a remarkably adroit use of social media and the internet to make 
contacts and disseminate his views to all corners of the globe. He has tens of 
thousands of followers across his social media pages and is linked to prominent 
neo-Nazis and other racist ultranationalists in the United States, Italy, France, and 
                                                
2 John Dunlop, “Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics,” Demokratizatsiya, 




elsewhere.3 His think tanks, such as Katheon and the Center for Conservative 
Studies, are likely to have received some funding from the Russian government 
and he was employed as the head of the International Studies Department at 
Moscow State University (MGU), one of the two most prestigious universities in 
Russia, until he was removed from his position due to an interview he gave where 
he stated that there are “terrible people” in Ukraine who must be “killed, killed, 
killed.”4 Once the mask of fascism had slipped from Dugin’s ‘Eurasianist,’ façade, 
the university was left with little choice, but to remove him from his position after 
a petition with 10,000 signatures, organized by students, was presented to MGU’s 
rector demanding his dismissal.  
 Dugin’s Eurasianism, sometimes referred to as ‘Neo-Eurasianism’, to 
distinguish it from earlier iterations of Eurasianism, has diverse, and at times 
contradictory origins. Much like Eisenstein’s original use of montage to stitch 
together vignettes to produce a powerful message, although for an opposing 
ideological message, Dugin cuts and stitches together ideas from many sources to 
produce a whole. There are four significant themes in this ideology. The first a 
dichotomy between land-based, continental civilization and coastal, seafaring 
civilizations based in the work of several historical figures, chiefly Alfred Mahan 
and Halford Mackinder. He stresses the superiority of tellulocratic (land based) 
                                                
3 Danila Galperovich, “Russian Social Media Sites Have Become Meeting Places for the American 
Ultra-Right” VOA Russia, August 26, 2017. 
 
4 Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, “Russia This Week: Dugin Dismissed from Moscow State University?”, 
The Interpreter, June 27, 2014. (Stephenson 2015) (Gessen 2017) (Clover 2017) 
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civilizations over talassocratic (sea based) ones. For him the former USSR and the 
Eastern Bloc embody Eurasian, continental civilization, while NATO and the 
United States are talassocratic ‘Atlanticists.’ Nations, peoples, and ideas that Dugin 
views sympathetically are labelled Eurasianist, while all those he opposes are 
Atlanticist. The second theme lies in the titular Geopolitics, whose foundations, he 
alleges, can be located in Friedrich Ratzel’s theory of Lebensraum, which would 
become the central idea motivating Nazi expansionist aggression. Under this 
theme Dugin advocates irredentism and expansionism, particularly to sparsely 
populated lands in the North and East, in a direct imitation of American Manifest 
Destiny, acknowledged by Dugin himself. A third is Dugin’s selective application 
of Marx’s works and Soviet symbology and imagery to appeal to the many Russian 
and former Soviet citizens who retain a favorable view of his ideology and 
nostalgia for the Soviet period. He describes Marx as a Eurasianist and a mystic, 
advocating for revolution against bourgeoisie, Atlanticist societies. However, 
Dugin is unconcerned with the plight of workers. He admires Marx for his 
opposition to the West and revolutionary fervor, but, beyond their enthusiasm for 
revolution, their ideas are diametrically opposed; Dugin simply appropriates his 
name and attributes ideas to him that are not present in Marx’s works. In 
Foundations of Geopolitics, Dugin distorts the core of Marx’s ideology to present 
his ideas as being in line with Eurasianism, when they are not. Dugin seeks statist 
control of the means of production, but strictly for the good of the Eurasian 
“Empire of Many Empires” and its elites, rather than for any improvement in 
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workers’ lives. While Dugin’s Eurasianist “internationalism” is authoritarian, 
fascist, based on elite rule and rooted in ethnic, rather than class identity. 
A last feature of Dugin’s view is a fascination with the “ethnos,” rooted in 
blood libel (a racist conspiracy that alleges Jews use the blood of Christian children 
for religious purposes), eugenic racial theories from the early 20th and late 19th 
centuries and Slavophilia. However, it is important to note that Eurasianism does 
not endorse a strict, narrow version of ethnic Russian supremacism, but rather 
portrays the ‘Holy Rus’ as exemplary Eurasians, not a master race. This strange 
brew of ideas has produced one of the more influential fascist ideologies of the 
new millennium.  
Dugin’s direct influence on the path of policymaking in Russia is difficult to 
trace, as he has had no formal positions in either the military or government, but 
vocabulary from Foundations of Geopolitics has unquestionably found its way into 
the highest levels of political and military discourse in Russia. The Kremlin and 
those trying to curry favor with it have employed the terms and ideas found in 
Foundationsof Geopolitics for both national domestic politics and as foreign policy 
tools over the past two decades. Many of the tactics used in the so-called 
‘information war’ being waged by Russia against electoral institutions and 
intended to mislead the electorate of voters in the United States and Europe can 
be traced back to the Foundations of Geopolitics. His ideas have been echoed by 
Putin and others in the Kremlin at times and certain strategic elements have been 
extracted from his writings. But Foundations is not a playbook for the Kremlin by 
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any means, as many of Dugin’s fantasist ideas would be immensely impractical or 
impossible to achieve. Still, there is no doubt that many of Russia’s top military 
leaders have read or are familiar with Foundations, and have been uniquely 
influenced by it.  
It is important to note that Foundations of Geopolitics was not written in a 
vacuum. Dugin’s anti-Western thinking was profoundly shaped by his personal 
experiences during the collapse of the Soviet Union and the social and economic 
chaos that followed. And he is far from alone in this. There were a number of 
fundamental problems in the Soviet Union that its collapse exposed, but these 
were compounded by American policymaking following its disintegration. The 
Russian economy was devastated by the fundamentally inefficient and unequal 
reforms that were conducted with the encouragement of American policymakers. 
The American government was deeply involved with propping up the teetering 
Yeltsin administration, all while denying Russia entry to NATO, any sort of 
Marshall Plan that would have helped bridge the gap for Russia’s economy 
between the two systems, and expanding NATO up to Russia’s borders despite 
assurances made by Clinton and Bush that this would not happen. The result was 
endemic corruption, drastic declines in all health metrics, and political and social 
instability. Given these experiences, it is quite easy to see how many Russians are 
predisposed to view the United States as the implacable enemy of Russia, no 
matter the form of government Russia maintains. Of course, this is just perception, 
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but opinion polling has shown that is held by many Russians, and it is constantly 
reinforced by the Kremlin’s propaganda machine.  
 If there is any intellectual or moral merit in Foundations of Geopolitics, it is 
Dugin’s rejection of the creeping American monoculture that has been a 
byproduct of globalization and the neoliberal world order and is profoundly 
unpopular in many countries and societies across the world. A rise in ultra-
nationalism, reactionary politics, and fascism, enabled and promoted by elites in 
different countries, as a misguided way to reclaim supposedly threatened 
traditional cultural identities, has been one negative result of neoliberal 
economics, as well as covert or overt support for authoritarian and corrupt regimes 
that maintain a neoliberal economic system. Thus, in some respects, the ideas in 
Foundations of Geopolitics, and their reception in Russia and elsewhere can be 
viewed in Chalmers Johnson’s language as blowback. Indeed, the blowback goes 
deep into American history, as many of the ideas Dugin adopts from Nazi 
ideologues were originally borrowed from Americans, particularly in regard to 
racial theories and Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier Thesis, which championed 







Chapter 2: Biography of Dugin Prior to the Collapse of the 
Soviet Union 
Born in Moscow, 1962, Aleksandr Dugin enjoyed a privileged upbringing. 
There is little information on his father, Geli, who left Dugin’s mother, Galina, 
when he was three. Galina was a doctor and Geli was an officer in the military, 
although his exact role is unclear. Dugin told British journalist Charles Clover, who 
has written the definitive English language biography of Dugin, Black Wind, White 
Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism, that Geli was a general in the GRU 
(military intelligence), but also that towards the end of his career, he worked for 
the customs police.5 Dunlop writes that he was a colonel, and cites one source also 
stating that he worked in the GRU.6  
Regardless of his exact position, per Clover, Dugin’s friends are “adamant 
that his father must have been someone of rank…the family had the accoutrements 
of prestige—a nice dacha, relatives with nice dachas, and access to opportunities.”7 
                                                
5 Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 157. 
 
6 John Dunlop, “Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics,” Demokratizatsiya, 
January 31, 2004, https://tec.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/aleksandr-dugins-foundations-geopolitics. 
 
7 Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 156. 
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For those Soviet citizens who were born before World War II and grew up during 
the profound social and economic uncertainty generated by Stalin’s purges and 
collectivization before the war, this was a time of stability and comfort, with 
families no longer having to share communal housing due to the widespread 
construction of khrushchyovkas. Additionally, although there was not a great 
variety of food, it was affordable and famines were firmly a feature of the past, 
healthcare was free, and modern appliances like refrigerators and televisions were 
now common in middle class households. Clover notes that “Dugin and his 
generation were the first to grow up with the accoutrements of a normal middle-
class lifestyle,” however, despite these material comforts, “Soviet life in the 1970s 
was like America in the 1950s: ideological rigid, materialist, one-dimensional and 
dull.”8 
Dugin, a precocious teenager with a knack for languages, rebelled 
outlandishly against this conformity. Clover reports that many of Dugin’s close 
friends and associates from the 1980s remember well their first meetings with him, 
as he cut a very striking figure:  
He sported a well-trimmed goatee beard and a simple pudding-bowl haircut 
with a straight fringe—an affectation popular in Russian intellectual circles 
of the time and known as a skobka or ‘parenthesis’ haircut. It evoked the 
simple and austere style of the medieval peasant, much like the nineteenth-
century Slavophiles inhabited St. Petersburg mansions wearing peasant 
murmolka caps. He had an erect bearing and a habit of trilling his ‘rs’ a little 
too heavily in a sign of aristocratic affectation; he sometimes accented this 
                                                




pose by speaking French. Most impressively, he often wore ‘galife’ 
trousers—the jodhpur like breeches of a cavalry officer of a century before.9  
 
The charismatic young Dugin, who at the time went everywhere with his 
guitar, made his debut in the ‘schizoid’ underground bohemian scene of Moscow, 
appearing at the dacha of Sergey Zhigalkin, a translator of Heidegger, where he 
announced his presence with this song:10 
The fucking end of the Sovdep 
Is just around the corner 
Two million in the river 
Two million in the oven 
Our revolvers will not misfire11 
When Dugin performed, it was under the name ‘Hans Sievers,’ taken in 
honor of the former Reichsgeschaftsfuher, Wolfram Sievers, the director of the 
Ahnererbe, which was an organization established by Heinrich Himmler to 
research paranormal and mystical phenomena. The real Sievers was hanged in 1947 
after being found guilty of gruesomely experimenting on concentration camp 
prisoners at the Nuremberg trials. This loathsome character provided the basis for 
Dugin’s alter-ego, which Clover describes rather generously, as being “composed of 
as many antisocial elements as its creator could find—a total and malevolent 
rebellion,” this rebellion was aimed “not just against the Soviet Union, but against 
                                                
9 Ibid, 158. 
 
10 Dugin is an admirer of Heidegger and has written extensively on him later in his career. He may 
have been emulating Heidegger’s habit of wearing Bavarian peasant clothing as well. 
 
11 Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 154. 
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convention and public taste.”12 This depiction makes it seem as if Dugin was just a 
Soviet Sid Vicious, armored in Nazi imagery, but this belies Dugin’s meaningful 
embrace and understanding of Nazi ideology. Another song performed by Dugin 
vividly illustrates this: 
Forward men, violent and rude 
We are inspired by the swastika in the night 
We see how your dead bodies dance the tango in the gas oven 
How nice and fresh the roses 
As happy and cheerful as the Russian forest 
On the last journey on the Via Dolarosa 
Goes the SS division13 
Dugin told Clover in 2005 that this alter-ego and his habit of spouting ‘Heil 
Hitlers’ regularly in public was motivated by a “shamanistic crisis of self-
actualization…I was completely normal in every sense: morally, rationally, 
psychologically. “14 Of course, Dugin’s self-diagnosis as ‘normal,’ is highly 
subjective. But his fondness for the tenets and figures of Nazism and his 
admiration of its aesthetics and belief in the occult, paranormal, and esoteric 
persistently emerge in his writings and Foundations of Geopolitics is no exception 
to this weltanschauung. In fact, a great deal of his ideological underpinning was 
manifested in Hans Sievers—the ahistorical mix of Slavophilia (through his 
haircut), aristocratic affectations, militarism, and Nazism.  
                                                
12 Ibid, 158. 
 
13 Ibid, 160. 
 
14 Ibid, 155. 
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 The crew of bohemian misfits, weirdos, poets, would-be philosophers, and 
hangers on of all sorts that Dugin enmeshed himself into was led by Evgeny 
Golovin. Golovin was, according to Arkady Rovner (a member of the circle), “a 
Moscow-based mystic who joined the circle in the 1960s,” he described Golovin to 
Clover as a “natural Russian phenomenon—a classic combination of aesthetic 
snobbishness, esoteric misanthropy, alcoholic inspiration, plus a hot peppering of 
black fantasy and American horror movies.”15 Of course, mysticism in of itself is 
not inherently bad, and there have been mystics who cared deeply about the 
human condition such as Tolstoy and Gandhi. But there was more to Golovin than 
just these traits, he was also, according to Clover, “completely obsessed with the 
Third Reich, seeing in it a monstrous and mystical yin to humanity’s yang…he 
began to refer to himself as the Fuhrer.”16 Golovin even “named his followers ‘the 
Black Order of the SS’ and told them all to wear Nazi paraphernalia. He hung a 
picture of Hitler on the wall.”17 “There was nothing anti-Semitic about it,” 
according to Igor Dudinsky (another member of the circle), “There were lots of 
Jews at these gatherings. We would all shout ‘Seig Heil’ and ‘Heil Hitler’ and all we 
meant was ‘down with Soviet power!’”18 This assertion is ridiculous, as Nazism is 
and was impossible to separate from its anti-Semitism, but anti-Semitism is like 
                                                









any ideology, and Jews themselves can be anti-Semitic, assuming Dudinsky is 
being truthful about this. The group sought out anything esoteric, occult, and 
mystical and their interests caromed between any new discovery, particularly 
when it came to banned topics and authors.  
Dugin in particular was greatly influenced by the works of René Guénon, a 
French philosopher of the twentieth century who espoused ‘traditionalism’ and an 
idea that all world religions were expressions of a single type of metaphysics. 
Masha Gessen, in her seminal The Future is History, writes that for Dugin and 
Guénon: “Modernity was the opposite of Tradition,” what “Dugin was seeking 
could be located only by stripping away all views and things contemporary and 
working backward. Another word for ‘modern’ might be ‘Western.’”19 Dugin 
learned Italian, just so he could translate the works of another great influence, 
Baron Julius Evola, an Italian aristocrat who worked with the SS, as Mussolini was 
too moderate for his taste, and he inspired fascist, right-wing terror groups in post-
war Italy. He believed in ‘spiritual racism,’ which would divide humanity into 
castes based on their function in society and that war was a crucible through 
which humanity could gain a higher form of spiritual existence.20 Dugin would 
adopt this idea of a purifying war to restore traditional societies in his geopolitics. 
                                                
19 Masha Gessen, The Future is History (New York: Riverhead Books, 2017), 53. 
 
20 Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 159. 
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Despite his capacity for languages, Dugin received little formal academic training, 
as he was expelled from the Moscow Civil Aviation Academy after two years. 
These ‘intellectual’ pursuits, his nonconforming circle of friends, and his 
provocative performances were likely to land Dugin in trouble sooner or later and 
it happened in 1983 after a performance of ‘Fuck the Damned Sovdep’ at a small 
concert. Zhigalkin and Dudinsky, who were in his reactionary circle, both believe 
Dugin’s father tipped off the KGB, who brought him in for interrogation the next 
day.21 Dugin was released after ratting on a man who had given him an archive of 
samizdat (published underground) writings by Mamleev and was released; 
however, his father was transferred to the customs service, a severe demotion, and 
never spoke to his son again. According to Clover, this was the climax of a long 
series of disagreements between father and son, writing that:  
According to Dugin’s close friend and collaborator Gaidar Dzhemal, Geli 
Dugin had, on more than one occasion intervened from a high-ranking 
position in the Soviet state to get his son out of trouble…Geli was Dugin’s 
‘get out of jail free’ card, which allowed his son to violate regularly the 
orthodoxies of Soviet life and get away with it. Undoubtedly this fueled 
complicated feelings of both entitlement and further resentment at the 
unfair privilege.22  
 
This final break with his father meant that Dugin was now on his own, his 
writings, ‘artistic’ pursuits, and social circles meant he would not be accepted into 
                                                
21 Ibid, 161. 
 
22 Ibid, 156. 
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Soviet academia or the political establishment, even if he had desired it, and Dugin 
worked menial jobs to make ends meet. 
Rescuing Dugin from obscurity was Dmitry Vasilyev, the head of the 
Pamyat (Monument) organization. Pamyat was founded in 1979 as a relatively 
apolitical organization devoted to preserving historical monuments, an 
uncontroversial task, as the Soviet Union by the Brezhnev era had moved away 
from destroying historical buildings, mainly churches and other religious building 
as well as Tsarist monuments and ‘bourgeoisie’ architecture. Vasilyev took control 
of Pamyat in 1986, following a heated speech where he absurdly accused ‘’Zionists’ 
of seeking the destruction of architectural landmarks.”23 Under his leadership, 
Pamyat “mutated from a gaggle of intelligentsia curiosities into a crypto-fascist 
street gang—an agglomeration of football hooligans and middle-class aesthetes.”24 
This mélange of anti-social elements constituted an organization that “would also 
be a sort of boot camp for a new generation of nationalist extremists.”25 According 
to Dugin, “It was Pamyat that gave birth to all other patriotic movements.”26  
Pamyat also gave Dugin entrée into the confusing and often contradictory 
world of perestroika politics. He joined Pamyat in 1987 and quickly was appointed 
to the organization’s central board, along with Dzhemal, due to their intellectual 
                                                






26 Ibid, 163. 
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background, which was much more extensive than most members. Pamyat 
emulated the outfits of the notoriously anti-Semitic Black Hundreds of the Tsarist 
era and so did their racist ideology, with Vasilyev reading the Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion at meetings, railing against Zionist plots to ‘alcoholize’ Russia, and 
on one occasion, according to Clover, asserting that, “Adolf Eichmann was 
‘representative of the Jewish people.’”27 Eichmann was not Jewish and this is a vivid 
indication of Vasilyev’s derangement. 
Pamyat did not gain its power due to the skillful leadership and wisdom of 
Vasilyev, who was in Dugin’s opinion, “an actor and a schizophrenic,” rather it was 
a krysha (literally, roof, but meaning official protection), likely provided by 
someone or some group within the KGB that supported Pamyat and its activities.28 
According to Clover, Dugin confessed that “Vasilyev said that there was a krysha in 
the central committee. But I don’t know whether it’s true because he did not make 
me privy to that.”29 The facts remain that Pamyat was the first political 
organization allowed in the Soviet Union aside from the Communist party and it 
held the first unsanctioned public rally in Soviet history when 500 people rallied in 
front of the Kremlin in May 1987, so it must have had some sort of official 
protection, if not the endorsement, from a relatively powerful figure or figures, 
likely on the central committee. Clover speculates that nationalists in the ‘Russian 
                                                







Party,’ a group of military and political officials sympathetic to Russian 
nationalism, “turned a blind eye to Vasilyev, seeing in him a potential ally who was 
worthy of support.”30 This is supported by the fact that “Pamyat mercilessly 
criticized and harassed the hardliners’ opponents such as Alexander Yakovlev, 
Gorbachev’s right-hand man and chief liberal reformer.”31 Another theory 
proposed by Clover is that Boris Yeltsin, an insatiably ambitious politician who had 
just been appointed first secretary of the Moscow Communist Party city 
committee, was looking for allies wherever he could find them as he sought to 
climb the ranks of power and challenge Gorbachev. For evidence, Clover notes that 
Yeltsin had a meeting with Pamyat after their May 1987 demonstration and at the 
meeting he made a pledge “to reduce the number of limitchiki (migrant workers) 
in Moscow, and to look into registering Pamyat as a society. And it may not be a 
coincidence that after Yeltsin was forced out by Gorbachev in 1987, Pamyat began 
to disintegrate.”32 Dugin and Dzhemal were expelled from the movement in 1988, 
due to an internal power struggle in the group when Dugin and Dzhemal sought to 
replace Vasilyev as leaders of the organization.33 
Pamyat was the first organization protected by elements within the KGB 
who were preparing a rearguard action to control the democratic process 
                                                




32 Ibid, 166. 
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accompanying the collapse of the Soviet system, which was becoming more and 
more apparent to those in the intelligence services. From behind the scenes, they 
attempted to create and control different parties from across the political 
spectrum as a way to restrict and manage any nascent democratic movement. 
Clover asserts that had Pamyat, “not been led so erratically by an obvious 
sociopath, Pamyat could ultimately have been registered as an independent 
party.”34 Instead the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), which was, and is, 
as liberal and democratic as the Holy Roman Empire was holy and Roman, would 
be the first party registered. While Vasilyev’s madness was no act, the leader of the 
LDPR, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, an ex-KGB agent who was expelled from Turkey for 
espionage in 1970, cynically copied his political persona. Clover notes that Dugin, 
“an associate of both men, insists that Zhirinovsky used to listen to tapes of 
Vasilyev’s speeches and learned his trademark demagogic style from him,” but, 
Zhirinovsky’s “insanity is purely for public consumption,” as opposed to Vasilyev’s 
authentic madness.35 He finished third place in the 1991 Russian presidential 
elections, and during the 1990s the LPDR at one time held a quarter of the seats in 
the Duma, making it, according to Clover, “one of the most successful of several 
joint Communist Party-KGB political projects to anticipate and attempt to control 
political reform.”36 Presently, the LPDR remains an important controlled 
                                                




36 Ibid, 171. 
 
 19 
opposition party. Some of these political projects, like the LPDR, were designed to 
win elections; others were designed to avoid them.”37 Political projects helmed by 




















Chapter 3: Bespredel (Lawlessness) 1989-1999 
 
It is difficult to overstate the crisis that struck Russian society during this 
period. Svetlana Stephenson notes that “Russian society went through some of the 
most drastic poverty and welfare reversals in the world.”38 GDP fell by over 40 
percent and industrial production was halved in the five years following the 
beginning of privatization.39 A vivid indicator of the scale of this crisis is how it 
affected the most vulnerable—between 1992 and 1995 62 percent of Russian 
children were living below poverty line.40 Hyperinflation ran rampant, destroying 
the savings of many Russians. The almost complete absence of state governance 
and erosion of societal norms created an atmosphere that allowed criminal groups 
to expand and flourish. Competition between groups was fierce and the lack of an 
effective or independent police force created circumstances where violence 
spiraled out of control. Acts that once would have been assaults escalated into 
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murders and firearms became widely available due to the breakdown of the Soviet 
military. 
The crisis was exacerbated by bad American advice and a lack of real 
assistance. Jeffrey Sachs, the Harvard economist often blamed for many of the 
economic reforms known as “shock therapy” which crippled governance in Russia 
and led to vast inequality, noted “that market reforms could not, by themselves, 
solve deep structural and societal problems, and that large-scale help would be 
needed from the West.”41 This help would not be forthcoming, although to his 
credit at least Sachs recommended it. Writing in 2012, Sachs argued:  
My estimate, which became somewhat notorious at the time [Summer 
1991], was that the Soviet Union (and later the successor republics) would 
need an infusion of Western aid (envisioned as grants and highly 
concessional loans) of around $30 billion per year over five years, or $150 
billion in total. That is still a number that I would endorse. Alas, nothing 
like that ever materialized.42  
 
The Soviet political and economic system was stagnant and ideologically 
moribund, but at least it provided a strong social safety net for population. Still, in 
an article he wrote for The Economist January 13, 1990, Sachs writes:  
Eastern countries must reject any lingering ideas about a "third way", such 
as a chimerical "market socialism" based on public ownership or worker 
self-management, and go straight for a western-style market economy. Two, 
Western Europe, for its part, must be ready and eager to work with them, 
providing debt relief and finances for restructuring, to bring their reformed 
economies in as part of a unified European market.43  
                                                








This clearly illustrates Sach’s lack of thought, at best, regarding what would 
happen if radical economic reforms removing all trace of the previous system went 
ahead without any significant help from Western European countries and the 
United States.  
Stephen Kotkin makes a case that even if substantial American assistance 
had been forthcoming, it would not have been able to make a significant difference 
due to the crumbling of Soviet institutions and the atmosphere of near universal 
corruption combined with the pervasiveness of organized crime. According to 
Kotkin: “the self-assigned role of the West in ‘promoting’ but not financing with 
direct investments Russia’s ‘transition’ had the effect of empowering anti-Western 
sentiment inside Russia, and anti-Russian sentiment in the West.”44 The result, per 
Kotkin, was that “raising expectations wildly proved to be a self-defeating 
endeavor. Ultimately it was ‘reform,’ rather than the Soviet inheritance, that took 
the blame for the country’s lingering woes.”45 This has helped foster Soviet 
nostalgia in Russia, particularly amongst pensioners and anti-American feelings. 
Regardless of the economic realities or the potential impossibility of reform of 
Soviet institutions in a free market system, the perception—created through 
American hubris—was that “reform,” and by extension the West was at fault for 
the deprivations of the bespredel era.  
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Seymour Hersh wrote about this presciently in 1994, quoting an anonymous 
senior administration official involved in denuclearization efforts, “there is little to 
be optimistic about in Russia." He adds: 
Hopefully, we will not repeat the 1930s in Germany…You have a contracting 
empire. The bulk of people are doing worse under freedom than ever 
before. People forget how primitive Russia is—it's Third World. Russians 
are dreaming about indoor plumbing, having a little car, not living with 
their parents. They can now travel. But they have no money. They can now 
vote. But for whom? They can now say what they want. But so what? 
They're not better off.46  
 
The slow, gradual, but incremental increases in standard of living that citizens 
enjoyed under the Soviet Union had not just ended, but they had been definitively 
reversed. 
In the absence of governance, street gangs and criminal organizations 
stepped into the void. Several key aspects mark the second transformation of these 
quasi-entrepreneurial gangs into true autonomous-ruling regimes, as they had still 
not become sufficiently enmeshed in national and regional power structures. The 
entrance of gang leaders into the oligarch class shifted that. Signaling a trend 
across Russia as a whole, gang membership became increasingly stratified. In a 
gang, a percentage of all profits were deposited in the gang’s general fund, known 
as an obschak. As obschaks grew in size, gang leadership began to invest in 
legitimate and semi-legitimate businesses, often at cut-rate levels due the lack of 
existing wealth during privatization. Leaders and their lieutenants obtained 
                                                




positions at all levels of all political office and in different branches in the civil 
service. These positions were obtained through blat (Russian slang for reciprocal 
favors) and bribery—one member of the 29th Kompleks, a powerful gang in Kazan, 
recounted that roughly 30 percent of obschak spending outside of investment, 
went into bribes and “public relations,” 30 percent went towards assisting 
imprisoned members, 30 percent was spent on pay for civilian employees or 
contracts for non-gang criminal work, such as contract killings, and the final 10 
percent was spent on assets like cars, phones, and guns.47 This system allowed 
gang leadership to enter elite society and accumulate political power, wealth, and 
prestige, while rank and file gang members at the street level received fewer 
opportunities for advancement as the privatization window closed. Unlike the vory 
(professional criminals who abided by a code dating back decades), who shunned 
contact with non-criminals, these groups became entangled in their local 
communities and provided some employment, protection, and social services 
(charitable giving that was accounted for under “public relations”) and in return 
they were tolerated by residents, who viewed them as a “necessary evil” and 
preferable to bespredel.48  
Because of the lack of governance from national or local institutions, across 
Russia gruppirovki (organized criminal groups) stepped in to provide a variety of 
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forms of extralegal governance, albeit often in a predatory fashion. Unlike in other 
societies where organized crime became comparatively pervasive, for example the 
mafia throughout much of the modern history of Calabria and Sicily or the cartels 
in 1980s Colombia and contemporary Mexico, in Russia organized crime 
organizations infiltrated structures and institutions originating in state socialism. 
This is significant, because the organs of state socialism influenced life at 
every level of social activity and had a great impact on daily life through the 
provision of social services, direction of the economy, and control of the military. 
When these structures were debilitated by the Soviet Union’s collapse and 
privatization, the public lost trust in them and contracts became impossible to 
enforce. In this vacuum, the gruppirovki emerged as defenders of the legitimacy of 
certain contracts due to their participation in more legitimate business activity. 
Businesses accepted kryshy with gangs to protect themselves both from the gang 
offering protection and that gang’s rivals. The gangs also provided loans to 
businesses and individuals, but all these services came with the cost of increased 
dependency on the gang for dispute resolution and other matters. Stephenson 
asserts that in these circumstances, “generally, the capacity of organized gangs to 
appropriate resources derives less from demand for their protection than from 
their ability to establish their own systems of domination.”49 In many cases, these 
“systems of domination” were the only form of governance in the bespredel of the 
                                                




1990s and in some areas, they were indistinguishable from state systems or more 
powerful than them locally, especially in some smaller regional municipalities. 
Similarly, in accordance with the ideas of Helmke and Levitsky, the influence of 
the “substitutive informal institutions” of the gangs waned as formal institutions 
grew in strength.50 As organized crime groups became more enmeshed in state 
power structures, they grew less visible at the street level; however, they had a 
strong influence on how law enforcement organizations and legal institutions 
operated and often infiltrated these institutions themselves.  
This combination of norms and strategies coalesced into a nebulous code of 
conduct referred to as poniatiia (understanding). As the translation implies, 
poniatiia is not a formal written code, but rather is socially learned and is taken for 
granted by those who abide by it. Poniatiia promotes a set of norms, many of 
which overlap with those of the earlier street level territorial elites and the vory. 
Self-control, in-group loyalty, obedience to the leader and avtorietity (senior gang 
leadership), misogyny, xenophobia, and the right to a private life outside of the 
group are some of the most prominent of these norms. For gang members and 
their dependents, poniatiia promotes a “Weberian patrimonial alliance,” where, 
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“like ancient and early medieval warrior coalitions, the gang is a male militant 
tribal alliance that is cement by quasi-kinship obligations and loyalties.”51  
The norms of poniatiia have a great deal of overlap with ‘traditionalist’ 
values that Dugin would set out in Foundations of Geopolitics. Indeed, many of his 
sponsors and patrons throughout this decade have close ties to these organized 
crime groups, as do many Russian oligarchs and senior politicians. Close ties were 
curated by intelligence agents and the leaders of the gruppirovki. Pamyat was the 
first organization to publicly appeal to ‘us vs. them’ sentiments and it easy to see 
how this mentality climbs geopolitical levels. Poniatiia relies on this mentality, as 
does, at the international level, racist ultra-nationalism, and at the global level, the 
planetary dualism of Eurasianism reflects this mindset as well. It should be no 
surprise that the ideology of Pamyat shared many of its characteristics with street 
gangs, although with an emphasis on overt fascism and anti-Semitism, and many 
of its members came from that section of society. Similarly, misogyny and a 
rejection of tolerance towards homosexuality is a core aspect of this ideology. 
These experiences have made many Russian more willing to sacrifice 
individual freedoms for stability—the appeal of authoritarianism. This is borne out 
in public opinion data. Today, popular Russian nationalism shares many normative 
values with poniatiia. In a Levada survey on attitudes towards migrants 67 percent 
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of respondents felt the government should do more to limit immigration.52 Views 
differed regarding specific migrants, with 48 percent of respondents stating they 
were neutral towards migrants from the Central Asian Republics and 38 percent 
felt negatively, with only ten percent responding that they sympathized with 
them.53 There were similar responses for migrants from Transcaucasia and the 
North Caucasus Republics, but attitudes were much more positive towards from 
ethnically Russian regions.54 Patriotism has risen under Putin, with 77 percent 
agreeing that they were definitely or probably proud of Russia in April, 2017.55 This 
is in stark contrast to the 48 percent who indicated the same responses in March, 
2006.56 Relatedly, 75 percent responded that they were very proud or somewhat 
proud to be a Russian citizen, in comparison with the 60 percent who responded 
in that fashion in August, 2004.57 Of course, such patriotic sentiments do not 
necessarily mean support for fascism or racist ultra-nationalism, but do reflect a 
general resurgence in national pride that was missing in the 1990s. As this 
resurgence has taken place under an authoritarian government that promotes a 
                                                















worldview that often aligns with the norms of poniatiia, it provides fertile soil for 



































Chapter 4: Biography of Dugin after the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union 
With the KGB and elements within the central committee sponsoring 
organizations for ideological renewal of the Communist Party and authoritarian 
alternatives across the political spectrum, it is important to note Dugin’s activities 
during this period and the extant of possible support from state elements. For 
Dugin, this period of time was full of opportunities, but he bitterly regretted the 
destruction of the Soviet Union. Dugin reflected to Clover on his participation in 
the crowd supporting the attempted coup in 1991 against Yeltsin, who had become 
the President of the Russian Federative Socialist Republic, “I understood that for 
the first time I am for the Soviet Union, just as it was about to die, I loved it.”58 The 
works of Lev Gumilyev, who would also be an influence on Foundations of 
Geopolitics, enjoyed incredible popularity during this period and the term 
‘Eurasianism’ was pervasive in Russian political discourse. Dugin explained the 
zeitgeist of the time: “The model of Soviet self-knowledge had broken…The society 
had lost its orientation. Everyone understood the necessity of change, but this 
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feeling was vague and no one knew what direction it would come from.”59 In 1990, 
Clover reports that the central committee funded a journal known as Continent 
Russia, with Dugin and Igor Dudinsky, his old friend from his bohemian Nazi days, 
as the editors.60 However, Continent Russia failed to reach a wide audience and the 
central committee lost interest in it. More successful were two books published 
with suspiciously large runs of 100,000 each: The Way of the Absolute, devoted to 
the traditionalist theories of Julius Evola and The Metaphysics of the Gospel, in 
which according to Clover, Dugin “called for a restoration of a medieval Byzantine 
social hierarchy, served by elite priest and warrior castes,” which mimics Evola’s 
spiritual racism.61 With the money earned, Dugin travelled to Europe to meet with 
far-right intellectuals and activists. Clover speculates on who provided the 
patronage for Dugin’s travels:  
Perhaps it was the project of a solitary romantic…more likely it was done 
with help from elements of the state that had an established track record, at 
precisely this time, of sponsoring right-wing ideological experiments.62 
 
 In Europe, the first thinker he met with was Alain de Benoist, a French 
writer who was a leading figure of the Nouvelle Droite. The Nouvelle Droite has 
been categorized as an attempt at keeping the flame of fascism alive on the 
continent, but also as for its anti-capitalist ideology that seeks to preserve 
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‘traditionalism,’ the rejection of modernism and materialism, and a plurality of 
cultures in the face of cultural homogenization as a result of globalization. 
Another facet of its ideology is the advocacy for empire as the alternative to the 
nation state. These sentiments would be reflected in Foundations of Geopolitics. 
Clover writes that, “among the thinkers most quoted by the New Right are quite a 
few ex-Nazis: philosopher Martin Heidegger, legal theorist Carl Schmitt, esoteric 
author Julius Evola, and scholar of ‘geopolitics’ Karl Haushofer.”63 All of these Nazi 
intellectuals (none were truly “ex” Nazis in their worldviews) are huge influences 
in Foundations of Geopolitics as well. Dugin met with other extreme figures like 
Robert Steuckers, the Belgian publisher Vouloir magazine, which supported 
apartheid and a ‘Greater Serbia.’64 The defense of ‘Greater Serbia’ against NATO 
would become a cause célèbre for Dugin and other Slavophilic Russians in the 
coming years. Jean-Francois Thiriart, a National Bolshevist who advocated for a 
European empire stretching from Vladivostok to Dublin was another extremist 
who Dugin sought out to meet.65 Dugin would include this theory in Foundations 
of Geopolitics and attribute it to Thiriart. In Paris, he also finally met in person his 
literary idol Yury Mamleev, the founder of the Yuzhinsky group that Dugin had 
flamboyantly participated in, and through him was introduced to Alexander 
Prokhanov, a writer and propagandist who was nicknamed ‘The Nightingale of the 
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General Staff,’ due to his close friendship with top Red Army Generals.66 
Prokhanov was deeply involved in the military’s efforts to cultivate deeper ties to 
nationalist, racist ultranationalist, and fascist groups.  
 According to Clover, following the series of retreats and missteps that 
marked the collapse of the Soviet Union, “the lesson learned by the army was that 
they could not trust their political masters.”67 They began casting for new allies 
and Prokhanov helped them forge closer links to reactionary groups. These groups 
had failed rather disastrously in open elections, for the most part, and per Clover, 
“the lesson the nationalists drew was that, faced with inevitable democratic 
political reforms, the only way they could triumph was through non-democratic 
means.”68 ‘Nationalist’ is too soft a descriptor for many of these groups, as some 
were overtly racist and expressed a fascist ideology and worldview. One of the 
more immediate results of these forces converging during a time of state weakness 
was the attempted coup of August 1991, which failed rather ridiculously due to the 
incompetence of the plotters and prompted Dugin’s belated paean to the USSR. 
This coup was led by Soviet hardliners, the same ‘Yesterday Forever’ forces 
mentioned by Yakovlev and potentially orchestrated, and certainly supported by 
Prokhanov. 
                                                
66 Ibid, 182. 
 





Here Dugin’s conspiratorial worldview and actual American skullduggery 
intersect. Seymour Hersh wrote in the Atlantic in the 1994 that:  
In early spring of 1991, well before the August coup attempt, the Bush 
Administration learned of the plotting against Mikhail Gorbachev and 
turned to Yeltsin as a possible alternative leader. Over the next few months 
U.S. intelligence agencies were assigned to help Yeltsin, then the President 
of Russia, improve his personal and communications security. When the 
coup finally took place, President Bush ordered that essential 
communications intelligence be provided to Yeltsin—over the bitter 
protests of the National Security Agency, which is responsible for such top-
secret intercepts. This help enabled Yeltsin to emerge from the crisis a 
triumphant hero. The transfer of intelligence was conducted under 
stringent secrecy and the House and Senate intelligence committees were 
not formally notified—as is required by law.69  
 
Similarly, Clover notes Yeltsin, “seemed to have been informed in real time of all 
communications the GKChP plotters had passed between one another.”70  
Following the coup’s failure, which likely would have occurred anyways do 
the amateurishness of the plot, Dugin was appointed to a lectureship of the Soviet 
Academy of the General Staff (now the Russian Academy of the General Staff) in 
1992. It was led by General Igor Rodionov, and Clover notes, “the Academy was the 
premier officer-training establishment for the Soviet (now Russian) army, but for 
Rodionov it had been a humiliating demotion.”71 Rodionov, a decorated soldier, 
had been shuffled off to the Academy after an incident in Tbilisi where troops 
under his command killed 21 pro-democracy protestors in 1989, one of the 
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bloodiest events during the USSR’s collapse. Embittered by his demotion, 
Rodionov began to favor nationalist, far-right sentiments, and Clover asserts that 
as a result the academy: “became a hive of opposition to the government of Boris 
Yeltsin and liberal reformers—a bastion of hardcore reactionary zeal that 
supported Dugin’s work and nourished him with strategic insights,” while Dugin, 
“fed generals with the new thinking of the European extreme right.”72 Dugin’s 
rapid transformation from outsider to insider had now begun in earnest, and 
Clover argues “within the space of a vertiginous three years he had gone from 
being a maladjusted fringe radical and member of a banned political organization 
to lecturing at the heart of the former USSR’s security establishment.”73 As Dugin 
had ingratiated himself with Rodionov, he was well positioned to take advantage 
when Rodionov was named defense minister in 1996 and served until 1997 as part 
of a resurgence in fortunes for the old guard of the Soviet defense establishment. 
According to Clover, Rodionov was “the hardliner’s hardliner.”74 Dunlop observes 
that, “it may be significant that Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics was written 
during the time that Rodionov was serving as defense minister.”75 
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Dugin, a political parvenu, was himself amazed by the swiftness of the 
changes to his fortunes during this period, reflecting that, “I had no social status, it 
was incredible to think they saw me as an equal, or could learn something for me,” 
but he realized, “they were utterly lost, they had no concept of the enemy, they 
needed to know who the enemy was.”76 If there is one thing consistent in Dugin’s 
writings it is the identification of the enemy—the Atlanticists. This would be the 
focus of his first major work, ostensibly co-written with General Klokotov of the 
Academy of the General Staff, Foundations of Geopolitics. On its release, it became 
somewhat of a national phenomenon with a wide print run and achieved a status 
as “one of the more influential works of the post-communist period.”77 Clover 
reports it “sold out in four editions.”78 More importantly, Foundations of 
Geopolitics reached the people most likely to shape and implement Russian 
strategy—Russia’s officer corps and senior military leadership. Clover reported in 
2016 that Foundations of Geopolitics continued to be taught at the General Staff 
Academy and other military universities in Russia.79 For his hardliner patrons, 
Foundations of Geopolitics provided intellectual justification for their statist and 
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expansionary tendencies, and Dugin’s ideas were eagerly received by the ‘yesterday 























Chapter 5: Eurasianists versus Atlanticists 
 
A rather obscure English politician and academic from the first half of the 
twentieth century, Halford Mackinder, provided an ideological basis for Dugin’s 
worldview. In The Geopolitical Axis of History, Mackinder, divides the world into 
civilizational types categorized by their location in the Heartland, the Inner 
Crescent, or the Outer Crescent. The Outer Crescent is best represented by Great 
Britain and later the United States, nations that have relied on their navies and are 
defined by their coastal characteristics. These nations economically rely on 
commerce. The Heartland, which according to Mackinder, stretches from Moscow 
to Paris, is continental, and economic activity is reliant upon the land and a close 
connection to the soil. The Heartland is location of the ‘geographical pivot of 
history.’ The Inner Crescent generally is composed of the lands that lie between 
the Outer Crescent and the Heartland and include Western and Southern Europe, 
the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent. According to Dugin, government 
type is determined by location: 
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The ‘outer crescent’ is liberal democracy; ‘the geographical pivot of history’ 
is non-democratic authoritarianism; the inner crescent is an intermediate 
model—a combination of both ideological systems.80 
 
According to Dugin, the qualities of Heartland civilization are incarnate in 
the Russian territory and people. The result is a Manichean dualism, in which the 
Atlanticist mission throughout history has been to keep down Eurasia. Dugin 
writes:  
It is not hard to understand why exactly Mackinder established in Anglo-
Saxon geopolitics, which in half a century would be the United States and 
NATO, this essential tendency: to impede in any way capable the very 
possibility of the creation of a Eurasian Bloc—established through a union 
of Russia and Germany—a geopolitical reinforcing of the heartland and its 
expansion. The West’s sustained Russophobia in the twentieth century is 
not just ideological, but also geopolitical in character. Still, taking into 
account Mackinder’s connection between civilizational types and these 
geopolitical characteristics, or other forces, one could acquire a formula for 
which geopolitical terminology is easily translated into ideological 
terminology.81 
 
Here, it is also important to note Dugin’s belief in the translatability between 
ideology and geopolitics, effectively resulting in no separation between the two. 
For him, ideology is determined by geopolitics, and geopolitics are determined by 
ideology. 
Lebensraum and Raumsinn 
This deterministic approach is especially evident in Dugin’s embrace of the 
concept of Lebensraum. Lebensraum or “Living Space,” was conceptualized by 
                                                







Friedrich Ratzel, who Dugin celebrates as the “father of geopolitics.”82 Dugin writes 
that in his work, Anthro-Geography, Ratzel elucidated his fundamental idea: 
“There is a connection between the evolution of peoples and demographics with 
physical geographic data; the influence that physical terrain has on a people’s 
culture, political development, and so on.”83 Ratzel considers states to function 
similarly to biological organisms, growing, living, and dying according to their 
natural merits in a manner similar to survival of the fittest in Darwinian evolution. 
Accordingly, Dugin writes: 
Ratzel’s ‘organic’ approach is in relation to its space (Raum). This ‘space’ 
brings over a cardinal material category in a new quality, becoming the 
‘Living Sphere,’ ‘Living Space’ (Lebensraum), in a ‘Geobiological 
Environment.’” A state gains Lebensraum by naturally obeying what Ratzel 
terms the ‘laws of expansion,’ the most significant of which is that ‘the state 
expands by consuming and absorbing units of lesser political significance.’84  
 
This removes any notion of ethics from international relations, with all states 
simply striving to achieve maximal Lebensraum. This term would be taught to 
Hitler by Karl Haushofer personally during his visits to Hitler and his student Hess 
while they were imprisoned in Landsberg. Haushofer is also a major influence on 
Dugin and will be discussed in more detail later. 









In tandem with Lebensraum is the concept of Raumsinn. A more nebulous 
concept, Raumsinn is related to a special connection between people and land. 
Dugin observes:  
For him [Ratzel], it was important to establish a conceptual instrument for 
advocating awareness of the history of the state and nation and their 
relationship to the land. In practice, he sought the awakening of ‘Raumsinn’ 
(the spirit of the land), among the leaders of Germany, who regarded 
geopolitics as a dry academic discipline merely representing abstraction.85  
 
Dugin views as necessary the awakening of Raumsinn in the Eurasian 
peoples, particularly the ‘Holy Rus,’ and his personal goal is to provoke this latent 
Raumsinn. Ratzel would die long before the rise of the Third Reich, but his ideas—
and their continuation under his student Rudolf Kjellen—would have great 
influence over two of its more famous geopoliticians—Karl Haushofer and Carl 
Schmitt. 
Conservative Revolutionaries  
For Dugin, conservative has the connotation of allegiance to absolute power 
and the defense of religion at the expense of individual rights, rather than the 
traditional American conservatism of small government and respect for habeas 
corpus, the rule of law, and property and individual rights. The works of Friedrich 
Ratzel and his student Rudolf Kjellen, as well as Mackinder’s heartland theory, 
were the primary influences on the geopolitical writings and worldview of Karl 
Haushofer. Haushofer was an army officer who served as the military attaché to 




Japan from 1908-1910 and was a capable officer on both the Western and Eastern 
fronts in World War I. Afterwards he became the director of the institute for 
geopolitics at the University of Munich, where Rudolf Hess became his disciple. 
Dugin does reference this connection, remarking: 
Through his student Rudolf Hess, he met Hitler right after he was 
imprisoned following his failed putsch. It is an unconfirmed historical 
opinion that Haushofer played a part in writing sections of “Mein Kampf” 
relating to geopolitics. But, a conceptual analysis shows a significant 
difference between Haushofer’s geopolitical outlook and Hitler’s simplistic, 
racist and propagandistic passages.86  
 
However, it is a fact that, after the Beer Hall Putsch, Haushofer regularly visited 
Hess and Hitler in Landsberg Prison. During summer and fall 1924, Haushofer 
spent many Wednesdays conducting seminars for the two failed putschists. Hitler 
later claimed that: “Landsberg was my university [education] at state expense.”87 
Given the timing, and Hitler’s respect for Haushofer, it is unlikely that Haushofer’s 
lessons had no impact on the content of Mein Kampf. Haushofer had a deep 
respect for Japanese culture and did not share Nazi racism against Asian peoples, 
but, despite his wife’s Jewish heritage, which would cause problems for his career 
as Nazi racial policies deepened, and his refusal to divorce her, he was an avowed 
anti-Semite. 
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 Dugin offers an apologetic description of Haushofer’s life and works to 
sugarcoat them to a Russian public and military justifiably proud of their defeat of 
Germany in the Great Patriotic War and cognizant of the horrific sacrifices that 
were made to achieve it. He tries to distinguish Haushofer’s geopolitics from the 
genocidal geopolitics of Hitler and Himmler. Dugin glosses over Haushofer’s role 
in popularizing the term Lebensraum and does not mention Haushofer’s own 
racist beliefs (or his wife’s ancestry). Instead, he emphasizes Haushofer’s advocacy 
for a “New Eurasian Order,” which would be led by a “joint civilizational effort of 
two continental powers—Russia and Germany” to “structure continental space 
around the World Island so as to completely remove itself from under the 
influence of ‘Sea Powers.’”88 Haushofer did indeed promote a Berlin-Rome-
Moscow-Tokyo axis; however, this is belied somewhat by his star pupil Hess’s 
quixotic attempt to secure a peace with the United Kingdom via parachute.  
Dugin rationalizes Haushofer’s employment of the term Lebensraum as not 
necessitating an expansion into Russian lands, but rather offers an explanation 
that: “the expansion of German Lebensraum was planned by Haushofer, not for the 
sake of colonizing Russian lands, but for the taming of gigantic unsettled Asiatic 
spaces and the reorganization of the land of eastern Europe.”89 He explains that 
despite Haushofer’s theoretical support for a Moscow-Berlin alliance: 
                                                







In practice, everything did not wash out so cleanly. The purely scientific 
logic of Haushofer, logically led to the necessity of a ‘continental bloc’ with 
Moscow, collided with the majority of other tendencies and qualities 
inherent in the German national establishment. It was the strictly racist 
outlook of history, which infected Hitler himself. This outlook considered 
racial affinities to be the most important factors, not geographical or 
geopolitical qualities. The Anglo-Saxon peoples—England and the USA—
were viewed in this case as the natural allies of the Germans because they 
were closer ethnically. Slavs and especially non-white Eurasian peoples 
were turned into racial enemies.90  
 
As a result, Nazi Germany missed an opportunity for creating the continental bloc, 
per Dugin, because “National-Socialist racism fell into direct contradiction with 
geopolitics, or more precisely, implicitly nudging Germans to their inverse, anti-
Eurasian, talassocratic strategy.”91 
Despite Haushofer’s preference for a continental bloc led by Germany, but 
with a friendly orientation towards Japan and the Soviet Union, he acquiesced to 
and endorsed the prevailing Nazi ideology. Although not the founder of the SS and 
creator of the Thule society he has alleged to have been, he is guilty of actively 
participating and aiding the Nazi regime as his ideas of imperial conquest based on 
deterministic geopolitics were a pillar of Nazi foreign policy and ideology.  
Haushofer’s own family became a victim of the Nazi regime—his son 
Albrecht was executed for participation in a plot against Hitler’s life in 1944, 
Haushofer was imprisoned, and in 1946 he and his wife committed suicide. In the 







last words of his suicide note Haushofer confessed: “I want to be forgotten and 
forgotten.”92 Alas, with his resurrection by Dugin his wish remains not granted. 
The Chief Counsel for the American Government at the Nuremberg Trials, Sidney 
Alderman alleged:  
Haushofer was Hitler’s intellectual godfather… his was a driving dynamic 
plan for the conquest of the heartland of Eurasia and for domination of the 
world by the conquest of that heartland…Really, Hitler was largely only a 
symbol and rabble-rousing mouthpiece. The intellectual content of which 
he was the symbol was the doctrine of Haushofer.93  
 
Alderman overstated Haushofer’s personal role in the Nazi regime and many of his 
ideas were rooted in the work of earlier writers on geopolitics, but his writings 
were indeed influential and provided intellectual support for the Nazi regime and 
Hitler himself. Additionally, they were a key part of Hitler’s doctrine that justified 
the slaughter of millions in their expansionary drives for Lebensraum.  
In his book Today’s World (1934), Haushofer urged his fellow Germans to 
“set their course” after that of their “God-given fuhrer.”94 Herbert Holwig, a recent 
biographer of Haushofer’s, summarizes Haushofer’s role in the creation of Nazi 
ideology as, “the ultimate tragedy of Karl Haushofer’s life was that, in the words of 
Albrecht, he ‘broke away the seal’ to the Aladdin’s lamp of geopolitics for Hess and 
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Hitler and then ‘let the demon soar into the world.’”95 The suffering inflicted on 
the world based on Haushofer’s theories far exceeded that of Haushofer and his 
family. Dugin shares Haushofer’s vision of a world determined by Raum composed 
of large states, while also purportedly emphasizing that this worldview is based on 
geographical, rather than racial principles. Despite Dugin’s pretense of a Eurasian 
empire with room for different ethnic groups and religions, his desire to “kill, kill, 
kill” in Ukraine suggests that not all will really be welcome.  
It can be reasonably inferred that Dugin would have, until the attack on the 
Soviet Union, like Haushofer, “lauded every move that Hitler made, celebrated 
every triumph,” especially the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which briefly provided a 
culmination of his proposed continental bloc.96 Illustrating this, Dugin argues that: 
Naturally, Hitler’s Austrian Catholic, anti-communist, slavophobia—despite 
attempts by some of the more historically responsible conservative 
revolutionaries and geopoliticians [likely referring to Haushofer and 
Schmitt]—caused Germany to lose its historical place as a result of its 
nightmarish defeat, inflicted by the forces of the ‘eternal union.’97  
 
Dugin attempts similar intellectual gymnastics to produce cognitive 
dissonance to quarantine what he views as the positive ideas of Nazi thinkers from 
the realities of the Nazi campaign against the Soviet Union. Carl Schmitt (1888-
1985) was a legal scholar who had a long, prolific body of work that was often 
                                                









devoted to justifying statist authoritarianism and expansionist geopolitics. Dugin 
excuses his deep ties to the Nazi regime by explaining: 
Like many conservative revolutionaries, he had a double-natured 
relationship with the National Socialist regime. In one sense, there is no 
doubt his theories appear in Nazi ideology, his books “Political Theology” 
and “Political Concepts” were used especially successfully, in them Schmitt 
openly criticized liberal rights and ‘the rule of law.’98  
 
These so-called conservative revolutionaries like Schmitt inevitably became 
Nazis upon Hitler’s rise to power or helped him on his way beforehand. Schmitt’s 
writings often functioned as legal rationalizations for Nazi policymaking. Dugin 
seeks to obscure the Nazi roots of Schmitt’s reasoning in a summation of Schmit’s 
work: 
All of Schmitt’s concepts were based on the fundamental idea of ‘peoples’ 
rights’ (volksrechte), which he distinguished from ‘human rights’ under 
liberal theory. His understanding emphasized that a people have rights to 
cultural sovereignty so as to preserve its spiritual, historical, and political 
identity.99  
 
Dugin continues this positive interpretation, submitting that: 
Such an approach was characteristic of some National Socialists, 
considering this ideology universal and applicable to all the peoples of the 
Earth. But, the dominant line of thought was Pan-Germanism, rooted in a 
chauvinistic and narrow nationalistic outlook. Therefore, with his theory of 
‘peoples’ rights,’ Schmitt was subjected to harsh criticisms, especially by the 
ideologues of the SS.100  
 









Although it is true that Schmitt was “virulently attacked by the SS for his 
relative distance from volkish ideology,” Schmitt’s involvement in the Nazi regime 
was much deeper than Dugin makes it out to be and his views on geographical 
space were not strictly distinct from racist Nazi ideology.101 A World War I veteran 
who was a professor of law at the University of Bonn, Schmitt curried favor with 
the Nazi regime after he joined the party in May 1933 and he followed the advice 
he was given by Martin Heidegger, who told him to “join the revolution.”102 By 
November, he was serving as the President of the National Socialist Jurists 
Association and became a favorite of Herman Goehring.103 Although purportedly 
concerned with grossraum (great spaces), Schmitt justified the racism 
underpinning Nazism in his writings during this period and enthusiastically 
embraced its racist ideology. Barnes and Minca note:  
According to Schmitt, racial homogeneity (Artgleichheit) ‘made judicial 
decision determinate,’ as both judges and the people were part of an overall 
‘concrete order’ preserved by the Führer. There was complete identification 
of the people with the leader because they were of the same substance. 
‘Species sameness’ was “a substitute for the categories of identity and 
representation.104  
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After the Night of the Long Knives he published an article defending Hitler titled 
“The Leader Protects the Law,” and he ended a 1936 speech at a conference, which 
he convened, on Judaism in Jurisprudence “(Das Judentum in der 
Rechtswissenschaft) in Berlin with the words: “By fending off the Jew, I struggle for 
the work of the Lord.”105 So Dugin’s assertion that Schmitt’s beliefs were 
inconsistent with mainstream Nazi racism is simply false.  
Dugin particularly admires Schmitt’s conception of grossraum. Barnes and 
Minca describe how Schmitt advocated for “the new international legal order 
based on Großraum…to replace the principle of the equality of sovereign states 
with a hierarchy of Reichs, or empires, based on culture, space, and ideology.”106 
“Schmitt's Reich would in practice include German-speaking peoples, and 
therefore linked to the substantial presence of a Volk, it was not necessarily 
dependent on the Blut und Boden elements of mainstream racialized discourses;” 
however, like similar apologies made for Haushofer, this rationale advocated for 
empire building and was certainly not mutually exclusive with volkish notions. 
After the war, an unrepentant Schmitt (he refused denazification and was 
considered for trial at Nuremberg), expanded on his grossraum concept through 
his development of “nomoses.” The nomos “a fundamental ‘unity of space and law, 
order and orientation” and is the “original spatial order” and he sets the nomos of 
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the earth, based on traditionalism, Christian eschatology, and continentalism 
against the nomos of the sea, rooted in capitalism, materialism, liberalism, and the 
secular.107 Dugin endorses these theories, as they perfectly fit his view of a dualistic 
world. Particularly consistent with Dugin’s fascist Neo-Eurasianism is Schmitt’s 
notion of “Großraum as the elementary building block for an anti-cosmopolitan, 
anti-universal organization of the international order based on a plurality of 
coexisting Großräume, each one under the leadership of one imperial nation.”108  
This is identical to Dugin’s characterization of Eurasia as an empire of many 
empires. For Schmitt: 
Pan-regions are meant to provide guarantees against the homogenization of 
the world into a liberal flatland—essential for the maintenance of difference 
and pluralism, indeed, essential for the very possibility of the political, the 
friend/enemy distinction, encased in mutually exclusive regional blocs.109  
 
This dichotomy of friend/enemy is essential in Dugin’s ideology. Dugin repeatedly 
emphasizes these aspects of Schmitt’s oeuvre, while omitting his anti-Slavic racism 
and unflinching support for Nazi policies, including the invasion of the Soviet 
Union, for the purpose of resettling and reordering empty space to expand the 
German Reich.  
Petr Savitsky and Original Eurasianism 
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A final major inspiration for Dugin among the men he considers to be the 
founders of geopolitics is Petr Savitsky, an aristocrat, although from the landed 
gentry of Chernigov, in what is now Ukraine, rather than one of the great noble 
families of Imperial Russia. He studied geography and soil sciences at St. 
Petersburg Polytechnic University and became the star pupil of Petr Struve. 
During the Russian Civil War, Struve briefly served as foreign minister for 
Wrangel’s government, with Savitsky as his deputy, and they fled to Bulgaria 
following the collapse of White Russian forces. He corresponded with Prince 
Nikolai Trubetskoy and the two became leaders in the first Eurasianist movement. 
Clover writes that the pair were motivated to symbolically rehabilitate the time 
period of Mongol conquest as a necessary and positive step for Russia to develop 
its own distinct identity, for Savitsky, “there was no contradiction in celebrating 
both Mongol heritage and the Orthodox Church as unique essences of Russian 
civilization.”110 Similarly, Savitsky came to appreciate the importance of the Russia 
Revolution and viewed it as a key moment in history. In a 1921 letter to Struve 
which ended their relationship, he wrote: “Changing the economic policy of 
Bolshevism is a condition for the life of Russia. Keeping its political apparatus is 
the condition for the strength of the country.”111 Internal disputes within the 
Eurasianist movement led to it fading away, with some of the more enthusiastic 
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proponents returning to the Soviet Union only to be caught up in Stalin’s purges, 
while Trubetskoy grew tired of the movement and devoted himself to work in 
linguistics. Many in the movement had actually worked covertly for the Soviet 
government, although they too, for the most part, were killed when they returned 
to the USSR. 
Savitsky supported the Soviet Union during the war, despite his 
reservations about the Bolsheviks, but was relatively unaffected by the war despite 
living in Prague under Nazi occupation. However, once Soviet troops occupied 
Prague he was taken to Moscow, interrogated in the notorious Lubyanka, and then 
sent to work camp in Central Russia. He returned to Prague in 1955 having been 
released as a result of Khrushchev’s ascent to power. Despite living mostly in 
obscurity and suffering from poor health, he would inspire another former gulag 
prisoner, a man who would eventually introduce Dugin to Eurasianism and receive 
a degree of fame and influence only as the Soviet Union was breaking apart—the 
son of Anna Akhmatova (although he despised living in her shadow), Lev 
Gumilyev. He adopted Savitsky’s ideas to his own work of inventing historical 
narratives for ancient nomadic tribes like the Scythians and the Xiongnu to form a 
Eurasianist ideology similar to Savitsky’s Turanism. He believed that Eurasia is 
dependent on a natural alliance and affinity between Slavic and Turkic peoples. 
Gumilyev also crafted some rather fantastic ideas on the influence of cosmic rays 
in creating civilizations and motivating their expansion. He termed this notion 
metaphysical notion ‘passionarity’, which Dugin has adapted. Dugin calls 
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Gumilyev “one of the great modern Russian historians and ethnographers” in 
Foundations.112  
For Dugin, Savitsky follows in the tradition of the German Organicist school 
of geopolitics. As evidence, he cites Savitsky writing in “The Geopolitical 
Organization of Russia” that “the social-political environment and its territory 
should merge into a single whole of geographical individualism or landscape.”113 
However, there were stark differences between the German geopolitical writers 
and Savitsky. For one, Savitsky was not interested in union with Germany and 
considered the Teutonic Knights one of the great enemies of historical Eurasian 
people. Savitsky’s Eurasianism was not explicitly militaristic either, for instance, in 
“The Geographical and the Geopolitical,” Savitsky writes:  
The purpose of the Eurasian peoples is to, by their example, carry the other 
peoples of the world down this path. Then will the ethnographic ties by 
which a number of Eurasian peoples are connected to some non-Eurasian 
nations become useful for ecumenical affairs. These include the Indo-
European connections of the Russians, the Persian and Iranian relations of 
the Eurasian Turks, and those points of contact existing between the 
Eurasian Mongols and the peoples of East Asia. All of these will come to 
benefit the construction of a new, organic culture for the ‘Old’ World, 
which is (we believe) still young and carries in its womb a grand future.114  
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Thus, for Savitsky Eurasianism is an internal goal for those living in Russian 
territory to achieve and that “Modern Russia, absorbing this tradition, must 
resolutely and irrevocably abandon violence and war, the old methods of 
unification belonging to gone and overcome epochs.”115 Savitsky argues that rather 
than conquest, “in the modern period, the cause is one of cultural creativity, 
inspiration, insight, and cooperation.”116 This is a stark difference in tone from 
Haushofer’s militaristic ideas. However, it must be noted that Savitsky’s ideas were 
highly illiberal and he was opposed to democratic forms of government, but he 
was not as explicitly expansionist as Schmitt and Haushofer. Savitsky’s ideal form 
of governance, according to Dugin, was an “ideocracy,” which he defines as: 
Ideocracy—a term which unites all forms of undemocratic illiberal forms of 
rule, based in non-materialists and non-utilitarian motivations. Savitsky 
consciously avoided refining this notion, which is incarnate in a theocratic 
sobornost, and in populist monarchs, and in nationalist dictators, and in 
states of the Soviet type. The breadth of the term corresponds to the purely 
geopolitical horizon of Eurasia, which covers vast historical and 
geographical expanse. This was an attempt to more closely describe the 
continent’s intuitive will.117 
 
Dugin includes Savitsky’s ideas of cultural synthesis, writing that in 
“Savitsky’s geopolitical ideas, Russia is understood not as a national state, but as a 
special type of civilization, established on the basis of several factors—Slavic-Aryan 










Culture, Turkic nomadism, and the Orthodox tradition.”118 Dugin argues that 
Savitsky’s concepts indicate “the intuitive feeling of all inhabitants of the 
‘geographical pivot of history’ towards geopolitical unity,” which, “acquires a new 
language, “’syntheticism,’ not able to be reduced to inadequate, fragmented, 
analytical concerns, of Western rationalism” and that “in this way Savitsky carried 
on the Russian-intellectual tradition always gravitating towards ideas of 
‘wholeness,’ ‘sobornost,’ ‘unity,’ and etc.”119 This urge to create a holistic, unified 
theory for geopolitics is Dugin’s motivation in Foundations of Geopolitics. To 
bridge the cognitive dissonance produced by his admiration for Nazi thinkers and 
the original Eurasianists, Dugin proposes a maxim that: 
The closer the viewpoint of the German continentalists is to the Russian 
Eurasianists, the greater the Ostorietierung [openness to the East, a term of 
Haushofer’s], the more logical and consistent are their doctrines, 
effectiveness in political projects, and their establishment on a geopolitical 
basis.120  
 
The Neo-Eurasianism of Alexander Dugin can similarly be viewed as a 
fusion between the statist, imperial, determinative, expansionist, mystical, and 
racist notions of Schmitt and Haushofer and the symbolic, spiritual, unifying, 
illiberal, and theocratic concepts of Savistky and other conservative Eurasianists. 
These seemingly paradoxical schools of thought are united in their repudiation of 
materialism, liberalism, democratic government, rationalism, and capitalism.  









Chapter 6: Pan-Slavism and the Origins of Eurasianism  
 
The ideological forebears of contemporary mystical Russian nationalism 
and Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism were offshoots of the Romantic branch of European 
thought in the nineteenth century. In the Russian Empire, and throughout Eastern 
and Southeastern European, regions with large populations of practitioners of 
Eastern Orthodox Christianity, the Romantic nationalist impulses—exhibited 
elsewhere in Europe through pan-Germanism or Italian irredentism—were 
manifested in Slavophilia and pan-Slavism. Broadly, Slavophiles mirrored other 
European Romantic movements by asserting a distinct cultural identity, 
undertaking a self-conscious examination of national character, believing that they 
were in the process of fulfilling a unique historical destiny, and hearkening back to 
an earlier, more ‘pure’ time.  
For Slavophiles, this was the Muscovite Era, which took place after several 
Russian city states had shrugged off the “Mongol yoke” and the residence of the 
Russian Orthodox Church was moved to Moscow, of course this is diametrically 
opposed to Savitsky’s Turanism. A fascination with early versions of Orthodox 
Christianity and loathing of the reforms undertaken by Peter the Great within the 
Church, an animus shared by Dugin, distinguished pan-Slavism from the religious 
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preoccupations by other European Nationalist Romantics, who often admired 
Pagan religions, but they shared an interest in mysticism. A consequence of this 
was that, “a great deal of nineteenth-century Russian religious thought was 
characterized by its reluctance to make clear distinctions between theology and 
philosophy.”121 This blurring of disciplines, present in Dugin’s works as well, was 
accompanied by a rejection of Western European rationalism and a loathing of 
Westernizers emulating the fashions, culture, and ideals of what was perceived as 
the decadent West. Three figures, Ivan Kireevsky, Ivan Aksakov, and particularly 
Nikolay Danilevsky, were, in different ways, important in establishing and 
popularizing pan-Slavism and remain influential among contemporary Russian 
nationalists in the mystical tradition. 
Ivan Kireevsky (1806-1856) studied in Germany as a young man, where his 
philosophical basis was set by his rejection of Hegel’s rationalism and embrace of 
Friedrich Schelling’s romanticism. He worked with Monastic elders of the Russian 
Orthodox Church to translate ancient texts written by Greek monks and his 
interest in early Orthodoxy led him to suggest that, “the patterns of Russia’s 
development has been determined by the fact that it had received its religion and 
its culture from Byzantium rather Rome.”122 He derived many of his philosophical 
ideals from early Greek Fathers and believed only through Orthodoxy was it 
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possible to launch a true spiritual search for truth. He rejected Western 
rationalism in his writings and argued that Orthodoxy and Catholicism fostered 
different philosophical methods, writing that “Eastern thinkers were primarily 
concerned with the proper inner condition of the thinking sprit, while Westerners 
were more interested in the external coherence of concepts.”123 This preference for 
a mystical, non-empirical understanding permeates Dugin’s worldview. 
Like many other Slavophiles, including Kireevsky, Aksakov was university 
educated and was born into the gentry. Not, much of an original ideologue 
himself, he was heavily influenced by Kireevsky, Danilevsky, and other thinkers, 
but he was notable for his long career as a journalist and promoter of Slavophilia 
and pan-Slavism. A modern analogue would be Prokhanov. His efforts to aid 
various Slavic peoples in fights against the Ottoman empire represented pan-
Slavism in action and he was instrumental in whipping up sympathy for Bulgarians 
that led to the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Although a difficult and bloody 
campaign, the Russians were successful in securing the independence of a Greater 
Bulgaria, based on medieval boundaries, and were on the verge of taking Istanbul, 
which was once Constantinople, the ancient capital of the Byzantine Empire. This 
would have been hugely symbolic due to the deep connection Slavophiles felt to 
Byzantium and the Eastern Roman Empire. These hopes were dashed when 
Austria-Hungary and Britain, alarmed at Russia’s gains, called for the Congress of 




Berlin, which eliminated most of Russia’s gains and even expanded Austria-
Hungary’s influence and territorial holdings in the Balkans at the expense of 
Russia. Infuriated at what he perceived as a betrayal, Aksakov, alleged “a 
conspiracy against the Russian people, a conspiracy carried out with the 
representatives of Russia.”124  
For many Slavophiles, these treacherous representatives were Jews or other 
“non-Rus.” The assassination of Tsar Alexander II prompted his successor 
Alexander III to enact reactionary counter reforms, which enjoyed the support of 
many Slavophiles. in the wake of the Congress of Berlin and the assassination. Pan-
Slavic sentiments became increasingly indistinguishable from anti-Semitism, as 
well as anti-Polish, Turkish, and Finnish sentiments, and the Black Hundreds 
gained momentum during this period by paralleling pan-Slavic organizations and 
by becoming unmistakably menacing towards non-Slavs. Slavophilia morphed into 
a form of “Russian Exceptionalism.”125 Many pogroms were carried out in the 
decades following the assassination of Alexander II and government support for 
the Black Hundreds deepened, with Nicholas II and some Orthodox clergy 
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accepting membership in the organization.126 These accusations of internal 
enemies and a conspiracy against Russia are an integral facet of Dugin’s writings. 
Nikolai Danilevsky represented a more radical wing of pan-Slavism and he 
advanced a deeply influential, distinctive form of socialism. Influenced by Fourier, 
he believed that the Russian peasant commune, or obschina, was a model, 
uniquely Russian version of socialism and was strongly against the institution of 
serfdom. He believed the Russian people have a unique connection to the land and 
he advocated for a return to this connection between people and soil, which he 
termed pochvennichestvo. Danilevsky also admired the zemski sabors, or 
democratic assemblies of Muscovite Russia. His views were inspired by some of the 
more radical Slavophiles, like Dostoevsky, and they were both were arrested as a 
result. He also shared the foreign policy views of pan-Slavism and supported the 
independence efforts of Balkan Slavs and viewed the Polish as the “old traitor to 
Slavdom.”127 He remains deeply influential today, and Alexander Dugin asserted 
that his own “Theory of a Multipolar World seriously and axiomatically adopts 
Samuel Huntington’s thesis about the plurality of civilizations,” but “Russia has its 
own author, who claimed the same thing more than a hundred years ago: Nikolai 
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Danilevsky and then the Eurasianists.”128 Dugin asserts that, “Savitsky’s worldview, 
like the majority of his fellow Eurasianists, was shaped by the works of Slavophile 
writers like Danilevsky” and that there was “a strain of revolutionary Slavophilia 
linking the singular historical identity of ‘Greater Russia,’ not reducible to religion, 
or ethnic Slavic qualities.”129 This is blatantly contradictory, as the Slavophiles and 
Savitsky held opposite views regarding Mongol and Turkic influences on Russia. 
Dugin attempts to bridge this chasm, by arguing: 
The fundamental duality of the Russian landscape—its division between 
forest and steppe—was noticed more by the Slavophiles. Savitsky presented 
the geopolitical idea of Russia-Eurasia as a synthesis of these two aspects—
the European forest and the Asiatic steppe. 
 
And he asserts that the Eurasianists: 
 
In this respect they were closer to Konstantin Leontiev, who formulated a 
most important thesis—‘Slavdom yes, Slavism No,’ meaning that the ‘ethnic 
and linguistic closeness of the Slavic peoples is not a sufficient basis for 
describing its uniform cultural character.’130 
  
Leontiev was a curious figure in his own right, who, according to historian 
Walter Laqueur:  
Was no nationalist in the customary sense, because nationalism, as he saw 
it, was Western in inspiration, modernist, and even liberal—and thus in 
contradiction to the religious and autocratic Russian tradition…Toward the 
end of his life he seems to have reached the conclusion that since Western 
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capitalism and liberalism had no future in Russia and since Eastern 
Orthodox (Byzantine) civilization could not be revived either, the only 
future for Russia was in some form of state socialism.131 
 
 Dugin moved from a narrow Pan-Slavism to a more inclusive Neo-Eurasianism, 
with far more in common with Leontiev than Danilevsky, realizing, according to 
Walter Laquer, that “the Old Right has needlessly limited its appeal because of its 
xenophobia.”132 Historian Robert A. Saunders similarly claims, a Eurasianism that 
provides for “the delinking of the russki ethnos from the name of the state would 
have made more political space for the various faith groups that are native to the 
lands that constitute cotemporary Russia.”133 “In this dichotomy, “Our People” (as 
seen by Dugin) “are not only Russians, but also the traditionalists among the 
smaller nations who recognize the fate of separatism on one hand and 
‘mondialism’ on the other.”134 The purpose behind such a strategy is to foster the 
reestablishment, hopefully through willing participation, rather than conquest, of 
the Soviet Empire and the Tsarist Empires, but with an avowedly authoritarian, 
traditionalist government. This explains the cloak of an inclusive empire of 
empires to disguise the beating heart of fascism at the core of his ideology and the 
                                                
131 Walter Laqueur, Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers), 1993, 8-9. 
 
132 Ibid, 141. 
 
133 Robert A. Saunders, Popular Geopolitics and Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Realm (New York: 
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group), 2017, 102. 
 
134 Walter Laqueur, Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers), 1993, 141. 
 
 63 
implicit status of Russia as the ‘center’ and the highest level of civilization within a 














Chapter 7: “A Path to the North,” The Frontier Thesis, and 
Lessons from the Talassocracy 
For Dugin, a great deal of Russian Lebensraum is already under Russian 
sovereignty—The Arctic lands and Siberia. Russia has more coastline on the Arctic 
Ocean and population living north of the Arctic Circle than any other state and 
historically Russians have played a leading role in exploring and developing the 
Arctic Region. At the site of modern Archangelsk, Russians have been using the 
White Sea, an inlet of the Barents Sea, which itself is a marginal sea of the Arctic 
Ocean, for trade and fishing since at least the 10th century. Russian exploration of 
the Arctic would not begin in earnest until the 16th and 17th centuries because 
Russians first needed to overcome external threats posed by the Poles, 
Lithuanians, Mongols, and other invaders, before they could expand and colonize 
the vast, but often inhospitable, swathes of land to the east, especially those along 
the Arctic Ocean. Dugin’s thinking towards the Artic and Asian stretches of its 
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empire mimics the German attempt to tame the “Wild East” by cleansing it of its 
Slavic inhabitants, which in itself was inspired by American manifest destiny.135  
Frederick Jackson Turner expresses several ideas which would not be out of 
place in the German Organicist school. He offers a connection between soil and 
national character, noting:  
From the conditions of frontier life came intellectual traits of profound 
importance. The works of travelers along each frontier from colonial days 
onward describe certain common traits, and these traits have, while 
softening down, still persisted as survivals in the place of their origin, even 
when a higher social organization succeeded. The result is that to the 
frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics.136  
 
And in this passage, Turner, in a fashion similar to Ratzel, likens the American 
state to an organism: 
Thus, civilization in America has followed the arteries made by geology, 
pouring an ever-richer tide through them, until at last the slender paths of 
aboriginal intercourse have been broadened and interwoven into the 
complex mazes of modern commercial lines; the wilderness has been 
interpenetrated by lines of civilization growing ever more numerous. It is 
like the steady growth of a complex nervous system for the originally 
simple, inert continent. If one would understand why we are to-day one 
nation, rather than a collection of isolated states, he must study this 
economic and social consolidation of the country. In this progress from 
savage conditions lie topics for the evolutionist.137  
 
Turner, considering the continent to be ‘simple, inert’ before the arrival of 
frontiersmen and women, glosses over the millennia of indigenous civilizations 
that existed in the Americas and ignores the centuries of genocide and exploitation 
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that resulted from colonization. The demise of indigenous peoples in Turner’s view 
is simply the result of an evolutionary drive towards ‘economic and social 
consolidation.’  
Turner was both aware and approving of Ratzel’s scholarship. Turner 
quoted Ratzel at length in 1896. In 1905, Turner paid tribute to Ratzel, writing that, 
his “recent death is lamented by American scholars. He was a forerunner in the 
path that American historians must follow who view their problems as those 
arising from the study of the evolution of society in the American environment.”138 
Turner’s thinking was clearly influenced by Ratzel, but Ratzel was also inspired by 
America’s colonial history in his writings. 
Jens-Uwe Guettel notes that the American experience fueled Ratzel’s desire 
for a comparable German Empire, while Ratzel’s ideas to that effect were eagerly 
received in America at the highest political and intellectual levels. He asserts: 
Ratzel’s work was inextricably linked to German imperialism and his 
American admirer Turner was not only aware of this fact, but also approved 
of the German geographer’s colonial agitation in part because he felt that 
German colonialism was modeled after the best possible example. Turner 
observed that ‘American colonization has become the mother of German 
colonial policy.’139 
 
Early German colonial policy, which Nazi ideology draws from via the well of 
Ratzel’s geopolitics, amongst other sources, was responsible for the first major 
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genocide of the twentieth century, in the form of a large scale campaign of mass 
extermination against the Herero and Nama peoples in what is now Namibia, as 
many as 75 percent of the Herero and as many as half of the Nama were murdered 
in the ruthless campaign, resulting in as many as 100,000 total victims.140 Like 
Turner, Dugin pays no heed to the fate of Russia’s own indigenous people. There 
are some 270,000 of them across Russia’s North, Siberia, and Far East. Based on the 
example set by Dugin’s geopolitical idols, it is unlikely they would benefit from any 
expansionary drive for Lebensraum taking place under the aegis of a Eurasian 
empire. It is curious that Dugin does not feature Turner in Foundations, but he 
does include Admiral Alfred Mahan as one of the founders of geopolitics. Mahan, 
had a similar notion of inevitable American expansion, but applied it on the global 
level and emphasizing the use of naval power to achieve an ocean spanning 








                                                





Chapter 8: Dugin on “The Jewish Question” 
 
It is perhaps surprising that a traditionalist, devout, self-proclaimed 
conservative would explicitly claim to draw inspiration from Marx, but Dugin 
makes several, generally sympathetic references to Marx in his writings; however, 
these are solely to draw from Marx’s legitimacy in Russian academic thought and 
are not usually rooted in any real overlap in content. In a chapter from the second 
volume of Foundations of Geopolitics, dedicated to the ‘Khazarian’ question (after 
the ancient Jewish state that existed north of the Black Sea from roughly the 7th 
through the 10th century), Dugin depicts Marx as a Eurasianist revolutionary, 
striving to overturn the Atlanticist capitalist order. But this chapter, rather than 
revealing any genuine overlap between Dugin’s ideology and Marx’s viewpoint, 
serves only to expose the racism that lies under the surface of Dugin’s thinking, 
which is usually more carefully concealed.  
He believes that Marx represents the ‘Orientalist Jew,’ naturally sympathetic 
to mystical, traditional Eurasianist values and locked in an immortal struggle with 
Talmudist Westernizing Jews. The Eurasianist Jew in religion is Kabbalist or 
Hasidic and socialist revolutionary in secular values, while Westernizing Jews are 
Talmudist in religion and liberal and humanistic in the secular realm. Dugin 
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further elaborates on this dichotomy, which is clearly just another application of 
his Eurasianist/Atlanticist dualism:  
Many Jews saw bolshevism as a possibility to finally merge with a large 
nation, abandoning the ghetto and the Pale of Settlement, to bridge 
eschatologically the messianic Russian with the messianic Jew under the 
general aegis of Eurasian revolution. The destruction of the alienating laws 
of capital and exploitation. Thus, extremist circles of Eastern European Jews 
of a mystical orientation (from Hasidim to Sabbateanists) themselves 
presented a growth medium for Bolshevism, SR and Marxism, and not 
accidentally the majority of leaders of the Reds came from families of 
Hasidim and mystics, taking on a mystical eschatological messianic pathos, 
despite the external paradox, this convergence of typological and 
psychological relations between Hasidic types of Jewish fundamentalists 
and the ardent atheist builders of Bolshevist society was intimate, since 
they both belonged to the ‘Eurasianism,’ ‘orientalism,’ and the irrational-
mystical sects of Judaism.141  
 
Dugin draws from Marx’s “On the Jewish Question,” in his discussion of a 
place for the Jews in Eurasia, and uses his writing to justify his own anti-Semitic 
typology. He claims to translate Marx as asking:  
What is the secular basis of the Jewry? Material consumption and self-
interest. What are the Jews’ earthly ideals? Trading. What is their earthly 
god? Money…Money is the fervent deity of the Israelites. Empirically, the 
being of the Jew is trading.142  
 
This quotation, like others he creates, are not featured in the English translation of 
Marx’s response to Bruno Brauer and are quite contrary to Marx’s sentiment in the 
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essay.143 This fabricated statement is a clear indication of Dugin’s own anti-Semitic 
beliefs.  Further illustrating Dugin’s barely concealed prejudices is a reference to 
“(a partially justified) anti-Semitism of the Russian patriots,” in regard to Jewish 
liberals.144 
 Further, any responsible analysis will demonstrate that Eurasianism and 
Marxism are incompatible. Both loathe commodity fetishism and abhor the 
capitalist system and seek its replacement; however, for Dugin it is to be replaced 
by an “empire of many empires,” of ‘nationalist’, traditionalist peoples under the 
direction of Moscow. Rather than a workers’ revolution, Dugin really advocates for 
a nativist, fascist revolution. For Dugin, Russians and other nations could 
supposedly overcome past hatreds through an ‘internationalism’ based on a 
common traditionalist point of view rooted in mystical contemplation, 
authoritarian leadership, and the country’s historical ethnic character. Thus, the 
“empire of many empires,” would resemble a confederacy of states dominated by a 
single ethnic group, with a Russian leader, and looking back to mythic history for 
guidance.  
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Marx’s internationalism is based on shared oppressive economic conditions 
inherent in the capitalist system. He uses English and Irish workers as an example 
to illustrate how prejudices and racism benefit a ruling class: 
The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who 
lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he regards himself 
as a member of the ruling nation and consequently he becomes a tool of the 
English aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland, thus strengthening their 
domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social, and national 
prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude towards him is much the 
same as that of the “poor whites” to the Negroes in the former slave states 
of the U.S.A. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. 
He sees in the English worker both the accomplice and the stupid tool of 
the English rulers in Ireland.145  
 
Thus, for Marx ethnic identity stand in the way of internationalization, 
which is also largely the point of his essay “On the Jewish Question,” and the 
destruction of the capitalist system in favor of internationalism. For Marx, fighting 
racism is an important part of achieving this goal. While for Dugin embracing and 
accentuating ethnic and religious identity is the way to achieve this goal. This 
worldview holds diversity to be a weakness and opposes multiculturalism. Dugin 
hopes to establish a Eurasian empire through the creation of an alliance of 
subservient xenophobic, authoritarian rulers obedient to Moscow and backed by 
domestic elites, the complete opposite of Marx’s internationalism. 
 
                                                




Chapter 9: Dugin’s Road to Influence  
 
Under Putin, Dugin has never held a government position of any power, 
although he has acted as an informal agent of the Kremlin at times, and served as a 
mid-level academic until he was fired for making comments on Ukraine that went 
too far for the Kremlin. Politically he has never had any electoral success. The 
National Bolshevist Party he founded with Eduard Limonov failed miserably in 
1993 and the two split acrimoniously in 1998. Dugin’s Eurasia party, founded in 
2001, performed even more poorly. The ‘red-browns’, a nickname for National 
Bolsheviks, based on their contradictory fusion of brown shirt Nazism and Red 
Army symbology, have come nowhere near the levers of power. By all responsible 
accounts he has no personal influence over Vladimir Putin and they do not orbit 
the same circles of power. Dugin is “not even a member of the Public Chamber—a 
consultative institution created by Putin to foster a regime-friendly civil society.”146 
Putin’s political record has largely been marked by pragmatism, with any 
ideological shifts being calculated to maintain domestic support. Dugin’s personal 
behavior has often been dramatic and his Neo-Eurasianist fantasies on the grand 
                                                




continental level are impractical; to say the least. Dugin’s professed Old Believer 
faith runs counter to the rehabilitation and active promotion of official Russian 
Orthodoxy by the Kremlin.  
A more palatable, Russian Orthodox version of Eurasianism espoused by 
Ivan Ilyin has been employed more overtly by the Kremlin and he has been cited 
on numerous occasions by Vladimir Putin. Ilyin, like Savitsky, fled Russia following 
the defeat of the white forces by the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution, but 
was more overtly friendly to fascism. He even worked for a time in Goebbel’s 
propaganda ministry and “regarded fascism as a positive force, criticizing it only 
for being insufficiently religious in inspiration.”147 Timothy Snyder asserts Dugin 
and Schmitt are similar in that: “Dugin shared with Ilyin a debt to Carl Schmitt. It 
was Schmitt who had formulated a vision of world politics without laws and states, 
grounded instead in the subjective desires of cultural groups for ever more land” 
and that “maritime powers such as Great Britain and the United States were 
bearers of abstract, Jewish notions of law.”148 Intellectually, Snyder dismisses 
Dugin, arguing “much of Dugin’s writing reads like a parody of Ilyin,” but this is 
fundamentally incorrect and ignores the many other ideological sources that have 
shaped Dugin’s worldview, particularly in regard to strategy and geopolitics.149 
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Although Dugin’s spiritual and mystical writings and attacks on the ‘decadent 
West’ certainly are similar to Ilyin’s, his geopolitical postulations owe much more 
of a debt to the Nazi geopoliticians he so admires, while Ilyin’s fall more in line 
with conservative slavophiles like Kireevsky. Snyder does concede that: 
Concepts from the three interflowing currents of Russian fascism—Ilyin’s 
Christian totalitarianism, Gumilev’s Eurasianism, and Dugin’s ‘Eurasian’ 
Nazism—appeared in Putin’s discourse as he sought an exit from the 
dilemma he created for his country in 2012.150  
 
Dugin’s ideas are not cited so overtly, due to his personal eccentricities and more 
controversial statements. His unstable personality makes power brokers in the 
Kremlin wary of making him the public face of the regime’s ideology, for instance, 
Sergei Markov, a political consultant on Putin’s staff has said, “he’s seen as a 
brilliant philosopher, but brilliance and madness are very close to each other.”151 
But this does not mean his ideas have been entirely eclipsed by Ilyin’s when it 
comes to influence over policymaking and strategy. 
Any comparisons of Dugin to a sort of Rasputin or references to him being 
“Putin’s Brain,” are sensationalist; however, the influence of his ideas and 
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terminology are another matter.152153 Published at a crucial time in Russian history 
and taught to many senior military leaders in the Russian Armed Forces at the 
General Staff Academy Dugin’s ideas—or perhaps more accurately—the montage 
of ideas he’s stitched together from disparate, authoritarian intellectual materials, 
have been influential, or at least superficially appropriated by the Kremlin and the 
Russian armed forces. His vocabulary has become mainstream in not just Russian 
political discourse, but internationally as well. The Kremlin is not a monolith and 
Putin, although an autocrat, does not actually operate on the basis of one man rule 
where he is personally responsible for every decision made. A substantial amount 
of leeway is afforded to military leadership to plan and implement their own 
operations. In Foundations of Geopolitics, Dugin moves beyond his earlier, more 
crude conspiracies to more nuanced ones, arguing the Council of Foreign Relations 
the Bilderburger Group, and the Trilateral Commission are part of the globalist 
project working: 
To transition to a single world system under the strategic domination of the 
West and ‘progressive,’ ‘humanistic,’ and ‘democratic’ values. For this they 
have worked out parallel structures—consisting of politicians, journalists, 
intellectuals, financiers, analysts and so on who were supposed to prepare 
the ground before the globalist project of World Government could be 
widely organized.154  
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This claim mimics contemporary allegations of conspiracies launched by deep 
states and globalists (usually personified in George Soros).  
Dugin blames Atlanticists and Gorbachev for the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, arguing: 
The voluntary concession of the Heartland was not accompanied by 
relevant concessions in maritime power and the West has not arrived at a 
compromise—neither geopolitically, nor ideologically—with a self-
liquidating Eurasia. NATO has not dissolved, nor left Europe or Asia.155  
 
This matches Putin’s language on the subject very closely.  
Nato’s unilateral action in the Balkans against the Serbs, although ultimately 
successful in protecting Bosnian Muslims from further genocidal violence, 
provided additional fuel for those who view it as the implacable enemy of Russia. 
Putin abhorred NATO’s intervention, arguing “that sort of behavior cannot be 
justified, even for so-called humanitarian reasons,” and adding, “I believe that the 
operation itself was a major mistake in international relations and a violation of 
the founding principles of international law.”156 Similarly, Putin has at times 
adopted rhetoric not unlike Dugin’s in projecting the West as a perennial, 
existential threat to Russia. He asserted that the Second Chechen War and the 
Russian campaign in the North Caucasus against fighters in Dagestan and 
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Ingushetia was undertaken because “I was convinced that if we didn’t stop the 
extremists right away, we’d be facing a second Yugoslavia on the entire territory of 
the Russian Federation—the Yugoslavization of Russia.”157 He also states that 
NATO’s “means of resolving the problem in Yugoslavia was predetermined after 
the fall of the USSR.”158 Relatedly, he referred to the Chechen separatist movement 
as, “a continuation of the collapse of the USSR.”159  
Tellingly, during the same in-depth interview very early during his rule, 
Putin is asked about his relationship with Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the 
Soviet KGB and a ringleader of the 1991 attempted coup, during his time in 
government before being designated Yeltsin’s successor. He is asked “Is it true that 
as director of the FSB [the KGB’s successor], you used to run into Vladimir 
Kryuchkov?” and Putin replies, “It’s true,” the interviewer responds “Accidentally?” 
allowing Putin a chance to distance himself from the controversial figure, but 
Putin does not, answering: “No, not accidentally. I worked rather actively with the 
longtime veterans.”160 He also offers his opinion that “Kryuchkov was a true believe 
in Communism, who sided with the coup-plotters. But he was also a very decent 
man. To this day I have the greatest respect for him.”161 According to Alexander 
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Yakovlev, a reformist member of the Politburo, Kryuchkov was the leader of the 
“yesterday forever” forces who worked frantically to avert the collapse of the Soviet 
Union through the promotion of political projects.162 These projects straddled the 
nationalist, democratic reformer, and communist camps and Clover reports, that 
in a “detailed after-the-fact examination of these projects, one name keeps 
popping up in documents, in conversations with those involved, and in anecdotes: 
that of Vladimir Kryuchkov.”163 It is reasonable to believe that during their active 
working relationship, Putin was familiarized with these political projects and their 
potential usefulness by Kryuchkov and his fellow “veterans” of the KGB, the 
“yesterday forever” forces.  
An indirect connection to Dugin’s ideas can also be made through Putin’s 
relationship with Gennady Seleznyov, a leader in the Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation (KPRF), a vestige of the Soviet Communist Party, who served 
as Speaker of the Russian State Duma from 1996 until 2003, when he left the party 
for the Party of Russian Revival—a more explicitly xenophobic party—after a 
losing a power struggle with his longtime rival Gennady Zyuganov.164 Dugin served 
as an adviser to Seleznyov beginning in 1998, a relationship that began as a result 
                                                
 










of Seleznyov’s rivalry with Zyuganov. Clover explains that Zyuganov was 
introduced to De Benoist as a result of Dugin’s efforts and that under Zyuganov, 
the KPRF only superficially retained its Marxist ideology. Instead Zyuganov 
“proceeded to retool the party with new nationalist messages that had little in 
common with an orthodox socialist message” and that this nationalist messaging, 
was “strikingly similar to the ‘radical centre’ theories that Dugin says he imbibed 
from the European New Right.”165 This appropriation of Soviet, communist, 
symbology and superficial embrace of its ideology combined with xenophobic, 
imperial expansionism has been a key plank of Dugin’s ideological platform. 
Dugin himself notes “at the critical moment of ideological choice, Zyuganov 
placed a bet on Neo-Eurasian populism, the main contours of which were 
described and formulated by myself and my colleagues at The Day newspaper.”166 
Annoyed at Zyuganov’s theft and popularization of his own mostly stolen ideas, 
Dugin and Seleznyov hoped to outmaneuver Zyuganov by moving farther to the 
right. Seleznyov was entirely receptive to Dugin’s ideas, having previously tried, 
quixotically, to have the Duma annul the 1991 agreement ending the Soviet 
Union.167 In his post as speaker Selezynov met personally with Putin while Putin 
was President in 2002 and in the First Person interviews Putin notes that when he 
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was announced as Yeltsin’s successor Selezynov remarked to him, “why did they do 
that to you? They’ve buried you.”168 This anecdote implies at least some kind of 
personal, familiar relationship between the two men. One of the reasons why 
Selezynov was ultimately forced out of the KPRF was because party officials felt he 
had become “increasingly reluctant to disrupt his good relations with the Kremlin” 
and he refused “to resign in protest over a reshuffle of Duma committee chairs that 
stripped the Communists of eight of their 10 leadership posts,” according to 
Moscow Times reporter Simon Saradzhyan.169 
Through Selezynov, Dugin achieved his closest orbit to actual power in the 
Russian Federation. His brand of fascism was promoted as a type of “political 
technology” by the famed spin doctor of the Kremlin, Gleb Pavlovsky, who 
reflected on this time to Clover: “He [Dugin] suggested some political projects, 
some of which I sent forward, because I thought it was important to widen the 
political front so to speak, that the regime should represent a wide spectrum.”170 In 
the fall of 2000, Clover reports that “Dugin was introduced to Putin. Dugin refuses 
to discuss the meeting, but it would change his career. Soon there were sponsors, 
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contacts and open doors.”171 It is hard to believe that this meeting had no impact 
on Vladimir Putin, still very early in his tenure as President, as a short time later, 
he delivered a speech in Kazakhstan on November 13 of that year where he stated 
that “Russia has always perceived itself as a Eurasian country.”172 As an aside, 
Kazakhstan has proven to be fertile ground for Eurasianism, an embodiment of 
Savitsky’s Turanism with a population descended from Russians, Turkic tribes, and 
Mongolians. It was a founding member of the Eurasian Union and the L.N. 
Gumilyov Eurasian National University is the premiere institute of higher learning 
in that country and was formed as a result of a merger between two other 
universities in Astana and renamed in 2001.  
Possibly through Selezynov (although Selezynov denied it), Dugin became 
close with Petr Suslov, a twenty-year veteran of the KGB, who admired 
Foundations of Geopolitics and together they set up the Eurasia Party in March 
2001. Clover reports that a month later an article appeared in the respected 
Russian paper Novaya Gazeta by investigative journalist and parliamentarian Yuri 
Shchekochikhin that alleged Suslov and Vladimir Revsky (Head of the Honor and 
Dignity KGB Veterans’ society) were part of a “splinter cell within the KGB that 
was working behind the scenes to bring back the USSR.”173 The following year 
                                                








Shchekochikhin wound up dead, with symptoms entirely consistent with radiation 
poisoning.174 Suslov operated at the nexus of organized crime and the shadowy 
elements of the Russian state—at the intersection of poniatiaa and Neo-
Eurasianism. He has been accused of hiring Max Lazovsky to organize a bombing 
campaign in Moscow to generate public support for the campaign in Chechnya, by 
pinning the blame on Chechen extremists, an accusation that was prominently put 
forward by Alexander Litvinenko in 2002, who was killed by radiation poisoning in 
London in 2002.175 Clover references the Umberto Eco novel Foucault’s Pendulum 
in describing Dugin’s partnership with Suslov, “in which the protagonists who 
make money by peddling phony conspiracy theories to the gullible, suddenly have 
to contend with the appearance of the actual secret society” and that “Dugin, 
having spent the last decade peddling the Eurasia conspiracy, suddenly [was] 
slightly blindsided by the overture from one of its minions.”176 Dugin did not deny 
any of this to Clover, reflecting that Suslov described himself as “a sort of state 
envoy to the organized crime world” and cynically observed: “Who are our political 
leaders after all? We are ruled by no one but bandits. They all have their own Max 
[Lazovsky]. You think Putin and Medvedev are any different?”177 
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At the Eurasia party’s founding conference, held in April 2001, Dugin made 
it clear that “our aim is not to reach power and to fight for power; our aim is to 
fight for influence over the regime,” and indeed the Eurasia Party never met the 
five percent threshold to win a seat in the Duma. However, influence over the 
regime was certainly achieved. The first, and to date probably the most concrete 
proof of his influence over Kremlin strategy, was its awarding Akhmat Kadyrov and 
his Kadyrovtsy militia the fiefdom of Chechnya. Suslov and his handlers connected 
Dugin with Khoj Akhmed Nukhaev a prominent member of the Russian criminal 
underworld who moved back to Chechnya in 1994 to fight for Chechen 
independence. Anna Politkvskaya, a Russian journalist assassinated in 2006 who 
covered the second Chechen war, described him as a man who like Dugin 
represented himself “as a philosopher, which he was not.”178 Nukhaev developed a 
keen interest in Eurasianism and he is quoted in his biography (his biographer 
Paul Khlebnikov was murdered the year after it was released and Nukhaev remains 
a suspect) as believing “Eurasianism means the alliance of Orthodoxy and Islam on 
the grounds of confrontation against the West.”179 Nukhaev served as a conduit 
between the Kremlin and Kadyrov, formerly an independence fighter who had 
changed sides in 1999. Suslov told Clover that:  
The people I worked with were interested in Eurasianism from a pragmatic 
point of view. They were looking for something that would work in 
                                                






Chechnya, something that would be a legitimate reason not to secede, an 
idea we could build a regime around…We wanted to show the Chechens 
that national minorities could by nature be nationalists but also have an 
idea of what the motherland is. That is Eurasianism.180  
 
The Kremlin’s end goal was to divide the Chechen resistance further 
between the foreign born or generally foreign educated Islamic fundamentalists 
and the Chechens who practiced Sufism and adhered to a traditional North 
Caucasus clan based identity. To arrange this, a conference was held in July 2001 at 
the President Hotel in Moscow, whose security was directly under the control of 
Putin’s bodyguards, and Nukhaev flew in from Turkey to attend and flew back 
after the conference ended, despite being the subject of a police manhunt. The 
conference opened with an address from Selezynov, who hosted the event along 
with the Eurasia party and then Nukhaev gave the keynote address. Per Clover:  
His speech was the first time that a Chechen official had condemned radical 
‘Wahhabism’ in public; and Nukhaev was also the first high-level Chechen 
politician to reject separatism and embrace cultural autonomy in the name 
of common civilizational bonds with fellow ‘Eurasians.’181  
 
In his speech Nukhaev asserted:  
An application of the value and effectiveness of this ideology you can see in 
the fact that I, convinced supporter of Chechen independence, today appear 
at this conference in the capital of a state at war with my people. 
Eurasianism creates that level of dialogue between Chechens and Russians 
on which, for the first time in our history, we have a real basis for mutual 
understanding, for peace, and for union against the common enemy.182  
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Weeks later Kadyrov issued a decree banning Islamic extremism and the Chechen 
resistance became hopelessly divided, heralding victory for Russia. Nukhaev 
himself returned to mountains of the Caucasus and engaged in shadowy activities, 
he was reported killed in 2004, but some sources believe him to be in hiding.183 
Ultimately, any ‘mutual understanding’ would be illusory, the Kremlin 
simply funneled resources to the Kadyrovtsy and allowed Akhmat, and following 
his assassination in 2004, his son Ramzan, a free hand to rule Chechnya as they 
pleased. But, as Clover notes, “the Eurasianist philosophy had at last managed to 
be useful to the Kremlin in a practical matter.”184  
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Putin believed he could make 
common cause with the West against Islamic extremists and sought better 
relationships with America and NATO, relegating Dugin and Eurasianism to the 
sidelines once again, although the Eurasian Economic Community and later 
Eurasian Economic Union of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Kyrgyzstan represent a soft and scaled down version of Dugin’s imperial Eurasian 
goals.  Strictly economic in nature for now, the use of ‘Eurasian’ branding does 
imply some ideological debt to Dugin, but his personal involvement has been 
minimal.  He “sought to attach himself to Putin’s pet project, the Eurasian Union, 
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by boldly proclaiming that he could become its de-facto theoretician and inject the 
project with the ideology that it lacked,” but Dugin was overshadowed by other 
figures.185 
 Yet ideas are not so easily consigned to the dustbin of history, and once 
tensions flared between Russian and NATO over Georgia in 2008, Dugin and his 
worldview made a comeback and he became personally useful to the Kremlin once 
again. He and the youth wing of his Eurasia party even decamped to the frontlines 
and may have participated in the fighting, which was foolishly started by the 
President of Georgia, Mikhail Sashkavilii, in the mistaken belief that he would 
receive NATO support.186 The Georgian offensive was legal under international 
law, as the breakaway regions he attempted to bring under government control are 
recognized as Georgian territory, but he broke a delicate status quo and provoked 
Russia to respond overwhelmingly.187 Providing evidence for the view that Putin 
does not personally share Dugin’s beliefs to the fullest, Russian troops withdrew 
from Georgian territory after securing the borders of the breakaway regions of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. If it were up to Dugin, they would have permanently 
occupied Tbilisi.  
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A similar divergence would also be the case in Eastern Ukraine. On Russia’s 
military intervention in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, Gessen writes:  
It had been over five years since Dugin declared his intention to become his 
country’s lead ideologue and it was happening…Back in 2009, Dugin had 
prophesized the division of Ukraine into two separate states: the eastern 
portion would be allied with Russia and the west would be forever looking 
toward Europe…Dugin had spent years waiting for Russia to claim its place 
as the leader of the anti-modern world.”188  
 
This has happened as a result of Russia’s intervention following the overthrow of 
the Russian backed kleptocrat Viktor Yanukovych. Dugin’s participation in the 
conflict has not just been rhetorical, his Eurasian Union of Youth have mobilized 
“dozens” of volunteers to fight there.189 He was placed on the U.S. Treasury 
sanctions list on March 11, 2015 as a result190. However, Putin has exercised more 
restraint than Dugin would care for However, Putin has exercised more restraint 
by annexing Crimea and providing assistance and military forces to the Kremlin 
puppet states of Donetsk and Luhansk, but not through overt annexation, and 
these actions were likely in reaction to developing events, rather than a pre-
planned strategy. There are also significant areas of Eastern Ukraine with a 
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Chapter 10: Blowback and Neo-Eurasianism 
 
Chalmers Johnson, a former consultant for the CIA who became a 
renowned political scientist, defined blowback as: 
A CIA term first used in March 1954 in a recently declassified report on the 
1953 operation to overthrow the government of Mohammed Mossadegh in 
Iran. It is a metaphor for the unintended consequences of the US 
government’s international activities that have been kept secret from the 
American people.”191 
 
 In many ways the Russian attacks on Western democracies through 
disinformation, spreading of divisive ideologies, and attacks on elections is 
blowback for American activities throughout the Cold War, but probably most 
emotionally relevant for Dugin given his personal history, was its covert support 
given to the Yeltsin administration during the 1991 coup. Dugin refers to these 
activities, arguing that: 
Every geopolitical level of the USA should be involved simultaneously, 
similar to the anti-Eurasianism of the Atlanticists: ‘sponsoring’ the 
disintegration of the strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), governmental unity 
(USSR), and furthering ethno-territorial problems under the guise of 
regionalism, Russia accomplished its progressive disintegration up to its 
complete destruction…The Heartland will force the Sea Power to pay in the 
same coin. This is basic symmetrical politics.192  
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The similarities between Dugin’s proposals and the actions that were taken by 
Russian state actors cannot be denied.  
For the purposes of putting together a new empire, Dugin writes that the 
“chief ‘scapegoat’ will namely be the USA—undermining of whose power which 
(up to the complete destruction of its geopolitical constructs) will be realized 
systematically and uncompromisingly by participants of the New Empire.”193 He 
advocated for the new Eurasian empire to “provoke every kind of destabilization 
and separatism within the borders of the USA (it might be possible to rely on the 
political forces of African American racists).”194 Developing new projects to divide 
the Atlanticists, is “the geopolitical problem of the West in its wider sense for 
Russia is the disintegration in two—the West of America and the West of 
Europe.”195 Russian involvement in the Brexit campaign, the Trump 
administrations ambivalent attitude towards NATO, and the rise of Eurosceptic 
governments in EU nations, often led by parties friendly towards Moscow, as in 
Italy, Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic, and especially Hungary fit this 
description. Finally, although Dugin could never have anticipated the 
pervasiveness of social media and the internet in 1996, these new mediums have 
created opportunities to destabilize and divide the citizenry of Western 








democracies. Reflecting his belief that diversity is a weakness, Dugin advocates 
that: 
It is generally important to introduce geopolitical chaos within the 
American daily experience by encouraging all manner of separatism, ethnic 
diversity, social and racial conflict, actively supporting every extremist 
dissident movement, racist sectarian groups, and to destabilize the political 
processes within America.196  
 
The FBI investigation into Russian involvement in the 2016 elections has 
revealed that Russian hackers successfully broke into the Democratic National 
Conventions cyber systems and also attacked state and county level election 
systems in key districts and battleground states.197 It is difficult to know if any 
votes were actually changed, and government reports have insisted they were not, 
but a successful hack would reveal no evidence. Experts have shown it is relatively 
easy to change the outcome of elections through hacking some voting machine 
hardware.198 Russian sponsored ads and disinformation promoted through 
Facebook and other social media sites were targeted at many different groups 
across the political spectrum, but with the intention of causing Hilary Clinton to 
lose the election through reducing the turnout of those that would support her 
and motivating her opposition to vote through misinformation and outright lies. 
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Here are just a few examples, fitting Dugin’s advice to “provoke destabilization and 
every kind of separatism”:199 
 
Figure 2      Figure 3 
 
Figure 4     Figure 5 
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There are 1000s such ads, targeting every community conceivable in the 
United States and designed to drive wedges between groups. Some are extremely 
homophobic, while others are seemingly pro-LGBT. Some emphasize the very real 
racism engrained in American society, while others, denigrate the Black Lives 
Matter movement and seek to appeal to Americans holding racist or xenophobic 
attitudes, six such ads are included above. For example, in the ad purportedly 
describing “another gruesome attack on police by a BLM movement activist,” the 
story is a blatant lie and the attack never happened. Ultimately, according to an 
analysis by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Lab of a trove of tweets sent by 




One main purpose was to interfere in the U.S. presidential election and 
prevent Hillary Clinton’s victory, but it was also aimed at dividing polarized 
online communities in the U.S., unifying support for Russia’s international 
interests, and breaking down trust in U.S. institutions.200  
 
Again, this matches Dugin’s stated goals and strategy for conquering the 
Atlanticists perfectly. Mark Galeotti observes that regardless of whether they are 
called “information warfare” or “active measures” by the Western press, “these 
tactics have a broad political objective — to distract, divide, and demoralize,” they 
are “largely opportunistic, fragmented, even sometimes contradictory.”201 
 Although these ads, tweets, posts, and messages target all sorts of different 
political groups and ethnic communities, Dugin himself has attracted followers 
from far-right movements in several countries, including the United States. This 
raises a possibility that Dugin had not even considered in Foundations of 
Geopolitics—that the United States itself could become ‘Eurasianist’ in spirit. 
However, an ideology like Dugin’s had preceded Eurasianism by many decades in 
the United States. Manifest Destiny, the Monroe Doctrine, are examples of 
supposedly inclusive imperial ideologies and these ideas have been prominently 
articulated by Frederick Jackson Turner and Alfred Mahan. Indeed, Dugin 
explicitly holds up the Monroe Doctrine as an example for Eurasian empire. 
Imperial American expansionism and white supremacist are not new innovations 
                                                
200Digital Forensic Research Lab, “#Troll Tracker: Twitter Troll Farm Archives,” Atlantic Council, 
October 17, 2018, https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-twitter-troll-farm-archives-
8d5dd61c486b. 
 




and its so-called alt-right proponents have simply popularized old ideas, 
emboldened by the current political climate. A divisive and directionless political 
climate exists in the United States not unlike Russia’s during bespredel, although 
certainly without anywhere near the degree of economic deprivation and social 
chaos that Russia suffered from then. Probably the most influential proponent of a 
traditionalist worldview geopolitically aligned with Russia has been Steve Bannon, 
Donald Trump’s CEO for his campaign and chief White House strategist for almost 
a year following Trump’s election.  
Steve Bannon, who refers to himself as an “economic nationalist,” has 
espoused views entirely consistent with Dugin’s. Bannon has cited and referenced 
Dugin, approvingly.202 In a speech delivered to a conference at the Vatican in 2014, 
Dugin clearly references Dugin, albeit without naming him, and shows his 
understanding of Dugin’s ideology and its domestic and international appeal:  
When Vladimir Putin, when you really look at some of the underpinnings of 
some of his beliefs today, a lot of those come from what I call Eurasianism; 
he's got an adviser who harkens back to Julius Evola and different writers of 
the early 20th century who are really the supporters of what's called the 
traditionalist movement, which really eventually metastasized into Italian 
fascism. A lot of people that are traditionalists are attracted to that. One of 
the reasons is that they believe that at least Putin is standing up for 
traditional institutions, and he's trying to do it in a form of nationalism — 
and I think that people, particularly in certain countries, want to see the 
sovereignty for their country, they want to see nationalism for their 
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country. They don't believe in this kind of pan-European Union or they 
don't believe in the centralized government in the United States.203  
 
The reference to Julius Evola also makes it clear that Bannon is at the very least 
familiar with the ideals of his strain of fascist, racist, traditionalism.204 Bannon’s 
website, Breitbart, published an article co-written by Milos Yiannopolous, which 
claimed that Evola’s writings are part of the “origins of the alt-right.”205 Although it 
is laughable that Bannon makes it sound as if he’s coined the term Eurasianism, a 
term that has been in existence for nearly a hundred years, it is clear he is very 
familiar with its tenets.  
The admiration between the two men has been mutual, so has their 
fawning admiration for Trump. Dugin told The Daily Beast that:  
I connect with Bannon’s focus of the entire presidential campaign: the 
denial of globalism, rejection of America’s hegemony, the return of religious 
and national interests, his criticism of liberals and respect for traditional 
values…Bannon is a bright personality, his team published my books in the 
United States, including The Fourth Political Theory.206  
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This connection has been noted in Russia as well. An article in the critical 
Svobodnaya Pressa notes that:  
The key element in this war is the former advisor to Donald Trump on 
strategic questions, Steve Bannon. The journalist and producer, previously 
the director of a site for the ultra-right, he is well-known for sharing the 
views of the Russian philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, openly speaking out 
against Muslims and invoking the battle for ‘Judeo-Christian values.’207  
 
 In an interview broadcast on Tsargrad TV, where he is a commentator and 
chief editor, Dugin lavished praise on Trump: “He can become an American 
Eurasianist, an American Putin.”208 Dugin has even drawn a direct line between his 
ideology and Trump’s slogan and call to action to “drain the swamp.” In a 
Facebook post (quoted by Richard Spencer on Twitter), Dugin makes a case that: 
“The Swamp is to become [a] new name for globalist sect, open society adepts, lgbt 
maniacs, Soros army, posthumanists and so on. Drain the Swamp is not only 
American categorical imperative. It is [a] global challenge for all of us.”209 
Bannon has noted the resurgence in right-wing nationalist, anti-globalist 
movements across the world that have coincided with Russia exporting its political 
technology: “you see a nationalist movement in Egypt, India, the Philippines, in 
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South Korea, and now Abe in Japan. I’d say Putin and Xii in China are nationalists. 
Look at Le Pen in France, Orban in Hungary, and the nationalists in Poland.” In 
Dugin’s words, these are “states not willing to dissolve their originality into a 
planetary melting pot.”210 Relatedly, as Russia’s alliance with China has deepened, 
familiarity with Carl Schmitt has very much become in vogue for Chinese 
intellectuals and government personnel, although it should be noted that Dugin 
viewed China more as a threat to Russia in Foundations than a potential ally, 
instead suggesting a Moscow-Berlin-Tokyo axis, imitating the Third Reich.211 
However, he has changed his thinking in line with Kremlin foreign policy.  
Bannon asserts that Trump himself shares this worldview. Bannon has said: 
“Look, I’ve been studying this for a while, and it’s amazing that Trump has been 
talking about these ideas for 25 years.”212 Perhaps the most vivid example of the 
elevation of Dugin’s vocabulary to the greatest heights of American political 
discourse was President Trump’s declaration that he is a “nationalist” at a rally for 
Ted Cruz in Texas on October 23, 2018. After proudly declaring himself a 
nationalist he set off on an attack against “globalists”:  
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You know what a globalist is, right? You know what a globalist is? A 
globalist is a person that wants the globe to do well, frankly, not caring 
about our country so much. And you know what? We can’t have that.213  
 
Since leaving his position at the White House, Bannon himself has been an 
apostle of the traditionalist, ultranationalist worldview, preaching to movements 
that are already established, and in some cases already sharing power in Europe.214 
He has also taken a role as adviser to the recently elected President of Brazil, Jair 
Bolsonaro, who represents an even more extreme version of Trumpian 
xenophobia, misogyny, and homophobia.215 
Dugin is also friendly with the conspiracy theorist Alex Jones and has 
interviewed him on Russian television. In an interview with Alex Jones on October 
2, 2017 on Infowars Dugin remarks that he “supports Trump with all my heart,” 
and rejects the label of either a fascist or a communist instead accepting the label 
of traditionalist, arguing: 
We defend the same position, we share the same concerns, we are lobbying 
our people and I am making that at the level of ideas and Mr. Putin is doing 
that at the level of great politics…what Alex Jones and what I hope Mr. 
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Trump shares the same position, the unity of the same position, and the 
same ideas.216  
 
Alex Jones’ conspiracy theories, rhetoric about “white genocide” in South 
Africa, and vilifying of Soros mirror those peddled by Dugin, and as in the Russian 
case, they have circulated at the highest levels, although it is more plausible to 
think Trump genuinely believes these tendentious conspiracy theories than Putin. 
Trump has appeared on Jones’ programs during the campaign telling Jones, “Your 
reputation is amazing. I will not let you down.”217 Trump even called to thank him 
after his election victory for his support.218  Putin uses these dog whistle conspiracy 
theories as a signal to generate support domestically, while simultaneously 
employing them abroad to destabilize rivals and unfriendly nations. Trump’s chief 
of staff John Kelly has reportedly even forbidden Trump’s aides from delivering 
him ‘news’ from Alex Jones and Breitbart.219 Although Dugin and Jones’ support for 
Trump is not unequivocal—they both criticized him for allowing strikes against 
Syrian chemical weapon facilities. 
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More flamboyantly racist figures have also followed suit and have cultivated 
personal ties with Dugin. Richard Spencer, a white supremacist who heads the 
National Policy Institute, has openly praised Dugin. Spencer’s views are vile and 
eugenicist, in an interview he offered: “’Race is something between a breed and an 
actual species,’ he says, likening the differences between whites and people of 
color to those between golden retrievers and basset hounds. ‘It’s that powerful.’”220 
Following Trump’s victory in the election, he crowed “hail Trump, hail our people, 
hail victory” at conference, where he was met with Nazi salutes and cheers by the 
crowed of white nationalists.221 His estranged Russian wife Nina Kuprianova, who 
writes under the pen name Nina Byzantina, has translated some of Dugin’s articles 
into English.222 Spencer and his National Policy Institute tried to organize a 
conference for “racial realists” and other racist ultranationalists, neo-Nazis, and 
far-right movements from across Europe and America in Hungary, to be sponsored 
by the extreme right Jobbik party. Although this was a bridge too far for the 
Hungarian government of Viktor Orban in 2014, who denied a visa to Dugin and 
forced Jobbik to cancel the conference.223 Jobbik went along with this, despite its 
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chairman Gabor Vona having lectured at Lomonosov University at Dugin’s 
invitation.224 He was responsible for organizing the rally in Charlottesville from 
August 11-12, 2007 to ‘Unite the Right’ where activist Heather Heyer was murdered 
by a man who shares Spencer’s views, illustrating the very real threat of violence at 
the heart of his repugnant ideology.  Illustrating the high regard they hold Russia 
in, when Spencer and his fellow travelers returned to Charlottesville two months 
later to demonstrate they chanted “Russia is our friend” as one of their slogans.225  
Matthew Heimbach, a ‘white nationalist’ who leads the Traditionalist 
Workers Party, another attendee at the Charlottesville rally, has called Russia the 
“axis of nationalists,” and invited Dugin to speak via Skype at a conference in 
California.226 Preston Wigington, who sublets an apartment from David Duke in 
Moscow when he visits Russia, had Dugin speak via Skype to a poorly attended 
conference at Texas A&M.227 Wigington has written: he has "best friends" in Russia 
— "the only nation that understands RAHOWA [Racial Holy War]" and that 
Russians are "leading skinheads."228 David Duke himself has met Dugin in Russia, 
                                                
224 “Gábor Vona Had a Lecture in at Lomonosov University in Russia,” Jobbik, May 24, 2013, 
https://www.jobbik.com/gábor_vona_had_lecture_lomonosov_university_russia. 
 
225 “White Nationalists Return to Charlottesville,” BBC News, October 8, 2017, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41543631. 
 
226 Natasha Bertrand, “’A Model for Civilization’: Putin’s Russia Has Emerged as a ‘Beacon’ for 









but Dugin’s appeal to white supremacists is limited for the most racist white 
supremacists in the United States. Anton Shekovtsov, an expert on the Russian far-
right and the rebirth of fascism makes the case that:  
Dugin was not well perceived in the States for one simple reason, because 
he considered that empire—it always has multiculturalism, and they need a 
pure white society, to be not Muslim, nor Jewish, whatsoever.229  
 
This has not stopped Dugin from attempting to foster ties with them, the Kremlin 
from trying to use them to exacerbate divides in American society, or for white 
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Chapter 11: Inspiration Worldwide and Kremlin Grand 
Strategy 
The strategy outlined by Dugin in Foundations of Geopolitics does not call 
for a military occupation of Europe, which even Dugin concedes is unrealistic, and 
as especially so in 1996, but through the ideological realignment of European states 
toward Russia and away from the United States fueled by their resentment of 
American cultural hegemony.  Dugin acknowledges this sentiment, arguing 
“Europe does not want to be Russia or America” and: 
Therefore, Russia has two paths—a military occupation of Europe, or a 
strategic reorganization of the European space, which will be made in the 
geopolitical sector by a secure strategic alliance with Moscow –preserving 
its sovereignty, autonomy, and its autarky. The first variant is so unrealistic 
it cannot be discussed seriously. The second variant—complex, but 
feasible—has been carried out on in Europe’s transition to a colony over the 
past half century, having left the track of serious European consciousness.230 
 
Since the canceled conference in Budapest, Orban and his Fidesz party have 
moved farther to the right and openly embraced a Eurasianist ideology and 
defended Russia against EU sanctions, becoming the first European Union nation 
                                                




to align ideologically with Russia. Hungary has been at the forefront of the anti-
refugee movement, as well as popularizing anti-Soros rhetoric, generally with anti-
Semitic connotations. Dugin writes very approvingly of the Visegrad group, an 
informal bloc of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary which have 
been at the forefront of reactionary European anti-refugee sentiment. He refers 
back to Carl Schmitt when describing it, arguing that: “the Eastern 
European Grossraum could be a pole by itself in the broader context of 
multipolarity.”231 He repeats his anti-globalist talking points by remarking:  
Every member of the Visegrad Group is trying to defend its traditional 
identity. But the mainstream political line and essential ideology of the EU 
is trying to dissolve these identities. The so-called ideology of human rights 
inherently refuses to recognize any kind of collective identity, including 
that of nationality and citizenship. Hence, we see provoked and 
uncontrolled migration, refugees, European self-hatred, and so on. 
Multiculturalism destroys society from within.232  
 
Of course, for Dugin, “Russia is now the natural ally for the Visegrad Group” and in 
line with his geopolitical formulations in Foundations he argues: 
Russia is also interested in reinforcing the Visegrad Group – not because 
Russia wishes to retake its traditional zone of influence (it’s not possible, 
anyway), but because we’re interested in it as something that could be 
independent of Brussels, and which could weaken the presence of globalist 
structures in Europe.233  
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This seemingly goes against his imperial worldview, but Dugin is aware enough to 
know, for the most part, that it is necessary to cloak his geopolitical intentions to 
make them palatable to potential subservient regions of a Eurasian empire, similar 
to how he obscures the Nazism of many of his geopolitical role models. Elsewhere 
in Eastern Europe, Russia has promoted an anti-Soros narrative in Macedonia and 
apparently successfully convinced enough Macedonians to boycott a vote on a 
name change to ‘North Macedonia’ that would have allowed it to join NATO.234 
This move to prevent a Slavic national group from joining the ‘Atlanticist’ bloc fits 
perfectly with Dugin’s geopolitics. In many respects Soros has become the ultimate 
bogeyman for the far-right across the globe, a narrative originally promoted by 
Russia, and his status as the ultimate globalist stems from his Jewish heritage; 
often the term ‘globalist’ has become a dog whistle synonym for Jew, much as 
terms like ‘cosmopolitan’ have in the past.235 This definition of globalist is distinct 
from a person or organization that has benefited from or supports neo-liberal 
globalization. 
Another project aimed at weakening the “globalist structures in Europe” has 
been support for Marine Le Pen’s National Front. Dugin wrote after the French 
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Presidential elections: “France is split according to the geopolitical principles. 
There is a Eurasian France, voting for Marine Le Pen... In these areas…residence of 
the Eurasian French ... This can be called ‘French Novorossiya.’"236 Russian 
financial and ideological support for Le Pen has been well documented.237 Russian 
actors also hacked Macron’s campaign and launched cyberattacks on French 
election infrastructure, although these were unsuccessful in swaying public 
opinion and countered by French officials.238  
Across the English Channel, there is evidence that the British vote to leave 
the European Union was also influenced by Russian misinformation and the Leave 
campaign benefitted from Russian funding. Dugin lauded the event: 
Now the EU cycle has passed its noon, sunset begins. This does not mean 
that it has already occurred. People who understand the trend are definitely 
not calmed by the reassurance that nothing bad is happening - it can still be 
fixed. But those who understand the trends, they know that it happened 
and are already thinking on this basis. For analysts that are forecasting on a 
global scale, the EU is over. And it is irreversible. The British cannot re-
vote. The critical point of Europe’s decay has passed.”239  
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This perfectly fits with Dugin’s geopolitics of the dividing the West of America and 
the West of Europe. With the removal of ‘Atlanticist’ Britain from the EU, the 
process of splitting the European Union and creating alliances with nationalist, 
authoritarian governments of individual European states can begin in earnest. 
Russian state media English language outlets like Sputnik News and Russia Today 
(RT) provided one-sided coverage of the vote, hoping to influence Britons.240 
While Russian funding, through Arron Banks, the biggest bankroller of the Leave 
campaign, aided the Brexiteers.241242 Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence 
Party, personal friend of Donald Trump, and the main cheerleader for Brexit, may 
even have served as an intermediary between Russia, the Trump Campaign, and 
Julian Assange and this possibility has been investigated as part of the Mueller 
Investigation.243 
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The crown jewel for Dugin would be concluding a geopolitical alliance with 
Germany, fulfilling his longed-for Moscow-Berlin axis, and allowing expansion to 
“French Novorossiya” and elsewhere. The political project aimed at achieving this 
has been the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD), a reactionary anti-migrant party 
that has achieved significant electoral gains over the past several years. Alexander 
Gauland, now the head of the party after its previous leader Frauke Petry left the 
party due to its growing extremism,244 has said he would have “no problem 
whatsoever” with an alliance between the youth wing of his party and the Putin 
youth.245 He travelled to St. Petersburg in 2015 and according to Der Spiegel 
reporters Melania Amman and Pavel Lokshin:  
[The] trip [was] paid for by the St. Basil the Great Charitable Foundation, 
which is financially backed by a Putin-loyal oligarch. In St. Petersburg, 
Gauland met with members of the Duma, a personal advisor to Putin and 
Alexander Dugin…Gauland says Dugin is a pleasant conversation partner.246  
 
Constanze Stelzenmüller, an expert at the Brookings Institute, testified to the 
United States Senate Intelligence Committee that Russia has targeted the German 
electorate with “active measures” aimed at manipulating public opinion; however, 
as Germany uses only paper ballots, any hacking of the election infrastructure is 
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not possible.247 She notes, like Dugin, that “For a Russia that is clearly bent on 
destabilizing Europe and the transatlantic alliance, Germany is the prize: Weaken 
Germany, and you diminish the EU and the European project.”248 Dugin agrees in 
Foundations of Geopolitics, asserting “the alliance of France and German…is the 
spine around which its altogether logical to build a new Europe.”249 
Italy, the birthplace of Evola, has proven to be the major European country 
most sympathetic to Dugin’s ideology at the current moment and here Dugin has 
created and maintained personal relationships with politicians that have concrete 
policymaking power. Italians turned to the upstart, anti-corruption Five-Star 
Movement founded by comedian Beppo Grillo in the most recent elections; in 
many respects, this was a protest vote against the stagnant economic policy and 
cronyism of successive Europhile center-left and center-right coalition 
governments, rather than a vote for a cohesive political platform, as the Five-Star 
Movement lacked one. But to achieve a coalition the Five-Star Movement joined 
forces with the ultranationalist, reactionary Northern League and named its leader 
Matteo Salvini as Interior Minister. Salvini is friendly with Dugin, having traveled 
to Moscow in 2015 to be interviewed by him. In the interview Salvini made his 
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opposition to the European Union clear: “The EU, being an unnatural structure, 
has already started crumbling. The European Union is a cell, the opposite of 
democracy, the opposite of the culture of labor.”250 In response to a question about 
EU sanctions against Russia due to the war in Eastern Ukraine he opined:  
I hope that they will soon be lifted. This is madness, just like the absent 
recognition of Crimea, a subject which identified itself as part of Russia. It is 
incredible that international bodies decide who can vote for self-
determination and who doesn't have this right.251  
 
In March 2017, Salvini signed an agreement of cooperation between the Northern 
League and Putin’s United Russia party.252  
A similar agreement was signed between United Russia and the Austrian 
Freedom Party, which is also in coalition government in Austria and shares similar 
anti-refugee principles.253 Steve King, an American congressman who has endorsed 
an openly white supremacist candidate for Toronto’s mayor, spouts Great 
Replacement conspiracy theory ideas adopted from the European far-right and 
shared by Alex Jones, writing on Twitter: “cultural suicide by demographic 
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transformation must end,” has also met with the leaders of the Austrian Freedom 
Party and the AFD.254  
Salvini’s advisor, Gianluca Savioni has known Dugin for twenty years and 
has close links to Orazio Marie Gnerre, who has been accused of recruiting 
mercenaries in Italy to fight for Russian-backed forces in Eastern Ukraine.255 
Gnerre formerly helmed an obscure Italian political party “Millenivm,” which is an 
analogue to Dugin’s Eurasia Party in Italy, and was endorsed warmly by Dugin.256 
Dugin approves wholeheartedly of the Italian coalition government and visited 
Italy in July 2018, when he gave an interview supporting it: “Matteo Salvini and 
Luigi Di Maio [current leader of the Five Star Movement] represent the fulfillment 
of Trump's ideas.”257  
Despite his anti-Semitism, Dugin became close with Avigdor Eskin, a 
Russian Kabbalist Jew (the good kind of Jew according to Dugin in On the Jewish 
Question) and member of the extremist, racist, and now banned Kach movement, 
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in the late 1990s after Eskin was released from Israeli prison following a four-
month jail sentence for incitement due to him pronouncing a kabbalist death 
curse on Yitzhak Rabin as punishment for his support for the Oslo Accords.258 
According to Clover, Eskin believes that Dugin needed “him as shield against being 
called anti-Semitic.”259 But, Eskin gravitated towards Dugin’s worldview and 
admittedly shared much of it before their meeting. In 2010, Eskin toured South 
African with Dr. Dan Roodt, who has associated with Neo-Nazi organizations in 
Europe and is the leader of the Pro-Afrikaans Action Group, which supports a 
whites only state in South Africa and a return to Apartheid.260 Eskin said in an 
interview with Haaretz after returning:  
We're talking about a broad coalition of right-wing parties with common 
interests. Today the struggle is no longer between countries or parties, but 
between civilizations. I will support any movement that shares my ideas, 
and is opposed to the process of globalization - whether involving ideas, 
goods or people. Right now, I have no ties with right-wing parties in 
Europe. Their worldview only relates to opposition to immigration and that 
doesn't interest me. I'd have no problem cooperating even with [French 
nationalist extremist Jean-Marie] Le Pen, or with Belgian nationalists, on 
condition that they disassociated themselves from their anti-Semitic 
statements. In certain situations, I definitely see them as natural partners.261  
 
This sentiment, with language about civilizational clashes and opposition to 
globalization and immigration parrots Dugin perfectly and the growth of parties 
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worldwide sharing this worldview, lauded by Steve Bannon, has benefited from 
Russian encouragement and the export of Dugin’s ideological and strategic 
precepts.  
Sensing a divisive issue, Russian information warriors have seized on this 
narrative of the victimization of Afrikaners in South Africa, against evidence to the 
contrary. Afrikaners today maintain a privileged place in the South African 
economy and control a disproportionate share of wealth and land. Russian officials 
have offered to help move Afrikaner families to Russia where they can live with 
“traditional Christian values” and have promoted a narrative of “white genocide” in 
South Africa.262 This rhetoric has been peddled in the USA by the Afriforum group, 
whose leaders spoke at the Cato Institute and were interviewed by Tucker Carlson. 
Their talking points were then inevitably repeated by President Trump, who 
tweeted: “I have asked Secretary of State to closely study the South Africa land and 
farm seizures and expropriations and the large scale killing of farmers. South 
African Government is now seizing land from white farmers.”263 The tweet was 
hailed by David Duke, who has his own connections to Russia.264 
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One of the most chilling examples of the influence of fascist, far-right 
ideology and movements similar to those promoted by Dugin and the various 
political technologies of the Kremlin was the despicable terrorist attack carried out 
by Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011. Breivik planted a bomb in Oslo which killed 
eight and ruthlessly gunned down sixty-nine young people at a camp operated by 
the center-left Norwegien Labor Party on Utøya Island. In his rambling manifesto, 
much of it plagiarized from other sources, such as the radical traditionalist aspects 
of Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski’s manifesto (while omitting his 
environmentalist ideas), Breivik articulates many of Dugin’s and his ideological 
allies’ points regarding militant resistance towards ‘multiculturalism.’ In his 
loathsome manifesto 2083: A European Declaration of Impendence, he writes:  
Multiculturalism (cultural Marxism/political correctness), as you might 
know, is the root cause of the ongoing Islamisation of Europe which has 
resulted in the ongoing Islamic colonisation of Europe through 
demographic warfare (facilitated by our own leaders). This compendium 
presents the solutions and explains exactly what is required of each.265  
 
Without naming Dugin, Breivik even offers a sympathetic critique of his 
Eurasianist ideology, but ultimately unacceptable to Breivik due to its lack of 
Islamophobia, noting: 
A subtler basis for sympathy is the so-called traditionalist current, which 
was represented by the converts René Guénon and Frithjof Schuon, and still 
has a following: it has been idealising Islam and esp. Sufism as the preserver 
of the age-old philosophia pernnis against modernity. In Russia, some 
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Slavophile anti-Western groups now seek an alliance with Islam against the 
impending Americanisation of their society. In the U.S., Christian 
fundamentalists and Islamic organisations are increasingly creating 
common platforms to speak out against trends of moral decay (abortion, 
pornography, etc.). Some of these phenomena of traditionalist alliance-
building are quite respectable, but they are nevertheless conducive to Islam 
negationism.266  
 
He also states that his alleged “Knights Templar” groups (no evidence was 
found of co-conspirators for his attack, but he was very active on far-right, neo-
Nazi message boards) have a “hostile stance towards any and all Marxist 
organisations (the only possible exception being the rare case of national-
Bolshevik organization).”267 Furthermore, he refers to himself and likeminded 
figures as “conservative revolutionaries.”268 Although he does not cite any of 
Dugin’s works, it is clear he is familiar with the Neo-Eurasianist ideology and the 
Nouvelle Droit figures who helped inspire it.  
He mentions Dugin by name in reference to the Ergenekon Case, 
illustrating a familiarity with Dugin himself. The Ergenekon Case was, possibly still 
is, or maybe never was a murky plot by ultranationalist Kemalist officers in the 
Turkish military to seize power from Recip Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP Party in 2008. 
Breivik is sympathetic to the plot and refers to Dugin as the movement’s “chief 
advocate.” He observes:  









When the Russian newspaper Kommersant declared Dugin to be the brains 
behind Ergenekon, Dugin responded that he had no part in illegal activities, 
but that he saw no crime in sharing their vision of Turkey's future—free 
from the influence of NATO and the United States.269  
 
Dugin probably had no active role in the plot, but in an interview with a Greek 
journalist he mentions the “Ergenekon Case and repressions by Erdogan against 
the Eurasian and nationalist chiefs of Turkish military forces.”270 After the 
massacre on Utoya, Dugin made no attempt to condemn it, rather, according to 
Johannes Due Enstad, for Dugin: 
Breivik is just another symptom of European decay. Dugin did not discuss 
ideology or why Breivik did what he did, but expressed a desire to see more 
Breiviks in the West, as this would further the inevitable collapse: ‘The end 
is coming to Europe…. Let there be multiculturalism, Freemasonry, gay 
pride, and Breiviks. Let all this European filth destroy itself…. The more 
Breiviks… the better.’271  
 
This modern fascism outlook fixated on the destruction of multiculturalism has 
already inspired a great act of evil and Dugin’s reaction to it reveals his inner 
darkness and the means he finds acceptable for achieving his Neo-Eurasianist 
fantasies. 
Even at the level of grand strategy, Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism can be seen as 
somewhat influential. Russia’s cautious embrace of Turkey echoes Savitsky’s 
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Turanism and has been thoroughly advocated for by Dugin, who has become 
somewhat of a media darling for the pro-regime press in Turkey, which is now the 
only press in Turkey.272 Dugin may even have been instrumental in mending ties 
between Turkey and Russia when a Russian jet was shot down over Turkey in 
2015.273 He was reportedly approached by two of the supposed ringleaders of the 
Ergenekon conspiracy, politician Dogu Perincek and Lt. Gen. Ismail Hakki Pekin, 
the former head of the Turkish Armed Forces’ Military Intelligence, to “help 
improve ties with Russia,” and Dugin recommended an apology, which was 
provided by Erdogan himself.274 His visit to Ankara in support of this initiative was 
heavily publicized by Dugin’s think tank Katehon, which is a reference to an 
apocalyptic transformation coined by Schmitt.275 Notably, in 2016, with relations 
between NATO and Turkey deteriorating and the Erdogan regime displaying more 
authoritarian tendencies, “the Supreme Court of Appeals overturned convictions 
in the Ergenekon trials, ruling that the “Ergenekon terror organization” did not 
exist at all and that evidence had been collected illegally.”276 Dugin has also 
                                                
















advocated for a close alliance with Iran due to their shared anti-atlanticism in 
Foundations, and this has also come to pass.277 Dugin has claimed that aside from 
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Chapter 12: Conclusion and What Comes After Putin? 
The multiple components involved in Eurasianism weaken its consistency, 
but broaden its appeal. In many respects, it is a Rorschach test for far-right 
movements around the world—seeing in it what they would like to see. However, 
its general principles are clear: authoritarianism, precedence of the state over the 
individual, a vocabulary of war, and deterministic geopolitics rooted in the ethnos. 
These are the principles of fascism, and Eurasianism is just its threadbare cloak. 
Vladimir Putin may personally sympathize with Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianist ideology 
or he may simply use it as a political tool to keep his most militaristic, fascist-
minded subjects and those with delusions of grandeur under the big tent of his 
United Russia Party and its allies in the controlled opposition. However, regardless 
of Putin’s intentions, the result has been the flourishing of Neo-Eurasianist 
ideology—or worse, a narrow ethnic Russian supremacism that even Dugin claims 
to find repellant. The terminology of Duin’s ideology has proliferated, as well as his 
Manichean worldview. The clumsy terms of Eurasianist and Atlanticist and 
tallassocracy and tellulocracy have largely been replaced by traditionalist and 
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globalist, or nationalism and multiculturalism, but the essential dichotomy and 
meaning remains the same. 
The Kremlin’s adventurism abroad, cronyism, and outright theft of state 
resources has drained the coffers of the Russian Federation and led Putin to raise 
the pension age for both men and women. This has provoked protests across the 
country—from St. Petersburg to Eastern Siberia—and triggered a sharp decline in 
Putin’s popularity.279 Not only that, but the opposition—such as it is—gained 
broadly across the country in the recent elections. However, the beneficiaries were 
not the tolerated liberal parties such as the Union of Right Forces, but rather the 
LPDR and the KPFR, both helmed by the same ultranationalists, Gennady 
Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who have continued to peddle Dugin’s ideas 
more brazenly than Putin and his United Russia party. There are no signs that the 
end of the Putin regime is anywhere near imminent or that Zhirinovsky or 
Zyuganov will really turn against the Kremlin. But this raises the specter that 
perhaps whoever comes after Putin will not be a liberal reformer, as many in the 
West have blithely concluded is predestined, but a demagogue or a strongman to 
the right of Putin. The consequences of such leadership could much more 
plausibly bring about Dugin’s fantasies of a transformative purifying eschaton that 
forges a traditionalist, fascist empire, which despite Putin’s silencing of dissidents 
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and blatant disregard for human rights, seems unlikely to occur during his reign. 
Yet, as Anton Shekhovstov, argues, Dugin and Putin remain aligned, because: 
The first step to Dugin’s new empire is the restoration of the old empire 
sought by Putin. In this sense, Putin, even if not directly pursuing Dugin’s 
plan, does perform steps which may – in the long run – lead to the 
implementation of Dugin’s project.280 
 
As a troubling indication of the Russian public’s potential acceptance for 
such a development, Stalin’s popularity is at an all-time high in Post-Soviet 
Russia.281 For Dugin, Stalin is the embodiment of the Eurasian tendencies of the 
Soviet Union, but an appraisal of Stalin’s reign reveals the hollowness of Dugin’s 
ideology. Under Stalin’s leadership, the Soviet Union carried the heaviest burden 
of World War II and crushed Nazi Germany ending the Third Reich which Dugin 
so admires. Additionally, national groups were often not treated as equals with the 
ability to retain cultural autonomy in exchange for loyalty to Moscow, instead 
many ethnic groups including the Ingush and Chechens, the Crimean Tatars, 
Koreans, Finns, Greeks, Germans, the Baltic peoples, and many smaller groups of 
Caucasian ethnicities were the victims of ethnic cleansing, forcibly deported from 
their homelands and pressured to lose their traditional identity.  
In the United States, in Europe, and elsewhere around the globe variants of 
his ideology, promoted by the Kremlin, have achieved notable success. It must not 
be overlooked that these nations have been susceptible to such attacks due to 
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weaknesses in domestic ideologies and the prevailing, although waning, neo-
liberal world order. Dugin and traditionalism provide an alternative to stale 
political narratives and he recognized this appeal when he was writing in 1996:  
Peoples and states which enter that bloc [a hypothetical Eurasian empire], 
could expect, at the least, ethnocultural sovereignty for direct participants 
in the creations and design of a new macro-ideology; whereas the 
geopolitical variant of the “New World Order,” is already fully elaborated 
and offering to the Earth’s peoples as in the colonial analogue of the Liberal, 
free-market American model.282 
 
Compounding this, the financial crisis of 2008 was a damning indictment of 
the weaknesses inherent in a deregulated banking system and the austerity 
regimes imposed by many nations in response only poured fuel on a long 
simmering flame. In the United States income gains have been vastly skewed 
towards the top earners, and the authors of the 2018 World Inequality Report note 
that:  
This stagnation of incomes of the bottom 50% relative to the upsurge in 
incomes experienced by the top 1% has been perhaps the most striking 
development in the United states economy over the last four decades…the 
groups have seen their shares of total us income reverse between 1980 and 
2014.283  
 
This development has been accompanied by a disturbing trend where alone 
among demographic groups in the United States, non-college educated white 
males—those most likely to support Donald Trump—have had an increase in 
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morbidity. Despite advances in medicine resulting in “mortality declines from the 
two biggest killers in middle age—cancer and heart disease,” these gains “were 
offset by marked increases in drug overdoses, suicides, and alcohol-related liver 
mortality in this period.” The rise in these diseases of despair reflect a certain 
hopelessness and frustration across this segment of the population. This was 
expressed when during the 2016 American elections, “Trump’s margin among 
whites without a college degree is the largest among any candidate in exit polls 
since 1980.”284 Although this is not Weimar America or comparable to the 
conditions of Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Americans 
are caught in a downward spiral of relative economic and social deprivation with 
few options to escape. 
For those caught in this economic and social despair, looking inwards and 
backwards to mythic historical narratives with little basis in truth provides pride 
and a sense of meaning to some people, as well as providing a strawman to blame 
for their problems in the form of immigrants, globalism, and multiculturalism. Of 
course, racism and xenophobia are not new features of Western politics and in 
many respects the appeal of traditionalism is an appeal to traditional prejudices. 
Russian propaganda did not suddenly make many Americans racist, but it has 
capitalized on racist attitudes and economic frustration to increase division and 
distrust. It is noteworthy that “Republicans who scored highest on racial 
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resentment were about 30 percentage points more likely to support Trump than 
their more moderate counterparts” during the Republican primaries.285 
Racist attitudes dovetail with another factor that causes voters to support 
xenophobic politicians—fear.  A study from the Public Religion Research Institute 
found “besides partisanship, fears about immigrants and cultural displacement 
were more powerful factors than economic concerns in predicting support for 
Trump among white working-class voters.”286 Other studies have found these fears 
are linked to a sense of displacement caused by changing demographics 
threatening the status of whites as the majority group and the feeling that 
“American global dominance was in danger.”287 Anxiety over cultural displacement 
and a perceived threat of losing a privileged place in society appear to have 
motivated many during the past election, rather than economic concerns. 
Desperation, fear, and the conviction that an ‘other’ is to blame, the 
friend/enemy worldview of Schmitt, provides opportunity for these prejudices to 
fester. The reality warping nature of immersive social media exacerbates the effects 
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of these efforts. Long before social media had been developed Hannah Arendt 
warned in On Totalitarianism: 
The self-compulsion of ideological thinking ruins all relationships with 
reality…The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or 
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between 
fact and fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer 
exist.288 
  
Social media and cable news, alongside intentionally and constantly deceitful 
political leadership, only amplify this blurring of true and false and lead to the 
possibility of violent radicalization. The appeal of such sentiments should not be 
underrated and the popular support for them cannot be dismissed as solely the 
product of Russian plotting and propaganda, nor can the public’s susceptibility for 
them be separated from historical and ongoing attitudes towards racism and 
xenophobia. Racism remains the original sin of the Americas and the Europe and 
its stain functions acts as a fertile growing medium for Dugin’s worldview to 







                                                





Alex Jones (Infowars) entrevista Aleksandr Dugin. 2017. posted by “Claudiombg.” 
September 23. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfG9juzqCzY.  
 
Amann, Melanie and Pavel Lokshin. 2016. “German Populists Forge Ties with 




Arendt, Hannah. 1951. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
Co. 
 
Baker, Peter. 2018. “’Use That Word!’: Trump Embraces the ‘Nationalist’ Label.” 




BBC News. 2017. "White Nationalists Return to Charlottesville.” BBC News, 
October 8. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41543631. 
 
Bertrand, Natasha. 2016. “’A Model for Civilization’: Putin’s Russia Has Emerged as 




Bokhari, Allum and Milos Yiannopoulous. 2016. “An Establishment Conservative’s 




Bravo, Richard, Gregory Viscusi, Nikos Chrysoloras, and Joshua Green. 2018. 
“Inside Steve Bannon’s Plans for a New European Political Order." 
Bloomberg. September 19. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
09-19/bannon-seeks-european-upset-with-appeal-to-eu-s-populist-forces. 
 
Breivik, Anders. 2011. “2083--A European Declaration of Independence.” Public 
Intelligence. July 28. https://publicintelligence.net/anders-behring-breiviks-
complete-manifesto-2083-a-european-declaration-of-independence/. 
 
Chokshi, Niraj. 2018. “Trump Voters Driven by Fear of Losing Status, Not 






Clover, Charles. 2017. Black Wind, White Snow The Rise of Russia's New 
Nationalism. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
—. 2016. "The Unlikely Origins of Russia's Manifest Destiny." Foreign Policy, July 
27. 
 
Cox, Daniel, Rachel Lienesch, and Robert P. Jones. 2017. “Beyond Economics: Fears 
of Cultural Displacement Pushed the White Working Class to Trump,” 
PRRI, May 9. https://www.prri.org/research/white-working-class-attitudes-
economy-trade-immigration-election-donald-trump/. 
 
Curridori, Francesco. 2017. “In Donbass Non Abbiamo Toccato Un ‘Arma.’” Il 
Giornale. October 15. http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/donbass-non-
abbiamo-toccato-unarma-1452694.html. 
 
Der Spiegel. 2008. "The Chronicle of a Caucasian Tragedy." August 25. 
 
Digital Forensic Research Lab. 2018. “#Troll Tracker: Twiter Troll Farm Archives.” 




Dugin, Aleksandr. 1997. Foundations of Geopolitics. Translated by Grant S. Fellows. 
Arctogaia. 
 
—. 2017. “The Name of Europe is Marine Le Pen.” Geopolitica.ru. July 5. 
https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/name-europe-marine-le-pen. 
 
—. 2016. " Brexit: Europe is Falling into the Abyss.” Katehon. June 25. 
http://katehon.com/article/brexit-europe-falling-abyss. 
 
Duncan, Peter J. S. 2014. Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism 
and After. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. 
 
Dunlop, John. 2004. Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics. 
Demokratizatsiya. January 31. https://tec.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/aleksandr-
dugins-foundations-geopolitics. 
 
Enstad, Johannes Due. 2017. “Glory to Breivik!": The Russian Far Right and the 2011 




Feder, J. Lester. 2016. “This is How Steve Bannon Sees the Entire World.” Buzzfeed 




Ferris-Rotman, Amie. 2018. “Why Russia is Wooing South Africa’s White Farmers.” 





Finnegan, William. 2016. “Donald Trump and the ‘Amazing’ Alex Jones.” The New 
Yorker. June 23. https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/donald-
trump-and-the-amazing-alex-jones. 
 
Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. 2014. Russia This Week: Dugin Dismissed from Moscow 




Fogelman, Shay. 2010. “We Won,” Haaretz. November 5. 
https://www.haaretz.com/1.5135481 
 
Galeotti, Mark. 2018. "I'm Sorry for Creating the Gerasimov Doctrine." Foreign 
Policy. March 5. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-
creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/. 
 
Galperovitch, Danila. 2017. Russian Social Media Sites Have Become Meeting Places 
for the American Ultra-Right. VOA Russia. August 26. https://www.golos-
ameriki.ru/a/4002082.html. 
 
Gatehouse, Gabriel. 2017. “Marine Le Pen: Who Funds the France’s Far Right?” BBC 
Panorama. April 3. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39478066. 
 
Gessen, Masha. 2017. The Future is History How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia. 
New York: Riverhead Books. 
 
Gevorkian, Natalia, Natalia Timakova, A. V. Kolesnikov, Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, 
Vladimir Vladimirovitch Putin. 2000. First Person: An Astonishingly Frank 
Self-portrait by Russia's President. Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. 








—. 2016. “The Cowboy Novels that Inspired Hitler.” The Daily Beast. August 21. 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-cowboy-novels-that-inspired-hitler. 
 




Green, Joshua. 2017. “Inside the Secret, Strange Origins of Steve Bannon's 




Guettel, Jens-Uwe. 2012. German Expansionism, Imperial Liberalism and the United 
States 1776-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Harkinson, Josh. 2016. “Meet the White Nationalists Trying to Ride the Trump 




Hersh, Seymour. 1994. “The Wild East.” The Atlantic Monthly, June. 
 
Herwig, Holger H. 1999. "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum." Journal 
of Strategic Studies 22 (2-3): 218-241. 
 
—. 2016. The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer "Educated" Hitler and 
Hess. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Holton, Kate and Guy Faulconbridge. 2017. “UK investigates Brexit Campaign 





Horowitz, Jason. 2017. “Steve Bannon Cited Italian Thinker Who Inspired Fascists.” 






Hughes, Michael. 2004. "Mysticism and Knowledge in the Philosophical Thought 
of Ivan Kireevsky." Mystics Quarterly 30 (1/2): 15-27. 
 




Jobbik. 2013. Gábor Vona Had a Lecture in at Lomonosov University in Russia." 




Johnson, Chalmers. 2001. “Blowback.” The Nation. September 27. 
https://www.thenation.com/article/blowback/. 
 




Kenar, Ceren. 2016. “Turkey’s ‘Deep State’ Has a Secret Back Channel to Assad." 
Foreign Policy. July 12. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/12/turkeys-deep-
state-has-a-secret-backchannel-to-assad/. 
 
Kirchgaessner, Stephanie, Nick Hopkins, and Luke Harding. 2017. “Nigel Farage is 
‘Person of Interest’ in FBI Investigation into Trump and Russia.” The 
Guardian. June 2. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/01/nigel-
farage-is-person-of-interest-in-fbi-investigation-into-trump-and-russia. 
 
Kirchick, James. 2014. “American Racist Richard Spencer Gets to Play the Martyr in 
Hungary.” October 7. https://www.thedailybeast.com/american-racist-
richard-spencer-gets-to-play-the-martyr-in-hungary. 
 
Kirkpatrick, David D. and Matthew Rosenberg. 2018. “Russians Offered Business 




Knezevic, Gordana. 2017. “Macedonian Witch Hunt Targets George Soros.” 
RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty. January 19. https://www.rferl.org/a/george-
soros-macedonia-witch-hunt/28243738.html. 
 
Konstantakopoulos, Dimitris. 2013. “Alexander Dugin on The Big Game—and Its 






Kouprianova, Nina. n.d. “Nina Byzantina,” 
https://ninabyzantina.com/category/geopolitics/. 
 
Langer, Jacob. 2007. Corruption and Counterrevolution: The Rise and Fall of the 
Black Hundred. Duke University. 
 




Laqueur, Walter. 1993. Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia. New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers. 
 
—. 2015. "Anti-Semitism and the New Russian Idea." Mosaic, June 15. 
 
Levada Center. 2017. "Attitudes Towards Migrants." May 2017. 
https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/05/29/attitudes-toward-migrants/. 
 
—. May. "National Pride". 29 2017. https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/05/29/national-
pride/. 
 
—.October. "Putin's Approval Rating." 2018, https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/. 
 
—. 2018. The Perception of Stalin. April 4. 
https://www.levada.ru/en/2018/04/17/the-perception-of-stalin/. 
 
Levitsky, Gretchen Helmke and Steven. 2006. Informal Institutions and 
Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Lilla, Mark. 2010. “Reading Strauss in Berlin.” The New Republic. December 17. 
 
Lukashevich, Stephen. 1965. Ivan Aksakov, 1823-1886: A Study in Russian Thought 
and Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 




Martin, Michelle. 2017. “Co-leader of Germany’s Far Right AFD to Qut in Major 






Marx, Karl. April. “Letter to Sigfrid Meyer and August Vogt in New York.” 
Marxists.org. 9 1870. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1870/letters/70_04_09.htm. 
 
Marx, Karl. n.d. “On the Jewish Question.” In The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by 
Robert Tucker, 26-46. New York: Norton & Company 
 
MEMRI. 2018. “Russia in the World—Russia-Italy Relations—Italian Prime 
Minister: Italian Government Supports a Revision of the Sanctions Against 




Metelkina, Sofia. 2018. “Aleksandr Dugin: Visegrád Group As the Project of the 




Meyer, Henry and Onur Ant. 2017. "The Russian 'Philosopher' Who Links Putin, 




Minca, Claudio and Rory Rowan. 2014. "The Question of Space in Carl Schmitt." 
Progress in Human Geography 39 (3). 
 
Minca, Trevor J. Barnes and Claudio. 2013. "Nazi Spatial Theory: the Dark 
Geographies of Carl Schmitt and Walter Christaller." Annals of the 
Assocation of American Geographers 103 (3): 669-87. 
 
Nakamura, David, John Hudson, and Isaac Stanley-Becker. 2018. “’Dangerous and 
Poisoned’: Critics Blast Trump for Endorsing White Nationalist Conspiracy 






Nardelli, Alberto and Olga Tokariuk. 2018. “Here’s a Totally Incredible Story About 
Pro-Russian Mercenaries and a Close Aide to Italy’s De Facto Leader.” 
 
 133 




Nemtsova, Anna. 2017. “Russia’s Alt-Right Rasputin Says He’s Steve Bannon’s 




Ockerman, Emma. 2018. “Steve King’s Supporters Don’t Care About the 




Polunin, Andrey. 2017. “Nine Months of Trump.” Svobodnaya Press.  October 23.  
http://svpressa.ru/politic/article/184294/?rss=1 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey. 2012. “What I Did in Russia.” jeffsachs.org. March 14. 
http://jeffsachs.org/2012/03/what-i-did-in-russia/. 
 




Salhani, Justin. 2016. “The White Nationalist Movement’s Favorite Philosopher.” 
ThinkProgress. December 19. https://thinkprogress.org/the-white-
nationalist-movements-favorite-philosopher-42576bc50666/. 
 
Savitsky, Petr. 1933. "The Geographical and Geopolitical Foundations of 
Eurasianism". Translated by Jafe Arnold. 
 
Shane, Scott. 2017. “These Are the Ads Russia Bought on Facebook in 2016.” The 




Shekhovtsov, Anton. 2018. “Austrian and Italian Far-Right Parties Signed 
Coordination and Cooperation Agreements with Putin’s ‘United Russia.’” 








Sommer, Allison Kaplan. 2018. “How Did the Term ‘Globalist’ Become an Anti-




Spannaus, Andrew. 2018. “A Russian Conservative View of Putin: Interview with 




Snyder, Timothy. 2011. The Road to Unfreedom. New York: Random House. 
 
Stelzenmüller, Constanze. 2017. “The Impact of Russian Interference on Germany’s 




Stephenson, Svetlana. 2015. Gangs of Russia: From the Streets to the Corridors of 
Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Telesur. 2018. "Brazil: Steve Bannon to Advise Bolsonaro Presidential Campaign.” 
Telesur. August 15. https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Brazil-Steve-
Bannon-to-Advise-Bolsonaro-Presidential-Campaign-20180815-0003.html. 
 
Teschke, Benno. 2014. "Carl Schmitt's Concepts of War: A Categorical Failure." In 
The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt, edited by Jens Meierhenrich and 
Oliver Simons. Oxford University Press. 
 
Tesler, Michael. 2016. “Trump Is the First Modern Republican to Win the 






Truscott IV, Lucian K. 2017. “Nixon and Trump: What Happens When President’s 
Unravel.” October 14. https://www.salon.com/2017/10/14/the-lessons-we-
learned-from-nixon-about-when-presidents-unravel/. 
 
Tsargrad Analytical Group. 2016. “Dugin: Trump Can Become an American 






Turner, Frederick Jackson. 1893. "The Significance of the Frontirer in American 
History" 
 




Vilmer, Jean-Baptise Jangéne and Heather A. Conley. 2018. “Successfully 
Countering Russian Electoral Interference.” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. June 21. https://www.csis.org/analysis/successfully-
countering-russian-electoral-interference. 
 
Wintour, Patrick. 2018. “Russian Bid to Influence Brexit Vote Detailed in New US 





















Section 1: Friedrich Ratzel: The State as a Physical Organism 
 
1.1 Background: The German “Organic School” 
Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) can be considered “the father” of geopolitics, 
although he did not use this term in his own writings. He wrote on “political 
geography.” His principal work, published in 1897, was titled “Politische 
Geographie.” 
Ratzel graduated from Karlsruhe Polytechnic University where he attended 
courses in geology, paleontology, and zoology. He completed his education at 
Heidelberg, where he became an acolyte of Professor Ernest Haeckel (who was the 
first to use the term “ecology’). Ratzel’s ideology was grounded in evolution and 
Darwinism and colored by his pronounced interest in Biology.  
Ratzel participated in the Franco-Prussian War, where he served as a 
volunteer and received the Iron Cross for bravery. In politics, he gradually became 
a committed nationalist and in 1890 he joined the “Pan-German League” of Karl 
Peters. His lengthy travels in America and Europe added to his own scientific 
interest in Ethnological research. He became a lecture of geography at the Munich 
Technical Institute and in 1886 he moved to a similar position in Leipzig. 
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In 1876 Ratzel defended his dissertation “The Chinese Immigration,” and in 
Stuttgart, he came out with his fundamental work in 1882, “Anthro-Geography” 
(“Anthropogeographie”) in which he formulates his basic idea: That there is a 
connection between the evolution of peoples and demographics with physical 
geographic data; the influence that physical terrain has on a people’s culture, 
political development, and so on. 
But his most fundamental book was “Political Geography.” 
1.2 The State as a Living Organism 
Ratzel showed in his work that land is a fundamental, fixed constant around 
which the interests of a people rotate. The movement of history is predetermined 
by earth and territories. Further followed by an evolutionary inference that the 
“state constitutes a living organism,” but one that is “rooted in the ground.” The 
state develops based on its territorial topography, size and its comprehension by 
the people. Thus, the state reflects the objective geographic principle and 
subjective national comprehension of this principle, and this is expressed 
politically. Ratzel considered a “normal” state, one which most organically 
combined geography, demographics, and ethnological national parameters. 
He writes: 
The state in all stages in its development as an organism contends with the 
necessity of preserving its connection with the terrain and therefore they 
should be studied from a geographical point of view. As shown in ethnology 
and history, a state develops on a spatial basis--conjugating and merging 
more and more--and extracting from it more and more energy. Thus, a state 
turns out to consist spatially, maintained and animated by this space, and 
should be managed, described, and measured through geography. A state is 
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described in a series of phenomena, with the expansionary principle being 
the most prominent. (Political Geography 1) 
 
It is clearly visible that from such an organic approach, Ratzel understood 
territorial expansion to be a natural, living process, similar to the growth of living 
organisms. 
Ratzel’s “organic” approach is in relation to its space (Raum). This “space” 
brings over a cardinal material category in a new quality, becoming the “Living 
Sphere,” “Living Space” (Lebensraum), in a “Geobioylogical Environment.” From 
this concept arises two different, important terms of Ratzel’s: “Sense of Space” 
(Raumsinn) and “Living Energy (Lebensenergie). These terms are closely related to 
each other and denote some special quality, inherent in geographical systems and 
predetermining political figuration in the history of the people and state. 
All these theses comprise the fundamental principles of geopolitics, in that 
form, which would be developed somewhat later by followers of Ratzel. 
Furthermore, the relationship to the state is similar to a “living, physical organism, 
rooted in the soil;” this is the chief principle and axis of geopolitical 
methodologies. That approach is oriented in synthetic analysis of the entire 
complex of phenomena, regardless of whether they belong to the human sphere or 
non-human sphere. The land is a concrete expression of nature, the surrounding 
environment, and is not regarded as a continuous living body of the ethnos--it is 
the land being inhabited. The material structure itself dictates the proportions of 
the final cultural products.  
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In this idea Ratzel is the founder of the entire German School of “organic” 
sociology, of which Ferdinand Tönnies is the most notable representative.  
1.3 Raum - Political Organization of the Land 
Ratzel’s observation was that there is a correlation between ethnos and 
space--as seen in the following excerpt from “Political Geography:” 
The state develops like an organism, tethered to certain parts of the earth’s 
surface, and its characteristics developing from the characteristics of the 
people and land. The most important characteristics are its size, location, 
and borders. Followed by types of soil, along with vegetation levels, 
irrigation, and finally, correlates in relation to the rest of the 
conglomerations of the earth’s surface, and in the first place, with 
neighboring seas and uninhabited lands, which, at first glance, does not 
represent especial political interest. The aggregate of these characteristics 
constitutes the Land (das Land). But adding to this, when speaking about 
‘our country,’ is that created by man--memories connected to the earth. So, 
an initially pure understanding of geography transformed into the spiritual 
and emotional bonds of the inhabitants of a land and their history. 
A nation is an organism not only because it articulates the lives of the 
people in fixed soil, but due to its intertwining bond, becoming something 
unified--unthinkable without one of two components. Desolate land, 
incapable of nurturing government, are barren fields in history. On the 
contrary, habitable land promotes state development--particularly if the 
state is surrounded by natural boundaries. People may feel themselves to be 
natural in their territory, but they are actually constantly mimicking one 
and the same characteristics, which proceeding forth from the terrain, will 
be inscribed in it. (2) 
 
1.4 The Law of Expansion 
The relationship of the state to a living organism implies the refusal of the 
concept of “borderlessness.” The state is born, grows, and dies like a living being. 
Consequently, a state’s spatial expansion and contraction are natural processes 
connected to an intrinsic life cycle. Ratzel, in his book “On the Law of Spatial 
Growth of the State” (1901), laid out the seven laws of expansion: 
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1. The state expands in relation to the development of its culture 
2. The physical growth of the state is accompanied by other manifestations of its 
development: in the spheres of ideology, production, commercial activities, and 
a mighty, attractive proselytizing power. 
3. The state expands by consuming and absorbing units of lesser political 
significance. 
4. The border is an organ located on the state’s periphery (understood as in an 
organism). 
5. Carrying out its territorial expansion, the state strives to cover important 
regions for its development: coastlines, river basins, valleys, and in general, the 
richest territories. 
6. The initial impulse for expansions comes from outside—that is in its expansion 
the state provokes states (or territories) with clearly inferior civilizations. 
7. The general tendencies of assimilation or absorption the weakest nations are 
reinforced by an even greater increase in self-perpetuating momentum.  
Unsurprisingly, many critics have rebuked Ratzel for his writings because they 
have been a “catechism for imperialists.” While he himself by no means pressed for 
the favorite methods for justifying German imperialism, still he did not disguise 
that he had nationalist convictions. For him, it was important to establish a 
conceptual instrument for advocating awareness of the history of the state and 
nation and their relationship to the land. In practice, he sought the awakening of 
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“Raumsinn” (“the spirit of the land), among the leaders of Germany, whom 
regarded geopolitics as a dry academic discipline merely representing abstraction.  
1.5 Weltmacht and the Sea 
Ratzel was greatly influenced by his experiences in North America, which 
he studied thoroughly and published two books on: “Maps of the Cities and 
Civilizations of the American South” (1874), and “the Southern United States of 
America,” (1878 1880). He noted, having his considerable experience of political 
geography in European history, the far greater degree that the “spirit of the land” 
had in American expansion because Americans first had the task of mastering the 
“empty” expanses. Accordingly, the American people sensibly put into practice 
what the Old World had come to intuitively and gradually. So, in Ratzel’s work we 
come across the first formulation of another important geopolitical concept—
“world power” (weltmacht). Ratzel observed that large countries have a tendency 
in their development to maximize geographical expansion, gradually moving to 
the global level.  
Therefore, some time or another, geographical growth should arrive at its 
continental phase. 
Applying this principle—inferred and deduced from the American political 
experiment and strategical unification of the continent’s space—to Germany, 
Ratzel predicted its destiny to be a continental power. 
He also anticipated another important geopolitical topic—the importance 
of the seas for civilizational development. In his book “The Seas: The Source of 
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Nations’ Power” (1900) (4), he pointed out the particular necessity of each mighty 
power to develop its naval forces, especially because full-fledged global expansion 
requires it. That some nations and states brought this about spontaneously 
(England, Spain, Holland, etc.), land powers (Ratzel, naturally, had Germany in 
mind) should do this sensibly: develop a fleet that is necessary under the 
conditions for approximating the status of a “world power.”  
The sea and “world power” were already connected for Ratzel, although 
only later geopoliticians (Mahan, Mackinder, Haushofer, and especially Schmitt) 
gave this topic completeness and centrality. The works of Ratzel are the essential 
for all geopolitical research. In a compressed form, his works contain practically 
every basic thesis, which would form the basis of this science. Kjellen, a Swede, 
and Haushofer, a German, based their concepts on Ratzel’s works. His ideas were 
also taken into account by Frenchman Vidal de la Blache, the Englishman 
Mackinder, Mahan, an American, and the Russian Eurasianists (P. Savitsky, L. 
Gumilev, etc.). 
It should be noted that Ratzel’s political sympathies were not accidental. 
Practically all geopolitics has been brightly marked by nationalist sentiment, 
regardless of whether it wears the cloak of “democratic” geopolitics (Anglo-Saxon 
geopolitics of Mackinder and Mahan) or “ideological” forms (Haushofer, Schmitt, 




Section 2: Rudolf Kjellen and Fredrick Neumann “Middle 
Europe” 
 
2.1 Defining a New Science 
A Swede, Rudolf Kjellen, was the first to use the term “Geopolitics.” 
Kjellen was a professor of history and political science at the University of 
Uppsalla and Goteborg University. However, he was an active participant in 
politics, he held a seat in parliament, and his politics were distinguished by an 
underlying Germanophilic orientation. Kjellen was not a professional geographer, 
but he developed the basics of geopolitics as part of political science. His work 
originated from Ratzel’s (he considered him to be his mentor).  
Kjellen’s geopolitics can be identified in the following passage: “This—the 
science of governments (states) as geographical organisms—is incarnate in the 
land.” 
Apart from “Geopolitics,” Kjellen proposed four more neologisms, which in 
his view should be the basis for the partition of political science into separate 
sections. 
1. Econopolitics: “The study of dynamics impulses, transferred from the 
people to the state.” 
2. Demopolitics: “The study of dynamic impulses transferred from the people 
to the state,” an analogue is Ratzel’s “Anthrogeography.” 
3. Sociopolitical: “The study of the social aspect of the state.” 
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4. Kratospolitics: “The study of the forms of governments and powers in 
relation to the problems of rights and socioeconomic factors.” 
But all of these disciplines, which Kjellen cultivated in parallel with geopolitics, 
did not receive more widespread recognition aside from the term “Geopolitics,” 
which steadily became established in quite varied circles. 
2.2 The State as a Life Form and Interests in Germany 
In his foundational work “The State as a Life Form” (1916), Kjellen 
developed postulations that had been hypothesized by Ratzel in his works. Kjellen, 
similar to Ratzel, considered himself a believer in German “Organicism,” rejecting 
the mechanistic state and society approach. The rejection of the strict bleaching of 
study in terms of “inanimate objects” (background), and “human subjects” 
(personalities), is a distinctive feature of geopolitics. In this sense, the very 
meaning of geopolitics is displayed in Kjellen’s work. 
Kjellen developed Ratzel’s geopolitical principles and applied them to 
specific historical situations in his contemporary Europe. 
He followed Ratzel’s idea of “a continental state” to its logical conclusion 
and applied it to Germany. He showed that in the European context Germany 
constitutes that space, which possesses the pivotal dynamism and is intended to 
structure itself to become encircled by the remaining European powers. Kjellen 
interpreted World War I to be a natural conflict arising between a dynamic, 
expanding Germany (Axis nations) opposed by the peripheral European (and non-
European) states (the Entente). Differences in the dynamics of geopolitical 
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growth—downwards for England and France and upwards for Germany—
predetermined the basic alignment of forces. Wherein, from his point of view, this 
is the natural and inevitable geopolitical position for Germany, despite the 
temporary defeat in World War I.  
Kjellen consolidated Ratzel’s geopolitical maxims that were in the interests 
of Germany (= the interests of Europe), in opposition to the interests of the 
Western European powers (especially England and France). But Germany, a 
“young” state, and the Germans, a “young people” (this idea—of “young peoples,” 
which is what Russians and Germans were considered to be—dates back to Fyodor 
Dostoevsky, who was quoted more than once by Kjellen). The “young” Germans, 
motivated by the “Central European Space,” should move to the level of a 
continental state on the global scale at the territorial expense of the “older 
peoples”—the French and English. Yet, the ideological aspect of geopolitical 
confrontations was considered by Kjellen to be secondary to the spatial aspect. 
2.3 Towards the Concept of Middle Europe 
Although Swedish himself, Kjellen pressed for political rapprochement 
between Germany and Sweden. His own geopolitical representation on the 
importance of the unification of German space matches exactly the theory of 
“Middle Europe” (Mitteleuropa), developed by Freidrich Naumann. 
In his book “Mitteleuropa” (1915), Naumann gave a geopolitical diagnosis 
that matches exactly with the concepts of Rudolf Kjellen. From Naumann’s point 
of view, to withstand competition from such organized geopolitical formations like 
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England (and its colonies), the USA, and Russia, the peoples inhabiting Central 
Europe should unify and organize in new integrative, political-economic ways in 
this space. The axis of this space, would of course, naturally, be Germany. 
Mitteleuropa differed from pure “Pan-Germanic” projects, since it was not 
based on nationalism, but strict geopolitical understanding, which the basic 
meaning was not given to ethnic unity, but commonalities in geographical fates. 
Naumann’s project involved the integration of Germany, Austria, the Lower 
Danube states, and in the wider view—France. 
The geopolitical project was also supported by cultural parallels. Germany 
itself was the organic formation identified with spiritual notion of “mitellage,” the 
middle position. This was more deeply formulated in 1818 by Ernst Arndt: “God has 
situated us in the center of Europe: We (the Germans) are the heart of our part of 
the world.”  
Ratzel’s ideas gradually acquired tangible traits through Kjellen and 














3.1 Scientist and Politician 
Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947) is one of the brightest figures amongst 
geopolitical scholars.  
Having received an education in geography, he taught at Oxford beginning 
in 1887, until he was named director of the London School of Economics. From 
1910-1992 he was a Member of Parliament and in 1919-1920 he was the interim 
British Ambassador in Southern Russia. Mackinder is known for his high esteem in 
the world of English politics, and internationally, in which he was very notably 
influential, and also, by the fact that he created some of the boldest and most 
revolutionary systems for interpreting world political history. 
For example, Mackinder most clearly depicted a typical paradox that is 
inherent in geopolitics as a discipline. Mackinder’s ideas were not accepted in the 
scientific community, despite his high position, not just in politics, but in the 
scientific community itself. Even the fact that he had actively and successfully 
participated in building English strategy in international questions, based in his 
interpretation of political and geographical world history, could not convince 
skeptics to accept the value and efficacy of geopolitics as a discipline.  
3.2 The Geographical Pivot of History 
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The first and boldest of Mackinder’s works was his paper “The Geopolitical 
Pivot of History,” published in 1904 in “The Geographical Journal.” In this piece, he 
outlined his core views on history and geography that would be developed further 
in later works. This text of Mackinder’s might be considered the main geopolitical 
text in the discipline’s history, because he not only summarizes previous schools of 
thought in “political geography,” but also formulates the type of basic laws present 
in the sciences. 
Mackinder claims, that for a state, the most advantageous geographical 
position would be in the middle, the central position. The concept of centrality is 
relative and it might vary in each specific geographical context. But from the 
global perspective, the Eurasian Continent lies in the center of the world and in its 
center—the “heart of the world,” or the “heartland.” The heartland is concentrated 
within the continental mass of Eurasia. It is the most favorable geographical 
springboard necessary for control of the whole world. 
The heartland is the key territory within the wider context of the World 
Island. Mackinder includes three continents—Asia, Africa, and Europe—in this 
world island. 
Thus, Mackinder hierarchizes global space via a system of concentric 
circles. In the very center is “the Geographical Pivot of History” or “pivot area.” 
This geographical concept applies equally to Russia. It is the same “axial” reality 
known as the heartland, “the heart at the core.” 
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Continuing, “the interior or marginal crescent (inner or marginal crescent.” 
This belt coincides with the coastal spaces of the Eurasian continent.” According to 
Mackinder, the “inner crescent” itself is presented as the zone of the most intense 
civilizational development. This corresponds with the historical hypothesis that 
civilizations arose initially on the banks of rivers and seas, the so-called “theory of 
theories.” It should be noted that the last theory is a significant instance for all 
geopolitical constructs. The intersection of aquatic and terrestrial spaces is a key 
factor in the history of nations and states. This topic would be developed further as 
the specialization of Schmitt and Spykman; however, they were first brought out in 
Mackinder’s precise geopolitical formula. 
Going further out to the next circle: “the outer or insular crescent” (outer or 
insular crescent). This whole outer zone (geographically and culturally is in 
reference to mainland masses of the World Island.  
Mackinder claims the entire course of history has been determined by the 
following processes. From the heartland’s center to its periphery, it is constantly 
under tension, from so-called “robbers of land.” Especially starkly and graphically 
reflected in the Mongolian invasions. But, they were preceded by the Scythians, 
Huns, Alans, and so on. Civilizations arising out of “the Geographical Pivot of 
History,” the deepest interior spaces of the heartland have, in Mackinder’s opinion, 
“autonomy,” “hierarchy,” “non-democratic” characteristics, and are “non-trading.” 
In the ancient world, these traits were embodied in societies like Dorian Sparta 
and Ancient Rome. 
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Tension is spread from the outside of these regions of the “island crescent,” 
to the world island by the so-called “robbers of the sea” or “island inhabitants.” 
With their colonial expeditions, springing from outside the non-Eurasian center, 
these aspirants counterbalance the terrestrial impulses, arising out of the interior 
margins of the continent. For civilizations of the “outer crescent,” characteristics 
are a “trading” nature and “democratic forms” or politics. In antiquity, these traits 
distinguished the Athenian or Carthaginian governments. 
Between these two civilizational poles, geographical impulses are located in 
the “outer crescent,” which are dualistic and constantly exerting opposing cultural 
influences that have the most mobility thanks to their priority positions in the 
development of civilizations.  
History, to Mackinder, rotates around the continental axis. This history is 
more felt in the area of the “outer crescent,” than in the heartland, where frozen 
archaism “reigns” and in the “inner crescent” there is a certain civilizational chaos.  
3.3 The Key Position of Russia 
Mackinder himself identified his interests with the interests of the Anglo-
Saxon World Island, i.e. of the position in the “outer crescent.” In that station, he 
viewed the fundamental geopolitical stance to the “world island” to be the 
maximum weakening of the heartland and in extending this influence to the 
furthest possible limits of the “external crescent” within the “interior crescent.” 
Mackinder stressed the strategic priority of the “Geographical Pivot of History,” 
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and he conjectured that that throughout the political world this was the 
paramount geographical law.  
“The one who controls Eastern Europe dominates the heartland; he who 
controls the heartland dominates the World Island; he who dominates the World 
Island dominates the world.” (“Democratic Ideas and Realism”) (10) 
At the political level this means an admission of Russia’s leading role in 
strategic thought. Mackinder wrote: 
Russia, as well as Germany, occupies a central strategic position in the 
world as a whole, and in Europeans relations. It can carry out attacks in all 
directions and be subjected to them as well, except form the North. 
Complete development of railway capabilities is a matter of time. (“The 
Geographical Pivot of History”) (11) 
 
Proceeding from this, Mackinder considered that the main objective of 
English geopolitics is to prevent the organization of a strategic continental union 
around “the geographical pivot of history” (Russia). Accordingly, the strategic 
power of the “outer crescent” is the ability to pick off the maximum amount of 
coastal space from the heartland and place it under the influence of “island 
civilization.” 
A disturbance in the power equilibrium towards the “pivotal state” (Russia 
and others), accompanying its expansion into the peripheral spaces of the 
Eurasia, will allow it to use vast continental resources for the creation of a 
mighty, seafaring fleet: this brings it closer to world empire. This will be 
possible if Russia unites with Germany. The threat of this development will 
compel France to enter into an alliance with oversea powers—and France, 
Italy, Egypt, India, and Korea will become coastal bases for the mooring of 
the Great Powers’ fleets to pulverize the forces from the “pivotal range” 
from all directions and thwart their efforts to concentrate forces into a 




Most interestingly, Mackinder did not just construct simple theoretical 
hypotheses, but actively participated in the international organizations supporting 
the Entente’s “White Movement,” which he considered to have Atlanticist 
tendencies—directed towards weakening the power of the pro-German minded 
Eurasianist-Bolsheviks. He personally consulted with the leaders of the Whites and 
tried to gain maximum support from the English government. It seemed he 
prophetically foresaw not only the Treaty of Brest, but also the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact.289 
In his 1919 book “Democratic Ideals and Realism,” Mackinder wrote: “What 
will become of the naval forces if one day the great continent is politically unified 
to become the foundation of an invincible armada?” (13) 
It is not hard to understand why exactly Mackinder established in Anglo-
Saxon geopolitics, which in half a century would be the United States and NATO, 
this essential tendency: to impede in any way capable the very possibility of the 
creation of a Eurasian Bloc—established through a union of Russia and Germany—
a geopolitical reinforcing of the heartland and its expansion. The West’s sustained 
Russophobia in the twentieth century is not just ideological, but also geopolitical 
in character. Still, taking into account Mackinder’s connection between 
civilizational types and these geopolitical characteristics, or other forces, one could 
                                                
289Dugin refers to it as only the Treaty of Brest, not Brest-Litovsk. Brest is the Russian name for the 
city and Litovsk is the Polish one.  
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acquire a formula for which geopolitical terminology is easily translated into 
ideological terminology. 
The “outer crescent” is liberal democracy; “the geographical pivot of 
history” is non-democratic authoritarianism; the inner crescent is an intermediate 
model—a combination of both ideological systems.  
Mackinder participated in the preparation for the Versailles Treaty, which 
would reflect the essence of Mackinder’s views. The treaty was designed to instill a 
Western European character in the coastal bases for naval forces (The Pax 
Britannica). Together with this, he envisaged the establishment of limitrophe 
states, which might divide Germans and Slavs, in every way discouraging a 
strategic continental alliance between them that would be so dangerous for the 
“island countries,” and accordingly, “Democracy.” 
It is very important to trace the geographical bounds of the heartland in 
Mackinder’s works. If the years 1904 and 1919 (corresponding with the article “The 
Geographical Pivot of History” and the book “Democratic Ideals and Reality”) the 
shape of the heartland coincides with the outline of the borders of the Russian 
Empire, later the USSR, and in 1943, in his text “The Round World and the 
Winning of Peace,” he reevaluated his former views and withdrew the Soviet 
territory of Eastern Siberia—located past the Yenisey River—from the heartland. 




Russian Lenaland has nine million inhabitants, five million of whom live 
along the transcontinental railroad between Irkutsk and Vladivostok. In the 
remaining territories, there is less than one person per eight square 
kilometers. There are great riches particularly untouched in this 
wilderness—lumber, minerals, etc. (“The Round World and the Winning of 
Peace”) 
 
The removal of so-called Lenaland from the boundaries of the heartland 
meant that he considered that territory’s potential to zones of the “inner crescent,” 
such as those coastal spaces, capable of being used by “island” nations in the 
struggle against “the geographical pivot of history.” Mackinder actively 
participated in organizing interventions by the Entente and “White Forces,” 
apparently considering Kolchak to be a historical precedent—resisting the 
Eurasian center—considered to be basically sufficient for controlling its territory 
by way of potential “coastal zones.” 
3.4 Three Geopolitical Periods 
Mackinder divides all world geopolitical history into three phases (16): 
1. The Pre-Columbian Epoch: In this phase, nations, belonging to the periphery of 
the World Island, for instance the Romans, living under constant threat of 
invading powers from the “heartlands.” For the Romans, these were the Germans, 
Huns, Alans, Parthians, and so on. For the oikumene of Central Europe, it was the 
Golden Horde. 
2. The Columbian Epoch: In this period, governments of the “inner crescent” 
(coastal zones) set off on invasions of little known territories around the globe—
nowhere meeting serious opposition. 
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3. The Post-Columbian Epoch: Large unconquered lands no longer exist. Dynamic 
civilizational ripples are doomed for a collision—compelling nations into a global 
civil war. 
Mackinder’s periodization-with the relevant geopolitical transformations—
leads us closer to the newest tendencies in geopolitics, which we discuss in the 



















Section 4: Alfred Mahan and “Sea Power” 
 
4.1 Sea Power 
As a military man, rather than an academic, the American Alfred Mahan 
(1840-1914) differed from Ratzel, Kjellen, and Mackinder. He did not use the term 
“Geopolitics,” but the methodology of his analysis and basic conclusions directly 
correspond to a strictly geopolitical approach. 
An officer in the Union Army, beginning in 1885 he taught the history of 
naval warfare at “The Naval War College” in Newport (Rhode Island). In 1890, he 
published his first book—almost immediately becoming established as a classic 
text of military strategy, “Sea Power in History (1660-1783).” This was followed in 
short gaps by “The Influence of Sea Power in the French Revolution and Empire 
(1793-1812),” “The Interest of American Sea Power Now and in the Future,” “The 
Problem of Asia and Its Impact on International Politics” and “Sea Power and Its 
Relationship to War.” All his works revolve around one particular theme—that of 
“Sea Power.” Mahan’s name is synonymous with this term. 
Not only was Mahan only a theorist of military strategy, but he was also an 
active participant in politics. In particular he hid powerful influence over 
politicians like Henry Cabot Lodge and Teddy Roosevelt. Moreover, if in a 
retrospective look at American military strategy throughout the entire 20th century 
we see that it was constructed in direct accordance with Mahan’s ideas. And, if in 
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World War I this strategy did not bring the USA tangible success, in World War II 
it’s effect was considerable, and the Cold War finally secured the success of “Sea 
Power” strategy. 
4.2 Sea Civilizations = Commercial Civilizations 
The main instrument of politics for Mahan is commerce. Military activity 
should only provide more favorable conditions for the establishment of a planter 
trading civilization. Mahan regarded the economic cycle as having three moments: 
1. Production/Manufacturing/Exchange of goods and services across 
waterways 
2. Navigation (which implements this exchange) 
3. Colonies (which produce an exchange of goods civilization at global levels) 
Mahan believe an analysis of the position and geopolitical status of the state 
falls within six basic criteria: 
1. The geographic position of the state: its openness to the seas, the possibility 
of naval interaction with other countries, the spread of terrestrial borders, 
the ability to control important strategic regions, and the ability to threaten 
enemy territories with its fleets.  
2. The “physical configuration” of the state—that is, the configuration of 
maritime coasts and number of ports and their locations. Commercial 
prosperity and strategic security depends on this. 
3. The expanse of territory: Its extension along coastal lines. 
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4. The population: It’s important for assessment of the ability of the state to 
build and maintain ships. 
5. National character: The ability of a people to study trade so that naval 
power will be based on wide ranging and peaceful trade.  
6. The political character of the government: The reorientation of the best 
human and natural resources towards the creation of powerful naval forces 
depends on this. 
From this review, it is already clear that Mahan proceeded to construct his 
geopolitical theory exclusively from “Sea Power” and its interests. For Mahan, an 
example of “Sea Power” was ancient Carthage and more recently to us 
historically—England from the 17th to the 19th centuries.  
An understanding of “Sea Power” is based on the freedom of “Maritime Trade,” 
and naval fleets serve only to ensure the guarantee of this trade. Mahan goes 
further, considering “Sea Power” the basis for a type a civilization (anticipating 
Carl Schmitt’s ideas)—the most optimal and effective and therefore destined for 
world dominance. 
4.3 The USA’s Conquest of the World—Manifest Destiny 
Mahan’s idea was received around the world and influenced many 
European strategists. Event land-based, continental Germany—in the period of 
Tirpitz—applied Mahan’s methods in his thesis and was active in developing its 




But, first of all, it was intended for America and Americans. Mahan was a staunch 
supporter of President Monroe’s (1758-1831) Doctrine, which was declared in 1812 
on the principle of mutual non-interference between the countries of the Americas 
and Europe and also made the growth of the USA’s power dependent on its 
territorial expansion to neighboring lands. Mahan believed America has a 
“maritime fate” and that “manifest destiny” represented the first step in the 
strategic integration of the entire American continent, and then the established of 
global dominance. 
It’s necessary to pay tribute to Mahan’s almost prophetic vision. During his 
time, the USA still had not moved into the category of great powers, and 
moreover; its “maritime civilization type” was not even obvious. Even Mackinder 
in his article “The Geopolitical Axis of History,” referred to the USA as a “land 
power,” including it in the “outer crescent” only as a semi-colonial extension of 
maritime England. Mackinder wrote: “The USA will become only an Eastern 
power. They will have no direct influence on the balance of power in Europe, only 
through Russia.” 
Admiral Mahan had already accurately predicted America’s planetary 
destiny in becoming the primary Sea Power, directly influencing the fate of the 
world, ten years prior to the publication of Mackinder’s article.  
In his book “The Interests of America in Sea Power,” Mahan asserted that for 
America to become a world power it should implement the following points: 
1. Actively cooperate with British Naval Powers 
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2. Discourage German naval pretensions 
3. Keep a vigilant watch on Japanese expansion in the Pacific Ocean and 
actively oppose it. 
4. Coordinate with Europeans in joint activities against Asian peoples. 
Mahan saw the USA’s destiny as not being a passive participant in the general 
context of a state in the “outer crescent,” but to achieve a leading position in 
economic, strategic, and even ideological relations.  
Mackinder and Mahan independently arrived at the same conclusion regarding 
the dangers for “Seafaring Civilizations.” This danger is a continental, Eurasian 
state, chiefly Russia and China, and secondarily Germany. A battle with Russia—
with this “continuous mass of the Russian Empire—stretching from Western Asia 
Minor to the Japanese Meridian in the East,” was for the Sea Powers the main long-
term strategic task. 
Mahan transferred this to a global level—the “Anaconda Principle”—applied by 
American General McClellan in the American Civil War (1861-1865). This principle 
consists of blockading every territory at sea and along coastlines to gradually wear 
out the adversary through exhaustion. Thus, Mahan considered that the power of 
the state is determined by its potential to become a Sea Power and in the event of 
strategic confrontations, the primary task is preventing the enemy camp from 
becoming established. Accordingly, America’s task in this historical confrontation 
is to strengthen its position via the six fundamental points (listed earlier) and 
weakening the adversary by these points. Vast coastal spaces should be placed 
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under its control and it is necessary to try and pick off the corresponding enemy 
zones (by any means from the continental mass). And furthermore, as with the 
Monroe Doctrine (in its section of territorial integration), the state’s power should 
be strengthened and should not permit the creation of analogous integrative 
formation by the enemy. The enemy or rival—in Mahan’s case, Eurasian powers 
(Russia, China, Germany) will be suffocated in the “Anaconda’s” coils, crushing 
them and taking control of the resources derived from its control of coastal zones, 
and blocking, if able, the outlets to maritime spaces. 
In World War I this strategy was implemented in support of the White Entente 
Movement on the Eurasian periphery (as a response to the Bolsheviks making 
peace with Germany). In World War II it was also employed against middle 
Europe and in particular through naval military operations against the axis nations 
and Japan. But, it can be seen especially clearly during the Cold War, when the 
confrontation between the USA and the USSR extended globally to planetary 
proportions, in which at the theoretical level, it had already been geopolitically 
operation since the close of the 19th century.  
It is a fact that the basic strategic line of thinking for NATO and also other 
blocs, is directed towards containing the USSR (the concept of “containment” is 
strategically and geopolitically identical to the “anaconda” concept)—ASEAN, 
ANZUS, CENTO—are directly developed from the foundational theses of Admiral 





Section 5: Vidal de la Blache— “France vs. Germany” 
 
5.1 An Overview of French Geography 
Vidal de la Blache is considered the founder of the French school of 
geography. A professional geographer, he was animated by Ratzel’s “Political 
Geography” and constructed his own theory based on it as a source, although he 
harshly criticized many aspects of the German geopolitical school. 
In his book “A Geographical Picture of France” (1903), he referred to the soil 
theories, so import for German geopoliticians: 
The relationship between soil and people in France is marked by its original 
character in antiquity, a continuity…in our country can often be observed in 
that people have lived in the same places since time immemorial. Starting 
at places with calciferous rocks that attracted people due to their usefulness 
for residence and defence. Our people—are true disciples of the soil. The 
study of soil will help determine the character, morals, and preferences of 
the population. 
 
But, despite this—altogether quite German—relationship between 
geographic factors and their influence on culture, Vidal de la Blache believed that 
Ratzel and his followers grossly overestimated that strictly topographical factors 
were geopolitically defining. People, according to de la Blache, are also “the most 
important geographical factor,” but there is also an “initial endowment.” It is not 





This criticism of Ratzel’s elevation of spatial factors led Vidal de la Blache to 
elaborate the basic geographical concept of “possibilism,” according to this 
concept, political history has two aspects—spatial (geographic) and temporal 
(historical). Geographical factors are reflected in the surrounding environment, 
historically in in its people (mediums of initiative). Vidal de la Blache considered 
the German “political geographers’” mistake to have been that they considered 
landscape the determinative factor in the political history of the state. Thereby 
belittling factors of human freedom and historicity. He proposed referring to 
geographical spatial position as “potentiality,” “possibility,” which could actualize 
and become active political factors or might not. The majority of this depends on 
subjective factors from the people who inhabit a given space. 
This approach took into account the German geopolitical school of 
Haushofer, who thought de la Blache’s criticism was quite important and justified. 
In this case, the role of ethnicity and the racial factor was clearly increased by 
revising the political history of the state ad this resonated deeply during Germany’s 
racial problems of the 20s. 
De la Blache’s possibilism was perceived by the majority of geopolitical 
schools to be a correction to the strict geographical determinism of earlier 
geopolitical writers. 
5.3 France for “Sea Power” 
Vidal de la Blache paid special attention to Germany, which was France’s 
chief political opponent at the time. He considered Germany to be a mighty, 
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united European state whose geopolitical expansion is intentionally being blocked 
by other developed European powers. If England and France have their extensive 
colonies in Africa and around the world, if the USA has almost complete freedom 
of movement to the North and South, if Russia has Asia, then Germany is squeezed 
from all sides with no outlet for its energy. De la Blache observed that this is the 
main threat to peace in Europe and he considered it absolutely necessary to 
weaken the development of this dangerous neighbor. 
This relationship with Germany logically entailed the geopolitical 
determination of France to generally side with the “Sea Powers,” oriented against 
the continental powers. De la Blache’s position was not shared by all French 
geopoliticians because there was a parallel and opposite Germanophilic movement 
represented by Admiral Laval and General de Gaulle. 
In 1919 Vidal de la Blache published his book “Eastern France,” in which he 
asserts that the region of Alsace-Lorraine is predominantly a part of France and 
German aspirations to the regions are illegitimate. He appeals to the French 
Revolution to support this, considering the Jacobin dimension to be expressed 
through the geopolitical tendencies of the French people, themselves stringing for 
a unique and centralized state through geographical integration. Political 
liberalism can also be explained through the people’s attachment to the soil and a 
natural desire to receive property in return for its resources. Vidal de la Blache, in 
his own way, connected geopolitical properties with ideological aspects. The 
political space of Western Europe (France) is inseparably linked to “democracy” 
 
 165 
and “liberalism.” With this, it is possible to assemble a geopolitical equation of the 
views of de la Blache, Mackinder, and Mahan. 





















Section 6: Nicholas Spykman “A Revision of Mackinder, the 
Rimland’s Centrality” 
 
6.1 In American Service 
An American of Dutch origin, Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943) is part of a 
direct line of thought originating with Mahan. Spykman was a professor of 
international relations and later director of the institute of international relations 
at Yale. Different from earlier geopoliticians, for him geography itself was not the 
majority of its interests, and was even less excited by problems of people and soil, 
the influence of landscape on national characters, and so forth. Spykman discussed 
geopolitics as an important, concrete instrument of international politics, like the 
Atlanticists’ method and system of formulas, to allow for more effective strategy to 
be made. On this topic, he had harsh criticism for the German geopolitical school 
(especially the book “Geography of the World”), considering the representation of 
“just and unjust borders to be metaphysical nonsense.” Like Mahan, Spykman had 
the characteristics of a utilitarian approach to producing more effective 
geopolitical formulae which build could aid the USA in quickly achieving the 
position of “world dominance.” This pragmatism shaped his thinking. 
6.2 Correcting Mackinder 
Spykman attentively studied Mackinder’s works and proposed his own 
variant of basic geopolitical systems that were somewhat different from 
Mackinder’s models. Spykman’s basic idea was that Mackinder was mistaken in 
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overestimating the geopolitical importance of the Heartland. This mistake 
impacted not only the actual position of forces on the world map—particularly the 
USSR’s—but also the initial historical plans. Like Mackinder, Spykman asserted 
that in the geographical history of the “inner crescent,” rimland, “coastal zones,” 
they were not subjected to pressure from “Nomadic Groups.” In his opinion, the 
heartland is only a potential space, receiving every cultural impulse from the 
coastal zones and not possessing any independently formed geopolitical mission or 
historical impulse. The rimland, not the heartland, is the key to world dominance. 
Mackinder’s geopolitical formulation: “Whoever controls Eastern Europe 
dominates the heartland…whoever dominates Eurasia…holds the fate of the world 
in their hands.” 
In principle, Spykman is not discussing anything new on this, as for both 
him and Mackinder the “coastal zones,” “outer crescent,” and rimland were key 
strategic positions for controlling the continent. But Mackinder understood these 
zones as spaces torn between two impulses—“maritime” and “terrestrial,” not as 
self-sufficient, independently thinking entities and he never understood Russia’s 
control over the heartland and its adjacent continental masses. Eastern Europe is 
the intermediate space between the “geographical pivot of history” and the 
rimland, so it follows that the exact ratio of forces in the heartland to the periphery 
is the key variable for the problem of world dominance. But Spykman introduced 
his geopolitics as a radically new shift relative to Mackinder’s. Really, they only 
diverged on some nuanced concepts. 
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6.3 Defining the Balance of Power 
In his books “American Strategy in World Politics” and “Geography of the 
World,” Spykman delineated ten criteria for the purpose of determining state 
geopolitical power. He followed Mahan in developing these criteria. They are: 
1. Territorial area 
2. Natural boundaries 
3. Population 
4. Abundance or lack of usable mineral resources 
5. Economic and technological development 
6. Financial might 
7. Ethnic uniformity 
8. Level of social integration 
9. Political stability 
10.  National spirit 
If the summary of the results based on these criteria are low, then due to the 
geopolitical capabilities of the state it will be forced to enter into a strategic 
alliance, sacrificing part of its sovereignty for global strategic geopolitical 
protection. 
6.4 The Midland Ocean 
In addition to reevaluating the significance of the Rimland, Spykman 
contributed one more addition to the geopolitical picture of the world, discernible 
in the positioning of the sea powers. He introduced the extremely important 
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concept of the “Midland Ocean.” The fundamentals of this geopolitical depiction 
lie in its emphasis on the analogy of the history of the Near East, Europe, and 
Northern Africa and the Mediterranean in antiquity to the Atlantic Ocean and the 
recent history of western civilization. Because Spykman believed “the coastal 
zones,” and Rimland to be the fundamental historical territories for civilizations, 
as the Mediterranean area was in antiquity forming its cultures and subsequently 
spreading them to the interior of the continent (acculturating barbarian tribes) 
and to remote territories, and this was achieved only with the aid of seas routes 
(acculturating the barbarians of the sea). Similar to the Mediterranean model, in 
recent times this has increased to a planetary scale proceeding through the 
Atlantic Ocean, both coastal areas—American and European—being the most 
technologically and economically developed areas in western civilization. 
The Midland Ocean has become, in this perspective, not a dividing, but a 
unifying factor, a “mare internum.” Accordingly, Spykman outlined a specific 
geopolitical reality, which might provisionally be called “The Atlanticist 
Continent,” at the center of which, like a lake in a land-locked region, the Atlantic 
is located. This theoretical “continent,” a “New Atlantis,” connected by common 
cultures of Western European origin, liberal-capitalist democratic ideology, 
political solidarity, ethics, and technology. 
Spykman especially pressed the idea of the role of intellectual factors in this 
“Atlanticist Continent.” Western Europe and the belt of coastline along North 
America’s Eastern Seaboard (especially New York City) would become the brain of 
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this new Atlanticist Networks.” The central nervous system and musculature its 
trade and military-industrial complex. Europe will prove to be an intellectual 
appendage of the USA, whose geopolitical interests and strategic line have become 
unified and prevalent for all western powers. This should gradually shrink 
European stares’ political sovereignty and power transferring to specific 
institutions unifying governments of the entire “Atlanticist” spaces and 
subordinating them to the primacy of the United States. 
Spykman anticipated important political processes—the power of NATO, 
diminishing sovereignty of European powers postwar, USA hegemony, etc. 
6.5 The Architect of the American Victory 
Spykman’s doctrine is based not only on the idea that the USA is positioned 
to be a “Sea Power”—powers because it had already become fact—it was also 
necessary to control the coastal territories of Eurasia—European, Arabian States, 
Indo-China, and so on—for final victory in the duel of maritime and continental 
forces. If in Mackinder’s portrayal the planetary reality is discussed as something 
“eternal” and “unfaltering,” Spykman considered complete control over the 
Rimland through the methods of “seas forces” would lead to a final and 
unconditional victory over the terrestrial powers and from then on would be in 
total control. 
Actually, it was the development of “anaconda tactics” that were critical 
which had already been explicated by Mahan. 
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The victory in the cold war of the “Sea Power” USA demonstrated the 
geopolitical correctness of Spykman, who can be called the architect of world 
victory for the liberal-democratic countries” over Eurasia. 
At the moment, Spykman’s theses apropos the strategic supremacy of the 
Rimland and the importance of the “Midland Ocean” has been proven by history, 
but he discarded entirely too quickly Mackinder’s theories on the persistent 
political reorientation of the Eurasian center towards continental expansion  
In other ways, some of his ideas (notably his follower Kirk, who developed 
still further a detailed Rimland theory) were supported by some European 
geopoliticians, highly regarding the points on the importance of “coastal 
territories,” who saw a chance for European countries to once again decided the 
World’s fate. But, for this the “Midland Ocean” concept must be tossed aside. 
Despite this geopolitical approach some European geopoliticians (the rest, 
however, were very ambiguous), Spykman belongs, without any doubts, to the 
Atlanticist geopolitical school. Moreover, he, together with Mahan, can be called 










Section 7: Karl Haushofer— “the Continental Bloc” 
 
7.1 War and Thought 
It is with special thanks to the Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) that geopolitics 
have been discussed not simply as a “pseudo-science,” but a “misanthropic,” 
“fascistic,” and “anthropophagic” theory. 
Karl Haushofer was born in Munich to a family of professionals. He decided 
to become have a military career and served in the army as an officer for more than 
twenty years. From 1908-1910 he was the German military attaché in Japan and 
Manchuria. Here he met with the Japanese emperor and the upper nobility. Failing 
health forced Haushofer to leave his rather successful military career ad in 1911 he 
returned to Germany, where he resided until the end of his life. He studied the 
sciences and received an “doctorate” from the University of Munich. During this 
time, Haushofer regularly published books on geopolitics in general, and with a 
special emphasis on the geopolitics of the pacific region. The first of his books was 
“The Gift of Japan,” covering Japanese geopolitics. Through his student Rudolf 
Hess, he met Hitler right after he was imprisoned following his failed Putsch. It is 
an unconfirmed historical opinion that Haushofer played a part in writing sections 
of “Mein Kampf” relating to geopolitics. But, a conceptual analysis shows a 
significant difference between Haushofer’s geopolitical outlook and Hitler’s 




For twenty years, beginning in 1924, Haushofer published the most 
important geopolitical journal, possessing huge influence—“Geopolitik,” later 
changed to “Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik.” 
Most of the articles were published in this journal. Haushofer’s relationship 
with the Nazis was very complicated. On some issues, he saw eye-to-eye with the 
Nazis, on others they diverged radically. Due to a dependence on the Nazi regime 
and from personal relations, Haushofer’s positions changed with the Third Reich. 
Until 1936 he was favored (especially enjoying the protection of his younger 
friend Hess), later these feelings began to cool. After Hess parachuted into 
England, Haushofer slipped into disgrace and after his son was executed for 
participating in an attempt on Hitler’s life in 1944, he was considered almost an 
enemy of the people. Still, despite the ambiguity in his views, he shared the “Nazi 
viewpoint.” He could not endure the blows of fate and the loss of all his hopes, and 
in 1946, Haushofer, along with his wife, committed suicide. 
7.2 A New European Order 
Haushofer attentively studied the works of Ratzel, Kjellen, Mackinder, Vidal 
de la Blache, Mahan, and other geopoliticians. The picture of “maritime 
civilization” versus “continental civilizations” or Talassocracies (the powers of the 
Midland Ocean) against “Tellulocracies” (“the powers of the Midland”), is key for 
him and behind it are those who are responsible for all secret international 
politics, and are implicated in all its direct actions. (In Japan, for example, he had 
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to deal with these forces who were most responsible for deciding the picture of 
spatial relations.) Indicative of this is that the term “New Order,” which was 
actively used by the Nazis and in our time in the form of the “New World Order’ of 
the Americans, was first used exactly in Japan. It applied to a geopolitical scheme 
for redistributing influence in the Pacific region which was proposed to be put into 
practice for Japanese geopolitics.  
The planetary dualism of “sea powers” and “land powers” was self-identified 
by Germany as being above all other problems. Supporters of the national idea, 
and Haushofer belonged to them without a doubt, strove to strengthen the 
German state, which meant industrial development, a cultural uplift and 
geopolitical expansion. But, Germany’s position, spatially and culturally mitellage, 
has united its western enemies, sea powers—England, France, and in this 
perspective, the USA. The “talassocracies” themselves did not hide their 
orientation regarding Germany and considered it (along with Russia) the 
geopolitical opponents of the Maritime West. 
In such a situation, it was not easy for the Germans to count on a strong 
alliance with powers from the “outer crescent;” moreover, for Germany, England 
and France had historically had pretensions to controlling the territorial order. 
Accordingly, a future Greater German nation (as in the geopolitical confrontation 
with the West, and especially the Anglo-Saxon world, with which the sea powers 
generally identified.  
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The entirety of Karl Haushofer’s geopolitical doctrine and that of his 
followers is based on this analysis. This doctrine concludes it is necessary to 
establish a “continental bloc” on a Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo Axis. This bloc cannot be 
formed haphazardly—it was the only full-fledged and adequate strategic response 
to the opposing camp who did not conceal that its greatest danger was the 
formation of an analogical Eurasian alliance. He wrote in his article “The 
Continental Bloc”: “Eurasia cannot be suffocated if two of the largest peoples—
Germans and Russians—in every way seek to avoid internecine conflicts, like the 
Crimean War or 1914: This is the axiom of European politics.” 
He then quotes American Homer Lee—“The last hour for Anglo-Saxon 
politics will be when the Germans, Japanese, and Russians unite.” 
This line of thought showed in various ways in Haushofer’s articles and 
books. It received the named “ostorientierung,” meaning “orientation to the East,” 
due to the assumed self-identification of Germany, its people, and its culture as a 
Western extension of the Eurasian, Asiatic traditions. It was not by chance that the 
English gave the Germans in World War I the derogatory nickname of “Huns.” For 
geopoliticians of the Haushofer school, this was perfectly agreeable. 
In this regard, it should be emphasized that Haushofer’s concept of 
“openness to the East” has a completely different meaning than “the occupation of 
Slavic lands.” His notion was about a joint civilizational effort of two continental 
powers—Russia and Germany—who would establish a “New Eurasian Order,” and 
structure continental space around the World Island so as to completely remove 
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itself from under the influence of “Sea powers.” The expansion of Germany 
lebensraum was planned by Haushofer, not for the sake of colonizing Russian 
lands, but for the taming of the gigantic unsettled Asiatic spaces and reorganizing 
the land of eastern Europe. 
7.3 Compromise with the Tallassocracies 
However, in practice everything did not wash out so cleanly. The purely 
scientific logic of Haushofer, logically led to the necessity of a “continental bloc” 
with Moscow, collided with the majority of the other tendencies and qualities 
inherent in the German national establishment. It was the strictly racist outlook of 
history, which infected Hitler himself. This outlook considered racial affinities to 
be the most important factors, not geographical or geopolitical specifications. The 
Anglo-Saxon peoples—England and the USA—were viewed in this case as the 
natural allies of the Germans because they were closer ethnically. Slavs and 
especially non-white Eurasian peoples were turned into racial enemies. Adding to 
this was the ideology of anti-communism, which itself involved a racial principle—
Marx and many communists were Jews, which signified, through the anti-Semitic 
viewpoint that communism itself was an anti-Germanic ideology.  
National-Socialist racism fell into direct contradiction with geopolitics or, 
more precisely, implicitly nudging Germans to their inverse, anti-Eurasian, 
talassocratic strategy. From the point of view of racist followers, Germany should 
have been concluding alliances with England and the USA to join forces against 
the USSR. But, in other ways the humiliation experienced at Versailles was still all 
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too fresh. All the ambiguous international politics of the Third Reich spring from 
this duality. These politics were constantly balancing between the talassocratic, 
outwardly justifying its racism and anti-communism (the anti-Slavic attitude, 
attacking the USSR, encouraging Catholic Croats in the Balkans, etc.) and the 
tellulocratic based in pure, geopolitical principles (the war with England and 
France, Molotov and Ribbentrop Pact, etc.). 
Because Karl Haushofer was partaking, to some extent, in the decision 
making of concrete political problems, he was forced to alter his theories in line 
with politics. In this position, he had contacts with the upper echelons of England. 
Besides, there was the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the creation of a 
Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, Haushofer outwardly hailed the move, welcoming it as a 
preliminary step on the path towards establishing a total “Eurasian bloc.” He could 
not understand the appearance that his anti-communist direction would have on 
the heartland’s center (Moscow), or secondary perimeter powers belonging to the 
Rimland, and having an opposite character to an authentic “continental bloc.” 
But all of these steps were dictated by political conformity and are not 
representative of all of the aggregate of Haushofer’s geopolitics. His name and 
ideas are personified at a high level in the concept of the “Eastern destiny” of 








Section 8: Carl Schmitt—“The Behemoth versus the 
Leviathan” 
 
8.1 Conservative Revolutionary 
Carl Schmitt, (1888-1985) was a German renowned as an outstanding jurist, 
political scientist, philosopher, and historian. But, all his ideas are inseparably 
connected with the geopolitical concepts found in his works—“Nomos of the 
Earth,” “Land and Sea,” etc., which are devoted to geopolitical factors and their 
influence on civilizations and political history. 
Carl Schmitt was close to German representatives of the Conservative 
Revolutionaries, paradoxically combining in himself national-conservative and 
social-revolutionary elements. Schmitt’s fate is the fate of his books and his 
juridical-philosophical schools. Like many other conservative revolutionaries, he 
had a double-natured relationship with the National Socialist regime. In one sense, 
there is no doubt his theories appear in Nazi ideology, his books “Political 
Theology” and “Political Concepts” were used especially successfully, in them 
Schmitt openly criticized liberal rights and “the rule of law”. In these texts, he had 
already given shape to his later intellectual creations—in their noticeable ultimate 
political realism, attempting to free problems of political science from 
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humanitarian rhetoric, sentimental pathos, social demagoguery. This 
corresponded quite well with the National-Socialist spirit. 
 
Joined with this, all of Schmitt’s concepts were based on the fundamental idea of 
“people’s rights” (volksrechte), which he distinguished from “human rights” under 
liberal theory. His understanding emphasized that a people have rights to cultural 
sovereignty so as to preserve its spiritual, historical, and political identity. Such an 
approach was characteristic of some National Socialists, considering this ideology 
universal and applicable to all the peoples of the Earth. But, the regime’s dominant 
line of thought was Pan-Germanism, rooted in a chauvinistic and narrow 
nationalistic outlook. Therefore, with his theory of “people’s rights,” Schmitt was 
subjected to harsh criticism especially by the ideologues of the SS (in 1936, the SS’s 
mouthpiece “Scharze Korps” published an especially threatening article addressed 
to him). 
The formation of Schmitt’s ideology took place in the same atmosphere of 
Ratzel and Kjellen’s ideas regarding “organistic sociology,” but also wherein also 
appeared the romantic theory of the “Northern Light” (Nordlicht), according to 
which social-political types and governmental organization are rooted in 
mythology, the sacred world of “stories and spirits,” not in a mechanistic, identity 
of functioning cells combined in mathematical conglomerates. In Schmitt’s 
theories, the paradoxical combination of “political romanticism” and “strict 
rationalism” is present. A refined mental apparatus expressing spiritual mythology. 
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At the Nuremberg Trials, there was an attempt to charge Carl Schmitt with “war 
crimes” based on his collaboration with the Nazi regime. Specifically, he was 
indicted for “theoretically justifying and legitimizing a war of aggression.” The 
charges were withdrawn after the judges were became acquainted with Carl 
Schmitt’s works in more detail. Nevertheless, Schmitt—like Heidgegger, Junger, 
and other “conservative revolutionaries” became persona non-grata in the global 
scientific community and his works were completely ignored. 
Only in the 70s, thanks to the colossal influence in juridical through of 
some leftist, socialist thinkers that Schmitt’s works gradually became rehabilitated. 
In our time, he is recognized as a classical political scientist and jurist. 
8.2 The Nomos of the Earth 
Schmitt was completely in the spirit of a geopolitical approach that asserted 
an original connection between political culture and space. Not only the 
government, but all social aspects and rights result from the qualities of spatial 
organization. 
From here, Schmitt introduced the “nomos” concept. Originating from the 
Greek term “nomos” meaning “something taken, formed, ordered, and organized,” 
but put in the context of space. This term is close to Ratzel’s concept of “relief” and 
the “place of development” of the Russian Eurasianists (Savitzky). Schmitt 
displayed how the nomos is the form that organizations in life take, which installs 
greater harmony in relationships within the social ensemble and between these 
ensembles. “Nomos” expresses this special synthesis combining subjective and 
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objective factors organically emerging in the establishment of political and 
juridical systems. In “nomos,” there appears natural and cultural features of 
humanity working collectively in combination with the surrounding environment. 
In his book “The World of Nomos,” Schmitt shows how specific types of 
land spaces influenced the development of culture and government. He juxtaposed 
various historical “nomoses,” especially highlighting the fundamental dualistic 
relationship between nomadic space and sedentary peoples. 
But, in an analysis of “The Nomos of the Earth,” the most important 
concept is his thoughtful approach to global history and civilizational space 
between the land civilizations and the sea civilizations. 
Exploring the “nomos” of the earth he collided with the qualitative aspects 
of the opposing land and sea “nomoses.” This led him to establish the basic 
geopolitical methodology for comprehending the world’s political history. 
8.3 The Land and the Sea 
In 1942 Schmitt released his most important work—“The Land and the Sea.” 
Together with the later text “Planetary Tensions between East and West” and “The 
Confrontation of Land and Sea,” these comprise the most important documents 
for geopolitical sciences. The significance of Schmitt’s The Confrontation of Land 
and Sea can be reduced to the idea that there are two completely different, 
antagonistic civilizations, irreconcilable to each other and they are not variants of 
a single complex civilization. This division almost entirely coincides with the map 
drawn by Mackinder, but Schmitt gives basic elements—talassocracy (Sea Power) 
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and tellulocracy (Land Power)—a thorough philosophical explanation connected 
with basic juridical and ethnic systems. Curiously, Schmitt used the names 
“Behemoth,” for “land forces” and for the “sea forces”— “Leviathan,” like the names 
of the beasts of the Old Testament, e of which had incarnate in itself all land 
animals, and the other—all of the aquatic and oceanic.  
The “nomos” of the Earth existed without an alternative for the duration of 
most of human history. All varieties of this “nomos” are characterized by a strong 
and strict legislative (and ethical) forms. Which are reflected immovably and 
fixedly in Land and the Sea. This connection to the land, spatially, is easily 
supported by structuralism (fixated on borders, stable communicational pathways, 
and immutable geographical qualities of the landscape) generating conservatism 
in the social, cultural, and technical fields. The concise version of the “The Nomos 
of the Earth” is constituted by what is accepted in history under the name of the 
“traditional society.” 
In the Sea’s situation, Water is the only civilizational influence, not land, 
and not extending into the ethnic sphere (or only occasionally). Only with the 
opening of the World Ocean at the end of the sixteenth century, bringing about 
radical changes. Humanity (and in the first place, the island of England) began to 
grow accustomed to their “maritime existence, becoming conscious of itself as an 
island in the middle of waters, like a ship. 
But aquatic space is considerably different from land, it is unstable, hostile, 
isolated, and constantly subject to change. There are no set pathways, nor 
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obviously different orientations. The “nomos” of the sea itself entails the 
transformation of the global establishment. The social, juridical, and ethical norms 
are “fluid”. This birthed a new civilization. Schmitt considered this new time and 
technical spurt, opening an era where industrialism must be included amongst 
geopolitical phenomenon—a transition for humanity towards a sea “nomos.” 
Thus, the geopolitical orientation of the Anglo-Saxon world’s “outer 
crescent” acquired for Schmitt a social-political definition. The “nomos” of the seas 
has an aspect that is hostile to traditionalist society. The geopolitical confrontation 
of land powers against those of the sea acquires a most important historical, 
ideological, and philosophical meaning. 
8.4 Grossraum 
Schmitt developed one more important geopolitical theory—the theory of 
“great spaces” (Grossraum). This concept states that the process of state growth is 
the ambition to acquire the greatest volume of territory. The principle of imperial 
integration is reflected in the logical and natural human aspiration to synthesis. 
The stages of a state’s territorial expansion thus, corresponding to the stages of the 
human spirit’s movement towards universalism.  
This geopolitical law spread in technological and economic spheres. 
Schmitt shows that starting at some moment, the technological and economic 
growth of the state required (quantitatively and qualitatively) territorial expansion. 
He is not necessarily indicating colonization, annexation, and military invasion. 
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The acquisition of Grossraum can occur by legal means—based on the acceptance 
of several states or peoples of a unifying religious or cultural form.  
In his 1940 text “Space and Large Space in People’s Rights,” Schmitt defined 
Great Spaces thusly: The area of for the planning and organizing of human activity 
correlates with actual and future developmental tendencies.” With the weight of 
some of these nebulous formulations, Schmitt indicates as an example of an 
intentional construction of a “Great Space,” as the implementation of the 
American Monroe Doctrine. 
Yet, Grossraum can, in a certain sense, be identified with the state, or 
rather, with an Empire (das Reich), this conception goes beyond just the 
conventional state. This new form of supranational unity is based on strategic, 
geopolitical, and ideological factors.  
Differing from Hitler’s Pan-Germanic appeal and Soviet internationalism, 
Schmitt’s Grossraum was based in cultural and ethnic pluralism, with strict 
autonomy, with centralism limited only to strategy and total loyalty to the highest 
power. Schmitt emphasizes that the establishment of a new “Great Space” depends 
not on scientific values of its own doctrine, not from cultural competition, nor 
from economic development of its constituent parts, or even the ethnic and 
territorial center which produces the impulse to integrate. Everything depends 




Schmitt anticipates in this doctrine the basic lines of thought in modern 
integrative politics. 
 
8.5 Total War and the Figure of the “Partisan” 
Schmitt’s geopolitical motives are distinguishable in practically all topics of 
which he discusses. In particular, he explained the connection between three 
concepts— “Total Enemy”, “Total War,” and the “Total State.” From his point of 
view the “total state” is the most complete form of government for the 
traditionalist type, that is the place of development of the land “nomos.” It exists as 
an unchangeable terrestrial land quality, despite the possibility of the state’s 
evolution to the scale of Grossraum. The “total state” is a key principle of the “total 
enemy” and “total war,” due to the representation of opposing “enemies” (and 
Schmitt imparted huge significance when forming the concepts of 
“friend”/”enemy”, amicus/hostis) built on the basis of itself, submitting the idea of 
“war form,” in which actions of a Jus Bellum and participating only as a natural 
contingency for a professional military. The peaceful parts of the population and 
territory, in their own fashion are placed under the protection of the law and (at 
least theoretically) removed from the path of military activity.  
Liberal doctrines, which Schmitt uniquely linked with modern times and 
corresponding to the “maritime civilization” and with the “nomos” of the sea, 
denies the “total state,” thereby opening a path to “total war” and “total enemy.” In 
1941, he wrote in the article “State Sovereignty and the Open Sea”:  
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War on land is subject to juridical norms because it will be a war between 
states, i.e. between armed forces of warring states. This rationalization 
arises from its organically reaching beyond to the peaceful population and 
the corresponding territories. War at sea rather, is not strictly between 
defined forces and is subordinated tot the strongest adversaries because if 
its bases in the concept of Total War. 
 
An overall geopolitical picture, Schmitt wrote, could be reduced to this 
civilizational dualism and confrontation of two Grossraums—the Anglo-Saxon 
(England and America) and the European-continental, Eurasian. These two “Great 
Spaces”—Talassocracy and Tellulocracy—between them lead to a planetary battle, 
the last step towards universalism and transferring over to world dominion. 
Schmitt persistently regarded any attempt to reduce this conflict to some kind of 
strict juridical basis because the civilizational macro-conceptions of both “Great 
Spaces” is based in the mutual-exclusivity of the “nomoses”—the “earth nomos” 
and the “sea nomos.” The last disruptive element contributing to this was the 
advent of aeronautics because “airspace” supports the structuralism of ethics and 
rights even less than that of the sea.  
At the end of his life Schmitt focused his influence on the figure of the 
“Partisan.” Per Schmitt, this figure is the last representation of the “nomos” of the 
earth, remaining faithful to his initial cause in spite of the “liquidation of 
civilization” and the dissolution of its juridical-cultural base. “The Partisan” is 
connected with his homeland through informal ties and the historical character of 
this tie dictates the basics of his war, radically differently from more broad and 
abstract norms. As to the universalism of the “maritime model” and “commercial 
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ethics,” which, naturally covers the sphere of military activity, and the figure of the 
“Partisan” acquires, per Schmitt, all the more civilizational significance because the 
“Partisan” will carry on the last activity to remain in history, who’s defense (by any 
means) of the “land order,” in the face of the talassocracy’s offensive. From here 



















Section 9: Petr Nikolayevich Savitsky—“Eurasia—the Middle 
of the Earth” 
 
9.1 Eurasia’s Destiny 
Petr Nikolayevich Savitsky (1895-1968)—is perhaps the first (and only) 
Russian author who in every sense of the word can be called a geopolitician. He 
received an education as an economist, studying as a pupil of V. Vernadsky and P. 
Struya. Near the start of the war he was a cadet. He emigrated to Bulgaria after the 
Revolution and after moved to Czechoslovakia in 1921. Together with Prince N.S. 
Trubetskoi, he helmed the Eurasian movement, in which geopolitical factors 
achieved a central role. Savitsky, to a greater degree than all the other Eurasianists, 
was interested in geopolitics.  
Savitsky’s worldview, like the majority of his fellow Eurasianists, was shaped 
by the works of Slavophile writers by Danilevsky and especially Leontiev. This was 
a strain of revolutionary Slavophilia linking the singular historical identity of 
“Greater Russia,” not reducible to religion, or ethnic Slavic qualities. In this 
respect, they were closer to Konstantin Leontiev, who formulated a most 
important thesis—“Slavdom Yes, Slavism No,” meaning that the “ethnic and 
linguistic closeness of the Slavic peoples is not a sufficient basis for describing it’s 
uniform cultural character.” One of the favorite subjects for the Eurasian 
movement was surprisingly similar to the German conservative revolutionaries. 
Like the conservative revolutionaries, the Eurasianists strove to combine 
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faithfulness to origins with the commercial qualities of the future, rooted in 
Russian national traditions with social modernism, technological development, 
and nontraditional political forms. Based on this, there were cautious, positive 
relationships between Eurasianists in the Soviet State and the October Revolution.  
Despite sympathy for the Soviets, a feeling which was characteristic not 
only of a pro-Soviet wing of the Eurasianists (Parisian circles published the paper 
“Eurasia”), whom Savitsky officially broke relations, but also of its most moderate 
and “conservative” elements. After Soviet forces took Prague in 1945, Savitsky was 
arrested and spent ten years in the camps. In the camps, he met the son of the 
poet Nikolai Gumilyev, Lev, who became his student and later one of the great 
modern Russian historians and ethnographers. 
In 1956, Savitsky was rehabilitated and he returned to Prague, where he 
died twelve years later.  
9.2 Russia-Eurasia 
Savitsky’s fundamental ideas is that Russia itself represents a special 
civilizational formation differentiated through its quality of “medianity.” One of 
his articles—“The Geographical and Geopolitical Basis of Eurasianism” (1933)—
began with the words “Russia has a much greater basis than China to be named 
‘The Middle State.’” 
If the “middleness” of Germany, mittelage, is organic in the European 
context, and Europe itself is only the “Western Cusp,” of Eurasia, for Russia 
occupies the coastal position on the continent. “Middleness” for Savitsky is the 
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basis of historical identity—it is not part of Europe, nor an extension of Asia—an 
indepent world standing alone and with a special spiritual-historical geopolitical 
aspect, which Savitsky called “Eurasia.” 
This concept denoted neither the mainland nor the continent, but the idea, 
reflected in the Russian space and in Russian culture, was a distinct historical 
paradigm for civilization. From the Russian role, Savitsky brought out the concept, 
rigidly matching with Mackinder’s maps, only abstracted as “reavers of the land” 
who represented “centripetal impulses travelling outwards from the geopolitical 
axis of history,” which to Savitsky clearly designated the fate of Russian history, 
Russian government, and Russian territory. Savitsky’s Russia-Eurasia can thus be 
viewed in the same light as Ratzel’s raum and still closer to Schmitt’s grossraum. 
If Mackinder claimed that the Heartland’s path travels through mechanical 
impulses the creation of coastal zones (“inner crescents”) of its culture and history, 
then Savitsky asserted Russia-Eurasia (=Mackinder’s heartland) possesses a 
synthesis of world culture and world history unfolding in space and time. Thus, 
Russia’s nature fits its culture. 
In Savitsky’s geopolitical ideas, Russia is understood not as a national state, 
but as a special type of civilization, established on the basis of several factors—
Slavic—Aryan culture, Turkic nomadism, and the Orthodox tradition. These 
qualities together compose some king of unique, “middle” formation, in itself 




Savitsky’s Greater Russia can be considered not just a branch of the Eastern 
Slavs, but a distinct empire formed on ethnicity, which possess Turkish and Slavic 
substratum. This moment in itself is an important term—Turan. 
9.3 Turan 
Many Russian nationalists were scandalized by this appeal to a positive 
orientation to Turanism. Savitsky indirectly justifies the Mongol-Tatar Yoke, 
attributing “Russia’s geopolitical individuality and preservation of its spiritual 
independence form the Roman-German world’s aggression.” This relationship to 
Turkism was designed to start differentiating Russia-Eurasia from Europe and its 
fate, predicated on Russia’s unique ethnicity. 
“Without the Tatars there would be no Russia”—this is Savitsky’s thesis in 
his article “The Steppe and the Sedentary” and it is key to the Eurasian formula. 
From here, he switches to a purely geopolitical assertion: 
Stated directly: in the history of the Western European space in the 
maritime sense as equally, although polar opposites, in opposing the 
natural Mongolian sense of the continent: between the Russian ‘walkers of 
the land’ and the sweep of Russian military mastery—this is the spirit, the 
sense of the continent. 
 
And furthermore: “Russia—the heir to the Great Khans, continues the work of 
Chingiz and Timur, unifiying…in themselves. simultaneously combining the 
historical narratives of the ‘steppe’ and the ‘sedentary.’” 
The fundamental duality of the Russian landscape—its division between 
forest and steppe—was noticed more by the Slavophiles. Savitsky presented the 
geopolitical idea of Russia-Eurasia as a synthesis of these two aspects—the 
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European forest and the Asiatic steppe. The result is not so much a juxtaposition of 
two geopolitical systems to each other, but as some kind of original and whole, due 
to its own properties and methodological assessments.  
Russia-Eurasia cannot be reduced to Turanism. It is something greater. But 
regarding Eurasia, with all “coastal” zones considered “barbarous” Russians 
identified “as the heirs to the Mongolian spirit” is provocative, opening the way for 
the historical and spiritual supremacy of Russia. 
9.4 The Place of Development 
In Savitsky’s theories the concept of “development places” is a rule of great 
importance. This term is presented as an almost complete analogue for raum as it 
is described in Ratzel’s “Political Geography” and German geopolitics in general (+ 
Kjellen). This concept was reflected in the Eurasianists’ “organicism”—accurately 
matching the German “organic” schools and contrasted starkly with Anglo-Saxon 
pragmatic geopolitics. If Spykman was familiar with Savitsky’s works than his 
indignation over “metaphysical nonsense” would be even more forceful than was 
the case with Haushofer. In his text “The Geopolitical Organization of Russia,” 
Savitsky writes: “The social-political environment and its territory should merge 
into a single whole of geographical individualism or landscape.” 
Land has the quality to be a “development place” in which objective and 
subjective traits merge in an inseperable unity into something whole. This is a 
conceptual synthesis. In the same text Savitsky continues: “Synthesis is necessary. 
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To look at the social-historical environment and the study of its territory is 
necessary.” 
Savitsky is closer, with this, to Vidal de la Blache. The French geopolitician 
justified the indivisibility of an independent French type of cultural unity 
independent of the racial groups that have lived in Alsace-Lorraine. Savitsky 
considered: “Russia-Eurasia to be a “development place,” a unified whole,” having 
“geographic individuality,” and “simultaneous geographical, ethnic, economic, and 
historic qualities, etc, and so on to landscape.” 
Russia-Eurasia is this “development place,” which is integral to producing 
the existence of more, smaller, “development places.” In Schmitt’s grossraum this 
corresponds to a whole hierarchy of smaller raums.  
Through the introduction of “development places” places to the 
Eurasianists, they moved away from the positive necessity of analytically dividing 
up historical phenomena, unraveling their mechanical systems—applying them 
not only to the natural, but also cultural traits. The appeal of “development places” 
and geographical individuality” caused the Eurasianists to avoid many of the 
resentments from national racial, religious, cultural, linguistic, and ideological 
problems. The intuitive feeling of all inhabitants of the “geographical pivot of 
history” [towards geopolitical unity] acquires a new language, “syntheticism,” not 




In this way Savitsky carried on the Russian-intellectual tradition always 
gravitating towards ideas of “wholeness” “sobornost,” “unity,” and etc.290  
9.5 Ideocracy 
The principle of “ideocracy” is very important in Savitsky’s theories. He 
imagined that the Eurasian state would be constructed, arising from its initial 
spatial impulses, from the top down and it follows that all of these strategies 
should be created in accordance with the a priori idea; at the head of the structure 
a class of “spiritual chiefs” should be established. This position is very close to 
Schmitt’s theories on “volitional” “spiritual” impulses, stemming from their origin 
in the grossraum.  
Ideocracy assumed a non-pragmatic supremacy not a materialistic and 
commercial approach to state building. The merits of “geographical identity,” 
according to Savitsky, is the ability to rise above material limitations, organically 
including the physical world in union of spiritual-creative impulses of global 
historical making. 
Ideocracy—a term which unites all forms of undemocratic illiberal forms of 
rule, based in non-materialists and non-utilitarian motivations. Savitsky 
consciously avoided refining this notion, which is incarnate in a theocratic 
sobornost, and in populist monarchs, and in nationalist dictators, and in states of 
                                                





the Soviet type. The breadth of the term corresponds to the purely geopolitical 
horizon of Eurasia, which covers vast historical and geographical expanse. This was 
an attempt to more closely describe the continent’s intuitive will. 
It is evident that ideocracy directly contradicts the pragmatic-commercial 
approach, dominating the doctrines of Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman. In this 
fashion, the Russian Eurasianists brought to final clarity the ideological term, 
which is reflective of the historical conflict between sea and land. The sea is liberal 
democracy a “trading regime” of pragmatism. The land—an ideocracy (all 
varieties), “hierarchical rule,” dominated by religious ideals.  
Savitsky’s views on ideocracy resonated with the ideas of German 
sociologists and economist Werner Sombart, who delineated all social models and 
types into two classes—“the heroes” and “the merchants;” and the geopolitical 
level the terms “hero” and “heroism” lose their pathetic metaphorical meaning and 
become technical terms for both juridical and ethical specifications for ideological 
rule. 
9.6 The USSR and Eurasia 
Petr Savitsky and, more widely Russian Eurasianists, played a huge role in 
the development of geopolitics as a science. And it is strange how little attention 
has been paid to this in western textbooks. In Savitsky’s works, we have a 
completely conscious, responsive, and competent geopolitics, which fully and 
specifically express the Heartland’s position, from its from its deepest part—
Russia—is its province. Savitsky’s geopolitical doctrine is the direct antithesis of 
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the views of Mahan, Mackinder, Spykman, Vidal de la Blache, and other 
“Talassocrats.” It is only in his works that go as far to completely reveal the outline 
of alternative doctrines; describing the ideological, economic, cultural, and ethnic 
factors. If we are to use Carl Schmitt’s terminology, then Savitsky and the 
Eurasianists are expressions of the “nomos of the land” in historical conditions 
consistent with the ideology of “tellulocracy,” grossraum’s true meaning, an 
alternative to the Anglo Saxon grossraum.  
The Russian Eurasianists’ ideas match with the theories of the German 
geopolitician-continentalists (Haushofer, Schmitt, etc.) who also attempted to 
construct a geopolitical model that would be the antithesis to the strategy of the 
“Sea Powers;” demonstrating that the Germans were only halfway down a path that 
the Russians (and in the first place, Savitsky) had completely finished, with totality 
and consistency, a complete worldview. This concept can be summarized by this 
law:  
The closer the viewpoint of the German continentalists is to the Russian 
Eurasianists, the greater the Ostorietierung, the more logical and consistent 
are their doctrines, effectiveness in political projects, and their 
establishment on a geopolitical basis.291 
 
In this line of thought, Savitsky was all the more closely approaching 
German National-Bolshevism—especially Ernest Niekisch—who was perfectly 
cognizant of the duality of Germany’s geopolitical position, whose “middleness” 
was secondary compared to the absolute continental and cultural Russian 
                                                
291 Dugin uses quotation marks here to emphasize his own words. 
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“middleness.” From here they conclude, Germans cannot pretend to have a role of 
geopolitical synthesis, that is it must choose between a Western-Southern Catholic 
slavophobia, of a Germany (together with Austria) in some respects “talassocratic” 
(bourgeoisie) and a North-Eastern German-Slavic, socialistic, russophilia, the 
protectors of Spartan Prussian. Niekisch belongs to the famous geopolitical 
thesis—“Europe from Vladivostok to Fleesing,” and only in this approach can 
German ways harmonize and fit in completely with continental Eurasianism. 
Naturally, Hitler’s Austrian Catholic, anti-communist, slavophobia—despite the 
attempts by some of the more historically responsible conservative revolutionaries 
and geopoliticians—caused Germany to lose its historical place as result of its 
nightmarish defeat, inflicted by the forces of the “eternal union” with which can 
only ensure German participation in the global order of the tellulocracy.  
The Soviet aspect of geopolitical thought in many ways coincides with the 
concepts of Savitsky and other Eurasianists, although their direct influence on 
Soviet leadership was effectively null: in many respects, the Smenovekhovtsy were 
close to the National-Bolsheviks—especially Nikolai Ustryalov—had clear 
influence on the Bolsheviks, especially Stalin, although never occupying important 
posts and their lives often ended in the camps.292293 A group of Eurasianists—
Efron, Karsavin, and others—openly collaborated with the USSR, but received no 
                                                
292 The Smenovekhotsky were Russian emigres after the civil war who eventually supported 
reconciliation with the Soviet Union, rather than its destruction. 
 
293 Ustryalov was the leader of this movement, and popularized the term National Bolshevik, he was 
killed during Stalin’s purges in 1937 after returning to the USSR in 1935.  
 
 198 
gratitude.294 However, an analysis of Soviet foreign policy—until the start of 
perestroika—leads to the conclusion that it consistently followed a Eurasianist 
course, never deviating from it. 
And here we can make an assumption: either there was a kind of 
independent organization with in the Soviet regime who were guided by Savitsky’s 
ideals, adapting to political realities and cloaking them in official “Marxist” lexicon, 
or it’s situation in the objective position of the Heartland compelled the USSR to 













                                                
294 Lev Karsavin and Sergei Efron. 
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Section 10: Geopolitics as an Instrument of National Politics 
 
10.1 Planetary Dualism—the Basic Law of Geopolitics 
A summary of this brief introduction to the foundation of the geopolitical 
science can be made with some general conclusions.  
Despite the diversity of points of view in these works, we are dealing with a 
singular view of the world, which can be termed geopolitics. This world view aims 
to include in its analysis historical processes, inter-peoples and interstate reactions 
among several disciplinary approaches—geographical, political, ideological, 
ethnographical, economic, and etc. This provides the composition for the basic 
character of all geopolitical doctrines—striving for interdisciplinary synthesis.  
The most broadly shared of all the geopolitical methodological formulae is 
the claim of a fundamental historical dualism between the Land, “tellulocracy,” 
“nomoses” of the Earth, Eurasia, the heartland, “the middle land,” “ideocratic 
civilization,” and “the geographical pivot of history” on one side, and the Sea, 
Talassocracy, Sea Power, the “nomoses” of the Sea, Atlanticists, the Anglo-Saxon 
world, trading civilizations, “outer island crescents,” on the other. This can be 
described as the main law of geopolitics. All postulations of this dualism count in 
this meaning. Despite differences, not one of the founders of the geopolitical 
sciences calls into question the fact of this conflict. In its significance, it is 
comparable to the universal laws of gravity in physics. 
10.2 Geopolitics Cannot Be Biased 
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Another feature of the views of the founders of geopolitics is their constant 
political commitment. From this springs the obvious prejudice of all of them, 
without exception. Geopolitics, proceeding on a scientific basis, is obliged to 
acquire its own its own place at one of the geopolitical poles; from this will depend 
on the angle of view, under which all world processes can be analyzed. In the 
history of geopolitics, we do not find one single author who was indifferent to the 
destiny of his own state and people, sharing its basic ethnic and historical 
orientation. This is especially starkly manifested at the extreme poles—Anglo-
Saxon authors implacably and unanimously following the logos and values of the 
system of Sea Power, talassocracy, formulating their own positions unconditionally 
aligned with Atlanticism; the Russia Eurasianists were equally consistent in their 
faithfulness of the heartland’s ideals—never questioning the absolute ethnic and 
historical superiority of the ideocracy of Russia-Eurasia. 
More complicated are the works of the French, who theoretically have the 
choice of self-identification—either talassocracy or tellulocracy. In the first case, 
solidarity with the Anglo-Saxon world, in the second—Germonophilia. Both 
variants undoubtedly have enjoyed national sympathies. Theoretically both of 
these tendencies were present amongst French geopoliticians, but the more 
graceful Geopolitical concepts were produced by those in the “Atlanticist group”. 
followed by Vidal de la Blache, who became established as the central figure in the 
field. His geopolitics were antipodal to Laval and de Gaulle and theirs were inferior 
to his from this point of view.  
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Germany too has a dualistic situation. If in general its geopolitical thought 
was predominantly oriented towards continental and “Eurasianist” schools, this 
orientation organically complicated relations with the Slavic world, Asia, and 
especially with Russia. Thus, there organically existed and Germany attempted to 
voluntarily equate its middle-European position with middle-Eurasianism, 
ignoring, so persistently, the greater historical significance of Russia-Eurasia, that 
in both World Wars Germany was forced to wage war against not only the 
talassocratic powers, but against its logical European allies—Russia (USSR). 
Geopolitically, it can be called Germany’s “non-Eurasian” continental character. 
This arrangement summarizes in a geopolitical formula all German history and 
predetermines the very structure of the German national establishment.  
It is necessary for geopoliticians to initially define their own position on the 
world map and its belts (Mackinder’s schema are an extremely clear illustration of 
this idea), this science was influenced by representatives of the great powers 
having ambition to become “a world power” (weltmacht), a “superpower,” aiming 
for global dominance.  
The Americans Mahan and Spykman and the Englishman Mackinder 
represent the “island crescent.” They are the “advocates” for Atlanticism and 
talassocracy. 
Vidal de la Blache (and his school) represent Atlanticist France. Laval and 
de Gaulle were inclined towards continentalism, “Europeanism,” and anti-
Atlanticism. Hence, their mutual Germonophilia, which brought them closer in 
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spite of the fact that they belong to two oppositional camps: Laval headed the 
collaborationist Vichy government and de Gaulle—the chief of the anti-fascist 
French army.  
The Germans Ratzel, Haushofer, and Schmitt identified Germany with the 
axis of land, tellulocracy, and strove to establish Germany as a “great space,” which 
could confront the Anglo-Saxon talassocracy. In this fashion, they are joined by the 
Swede Rudolf Kjellen, who; however, was closer to middle Europe, a representative 
of German-European space, and not as a “narrowly-Swedish” nationalist. Ernst 
Niekisch, Freidrich Georg Junger, Artur Muller van den Brook, and others—went 
still further, deeming Germany’s future was only in spatial integration with 
Eurasian Russia.  
Finally, the Russian Eurasianists (Savitsky, Trubetskoy, etc.) offered the 
most complete version of continentalism, the most radical expression of the 
“nomos” of the Earth, tellulocracy.  
The lack of any exceptional names amongst the geopoliticians from other 
countries (although there were some from Italy, Spain Belgium, Romania, Holland, 
and others) is explained by secondary states in terms of power only indirectly are 
concerned with geopolitical dualism, their influence on the global conflict 
unnoticeable, and furthermore its geopolitical essence, its acuity, its actuality, its 
“fateful” measurements, are completely irrelevant.  
10.3 The Fate of the Scientists—The Fate of the Powers 
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The citizenship of geopolitical scientists is the most direct factor 
influencing their views. The connection here is obvious. Geopoliticians, in fact, are 
the people who with the greatest perspicacity and capability to recognize historical 
tendencies of global developments in the spatial arena, understood as the place of 
its state and its people in this context, formulating foundational and more 
reflective projects for the future. Therefore, they were often either directly or 
indirectly involved in world history, in ways that materialized through groups, 
parties, leaders, and in completely other ways, instantly relevant slogans 
There is one more interesting and consistent pattern. The extant of 
influence geopoliticians have on power, the inverse connection between scientific 
design and the political course of international relations of their state, varies 
widely.  
Mackinder, Spykman, and Mahan held high posts in their governments, 
their political activity having a most direct result, their personal influence on 
Anglo-Saxon politics was obvious and huge. Despite some friction with the 
scientific world in their countries and some (tactically) concealed the full meaning 
“maritime civilization” as a whole, they lived their lives with distinction, enjoying 
all types of support their lives and careers were undoubtedly successful. 
The experience was different for the continentalist geopoliticians. Vidal de 
la Blache was considered just a geographer, aiming to expand the sphere of his 
discipline to political power. His relationship with his government was respectful, 
but as a whole indifferent, despite many practical principles (generally outlined in 
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“Eastern France”) being put into practice. He did not receive the prestige of the 
Anglo-Americans, but his theoretical legacy must be taken into account.  
The situation was more serious for the Germans—especially Haushofer and 
Schmitt. In the Weimar Republic and under Hitler, their relationship with the 
changing waves had them pass from decided influences with power to direct 
repression. Compared to the “talassocratic” geopoliticians their fates were tragic 
their careers zigzagged, and in their defining moments even becoming victims of 
the regime whose national goals roughly coincided with their own. Here, there was 
no honor or glory, just historical influence alternating with persecution. 
And for the Eurasianists, the picture was even more tragic. Here, there was 
no direct influence, not one mention in official sources, only the camps, exile, 
arrests, and persecution to the fullest extent; and still, the defining moment in 
Soviet history leaves the impression that the fundamental decisions at the 
international level were made by followers of Petr Savitsky, verified at every stage 
by Eurasianist publications, the watershed moment arrived in 1989 when it became 
clear that some in Soviet leadership were incapable of interpreting logically 
traditional foreign policy, and as a result the gigantic Eurasianist organism 
disintegrated rapidly, created with such exertion by three generation, withstanding 
wars, destitution, suffering, and backbreaking labor. 
The role of geopoliticians and the extant of influence they have on power 
decreases along a west to east axis. The relevance of Mackinder and Spykman 
contrast with consistent threats to Schmitt from the SS and the persecution of 
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Haushofer (his son was shot), and to an even greater degree the camps of Savitsky 
and Karsavin.295 It is striking that ultimately, it was the countries who listened 
more closely to their geopoliticians and appreciated them, that achieved 
tremendous results and almost completely achieved world dominance. Germany 
too paid for its inattention to Haushofer’s theses on the “continental bloc,” and for 
half a century it would fall from history, suffering a monstrous defeat and fading 
away into a political nonentity. The USSR did not pay attention to the works of 
more responsible, deep and far sighted Russian patriots, without a fight or 
resistance in almost all situations, so that following Germany—would inevitably 
fade away, drastically shrinking in space and the economic and social structures 










                                                




Part 2, Section 3: Globalism 
 
2.3.1 The Prehistory of Globalism 
The concept of “globalism” arose long before the West’s ultimate victory in 
the Cold War. 
The idea of globalism can be reduced to postulating an inevitable, total 
global integration—a transition from a pluralism of governments, peoples, nations, 
and cultures to a uniform world, One World. 
The origins of this idea can be discerned in some utopian and chiliastic 
movements dating back to the middle ages and even deeper in antiquity. 
Fundamentally, in its representation that in some culminating moment of history 
will occur that gathers all the peoples of the earth in One Kingdom, which will no 
longer know anymore contradictions, tragedy, conflicts, and problems 
characteristic of regular world history. Besides a pure, mystical version of globalist 
utopias there were its rationalistic versions, once of which could be considered the 
doctrine of “Third Era” positivist August Comte or the humanistic eschatology of 
Lessing. 
The globalist idea was more often characterized by moderate European and 
generally English socialism (some of them were combined in the “Fabian Society”). 
Communists spoke of a single World State. In different ways, analogical globalist 
organizations were formed beginning at the close of the nineteenth century and 
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centering on global business figures, for example Sir Cecil Rhodes—organizer of 
the round table group, members of which were supposed to have been 
“contributing to the establishment of unimpeded trade for the whole world and 
creating a single ‘World State.’” Socialist motives often were interwoven within 
liberal-capitalism and communists were flanked in these organizations by 
representatives of great financial capital. All were united by their faith in the 
utopian idea of a united planet. 
It is revealing that the most well-known of these organizations, the League 
of Nations—later the U.N. and UNESCO, were continuations of exactly these 
globalist circles, who had great influence in world politics.  
By the end of the twentieth century, these globalist organizations, avoiding 
unnecessary publicity and often cloaked in “secrecy,” had exchanged many names. 
There existed a “universal movement for a world confederation,” led by Garry 
Davis, “the federalist union,” and “the crusade for world government,” and 
organization of English MP Henry Osborne in 1946). 
As the whole conceptual and strategic power of the west was concentrated 
in the USA, naturally its government became the primary headquarters of 
globalism, representatives of which formed parallel power structures, comprised of 
advisers, analysts, and centers of strategic development. 
Three fundamental globalist organizations have evolved, the existence of 
which have only recently been discovered by the general public of the West. 
Unlike official structures these groups have benefitted vastly from large, 
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unregulated design and development because they were released from formal and 
fixed procedures regulating the activities of the U.N. commissions and the like. 
First is the “Council of Foreign Relations” (C.F.R.). Its creator was the 
greatest American banker—Morgan. This unofficial organization was busy working 
on American strategy on a planetary scale, which is connected to the ultimate goal 
to completely unify the planet and establish a World Government. Moreover, in 
1921 the affiliate “the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace” arose, 
consisting of high-ranking politicians attached to the globalist viewpoint on the 
planet’s future. Since the majority of the C.F.R.’s members were simultaneously 
high-ranking dignitaries of the Freemasons and it can be assumed, that their 
geopolitical projects had some kind of humanistic-mystical dimension. 
In 1954 the second globalist structure, the Bilderberger Group/Club was 
established. It unites not only American Atlanticists, politicians, financiers, and 
intellectuals, but their European colleagues as well. From the American side, it was 
presented exclusively by members of the C.F.R. and the group was considered its 
international extension.  
In 1973 activists of the Bilderberger Group established the third important 
globalist structure, the “Trilateral Commission.” It is led by Americans and is 
included as a part of the C.F.R. and the Bilderberger Group. Apart from its 
headquarters in the USA (address: 345 E. 46th St, New York), it has two additional 
headquarters in Europe and Japan. 
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The “Trilateral” commission is named for one of the fundamentals of 
geopolitics. United under the aegis of America, three large spaces—the 
commission’s namesake—will lead technological development and market 
economies: 
1. The American Space, including North and South America 
2. The European Space 
3. The Pacific Space, controlled by Japan 
At the head of the most important globalist groups—Bilderberger and 
Trilateral—is a high-ranking member of C.F.R. the notable banker David 
Rockefeller, owner of “Chase Manhattan Bank.” 
Except for him, at the center of every globalist project are permanent analysts, 
geopoliticians, and strategists of the Atlanticists: Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry 
Kissinger. It also includes the famous George Ball. 
The basic line of every globalist project consists of the transition to a single 
world system under the strategic domination of the West and “progressive,” 
“humanistic,” and “democratic” values. For this, they have worked out parallel; 
structures—consisting of politicians, journalists, intellectuals, financiers, analysts, 
and so on who were supposed to prepare the ground before the globalist project of 
World Government could be widely organized because without preparation it 
would encounter powerful psychological opposition from peoples and states not 




The globalist project, being developed and held by these organizations, was not 
homogenous. There existed two if its original versions, which differed in method, 
but were theoretically in pursuit of the same goal.  
2.3.2 The Theory of Convergence 
The first and most pacifistic and “conciliatory” version of globalism is 
known as “convergence theory.” Developed in the 1970s in the bowels of the C.F.R. 
by analysts of the “leftist” group under the leadership of Zbigniew Brzezinski. This 
theory assumes that it would be possible to overcome the ideological and 
geopolitical dynamism of the Cold War through the creation of a new cultural-
ideological civilization type, which would be an intermediate between socialism 
and capitalism, between pure Atlanticism and pure continentalism.  
Soviet Marxism was considered a barrier which could be overcome by 
moving towards its moderate, social-democratic, revisionist version through a 
refusal of the theses of the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” “class war,” “the 
nationalization of the means of production,” and “the abolition of private 
property.” In its turn, the West’s capitalism was supposed to restrict the free 
market introducing partial governmental economic regulation and so forth. A 
community of cultural orientation could possibly be found in the Enlightenment 
tradition and humanism, which would be constructed in western democratic 
regimes and the social ethics of communism (in its softer, social-democratic 
versions). A World Government, which might appear in basic “convergence 
theory,” and was conceived by Moscow’s admission, to Atlanticist management 
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jointly with Washington. In this case, this would commence an era of universal 
peace, the Cold War would end, and peoples could be released from the weight of 
geopolitical stresses. 
Here, it is important to catch the parallel with the technological transition 
from systems rooted in “talassocracy”296 to “efirocracy297”: globalist politicians 
started to see the planet not through the eyes of dwellers of the western continents 
surrounded by the sea, like traditional globalists, but through the eyes of 
“astronauts in cosmic orbit.” In this case, their view really represents One World.  
The globalist centers have their corresponding ones in Moscow. A key 
figure here was the academic Gvishiani298, director of the Institute of the Systems 
of Development, which is a sort of affiliate of the “Trilateral Commission” in the 
USSR. But particularly successful were its activities among extreme left parties in 
Western Europe, where it set them down the path to “Eurocommunism” and it is 
considered a fundamental concentric base for global convergence. 
2.3.3 The Global Victory of the West 
Theories of convergence were ideologically based and referenced by Mikhail 
Gorbachev and his advisors while implementing Perestroika. A few years after 
                                                
296 Naval based. 
 
297 Airspace based. 
 
298 A murky figure, there are references to a D.Gvishiani known for mathematical economic analysis 
and the organization he led was noted for a large proportion of Jewish members. His surname is 




beginning Perestroika, a similar project began to be realized in China, with 
representatives of the “Trilateral Commission” installed in the late 1970s. But, the 
Chinese and Russian “Perestroikas” would have different fates. China insisted on 
an “equitable” distribution of the roles and Soviet shifts in ideology towards the 
West on the side of Socialism led the USSR to famously embark on a path of 
further concessions. 
Following globalist logic, Gorbachev began structuring the organization of 
the Soviet space in “democratic” and “liberal” ways. First, this impacted the nations 
of the Warsaw Pact, and then the USSR’s republics. This started with the reduction 
of strategic armaments and ideological convergence with the West. But, in this 
case, one should pay heed to the fact that the years of Gorbachev’s rule coincided 
with a period of control in the USA by the Republicans, Reagan and Bush Sr. 
Moreover, Reagan was the only President in recent years to consistently refuse to 
participate in every globalist organization. By conviction he was a rigid, 
uncompromising, and consistent Atlanticist and free marketer not inclined to 
compromise with “the left” even in its mild democratic or social-democratic forms. 
Consequently, Moscow’s steps in the direction of convergence and the foundation 
of a World Government—with significant weight given to the governments of the 
Eastern Bloc—were from opposing poles—having not a few unfavorable 
ideological obstacles. Reagan, the Atlanticist (later Bush), simply used Gorbachev’s 
globalist reforms for purely utilitarian ends. The voluntary concession of the 
Heartland was not accompanied by relevant concessions in maritime power and 
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the West has not arrived at a compromise—neither geopolitically, nor 
ideologically—with a self-liquidating Eurasia. NATO has not dissolved, nor left 
Europe or Asia. Liberal-democratic ideology is stabilizing its position more and 
more. 
In this case, Globalism has not come forward independently of geopolitical 
doctrine realized in practice through the pragmatic use of instruments of the Cold 
War, from logic, which based on the theories of Mackinder and Mahan, has not 
been rejected in the USA. 
2.3.4 “The End of History” of Francis Fukuyama 
After the breakup of the USSR and the victory of the West, the Atlanticist-
globalist project had to either be destroyed or change its logic. 
The new version of globalism in the Post-Soviet era was Francis Fukuyama’s 
doctrine—published in the early 1990s in an article, “The End of History.” It may 
be discussed as the basis for the ideas of neo-globalism. 
Fukuyama continues to follow the version of an historical process. 
Humanity, from the “law of might,” “obscurantism,” and “irrational management 
of social reality” of the Dark Ages moved towards the ranks of the most reasonable 
and logical—embodied in capitalism, modern western civilizations, free markets, 
and liberal-democratic ideology. History and its progress endured only on account 
of irrational factors, which gradually cede their places to the law of reason, a total 
monetary equivalency, and other similar goals. The fall of the USSR marked the 
defeat of a last bastion of “irrationality.” In this fashion to the end of History and 
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the start of a distinct planetary existence, which would occur under the guidance 
of Markets and Democracy to unite the world in a coherent, rational, functional 
machine. 
This New Order, still universally based in purely Atlanticist systems, goes 
beyond Atlanticism and all regions of the world will begin to be reorganized on the 
new model—centered on the greatest economic development.  
2.3.5 “Geoeconomics” of Jacques Attali 
European authors have analogues to Fukuyama’s theories. Jacques Attali, 
being a longtime advisor to French President Francoise Mitterand, and then 
Director of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, explored a 
similar theory in his book “Lines on the Horizon.” 
Attali considers the present moment the onset of the Third Era, the “era of 
money,” which is an equally universal goal, by luring all to digital expressions of 
materialism—with these its extremely simple to rule in the most rationalistic 
manner. This approach of Attali’s is itself connected with the arrival of a messianic 
era understood in a Jewish-Kabbalist context (to read more on this aspect he 
develops it in another book, specially dedicated to a messiah, “He Arrives.” This 
separates him from Fukuyama, who strictly stays within the limits of pragmatism 
and utilitarianism. 
Jacques Attali submits his version of the future, which has “already arrived.” 
Dominating the entire planet will be a single liberal-democratic ideology, market 
systems, and together with the development of information technology, the world 
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will become unified and dominated by homogeneity—geopolitics and history will 
be relegated to the background. During the “Third Era,” geopolitical dynamism 
will be abrogated.  
And, the unified world would receive a new geopolitical structuralism on 
this occurring, based on the principles of “geoeconomics.” The first conception of 
“geoeconomics” was developed by historian Fritz Ringer and popularized by 
Ferdinand Braudel. 
“Geoeconomics” is a distinct version of globalist geopolitics, which regards 
geography, culture, ideology, ethnicity, religion, and the like as not being prime 
factors; the true essence of this approach is pure economic reality and its 
relationship to space. For contemporary geoeconomists it is unimportant what 
people reside here or there, what their history is, or cultural traditions, and so on. 
It all boils down to where global exchange centers, useful minerals, information 
hubs, and very large spaces are located. 
“Geoeconomics” dovetails with political reality as if a World Government 
and unified planetary state exists. 
The geoeconomical approach of Attali leads to the highlighting of three 
important regions, which in a unified world will compose the centers of new 
economic spaces. 
1. The American Space: Finishing the unification of both Americans in a 
single, financial-manufacturing zone. 
2. The European Space: Emerging out of the economic integration of Europe. 
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3. The Pacific Region: A zone of “new prosperity,” possessing some competing 
centers—Tokyo, Taiwan, Singapore, and so forth. (12) 
In Attali’s opinion, between these three globalist there would not be any 
particular differences or contradictions, so that in economical and ideological 
types they would be strictly identical. The single difference will be simply 
geographical location of its developed centers, around which will be structurally 
concentrated its less developed regions, located in nearby spaces. This concentric 
restructuring can only truly happen at “the end of history,” or in other words, upon 
the end of traditional reality as dictated by geopolitics. 
Geopolitical-civilizational dynamism will be canceled. The lack of a pole in 
opposition to Atlanticism has led to a drastic rethinking of spaces. This has 
commenced the era of geoeconomics. 
In Attali’s model can be found the ultimate expression of the idea, which has 
been at the foundation of the “Trilateral Commission” and political-conceptual 
instrument being developed and realized for similar projects. 
It is revealing that the leadership of the “Trilateral Commission” (David 
Rockefeller, Georges Berthoin as its chief of the European branch, and Henry 
Kissinger) visited Moscow in January 1989 and were received by USSR President 
Gorbachev. Alexander Yakovlev299 was present, as well as several different upper 
                                                
299 Known for being the architect as glasnost 
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echelon Soviet Leaders: Medvedev300, Falin301, Akhromeyev302, Dobrynin303, 
Chernyaev304, Arbatov305, and Prymakov306. And Jacques Attali himself supported 
close contacts with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. 
One thing is certain: the transition to geoeconomic logic and neoglobalism was 
possible only after the geopolitical self-liquidation of the Eurasianist USSR. 
Neoglobalism is not a direct continuation of historical globalism, which 
initially expected the presence of a final model of socialist, leftist elements. This 
intermediate variant between proper globalism and Atlanticism. 
2.3.6 Poststructuralist Globalism of Professor Santoro307  
There is a more detailed version of neoliberalism. One of the most vivid is 
the futurist geopolitical concept developed at the Milanese Institute for the Study 
of International Politics (ISPI) under the leadership of Professor Carlo Santoro. 
According to Santoro’s model, in the present moment humanity is 
inhabiting a period of transition from a bipolar world to a globalist version of 
                                                
300 KGB general responsible for Gorbachev’s security. 
 
301 Soviet diplomat disgraced after $600,000 cash was found in his office during the failed 1991 coup. 
 
302 Conservative Soviet general, later committed suicide following the 1991 failed coup. 
 
303 Longtime USSR ambassador to the USA. 
 
304 Principal foreign policy advisor to Gorbachev. 
 
305 Longtime foreign policy expert and academic, fluent in English and known for appearing in US 
media. 
 
306 Foreign Minister and intelligence chief of the USSR and expert on the Middle East, fluent in 
Arabic. 
 
307 Carlo Maria Santoro 
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multipolarity (understood geopolitically, as in Attali). International institutions 
(like the U.N. and so on) represent an achievable development for the optimistic 
globalism of Fukuyama, which is that they would become the core of a World 
Government presented by Santoro as ineffectual and mirroring the outdated logic 
of bipolar geopolitics. Additionally, the entire world bears a firm imprint from the 
Cold War—the geopolitical logic of which remained domination. Santoro foresaw 
that this situation cannot but end in a period of civilizational catastrophe. 
He expounds further on the scenario of this supposed catastrophe: 
1. The further weakening of the role of international institutions. 
2. The swelling of nationalist tendencies among nations, including the 
Warsaw Pact and the third world, this will bring chaotic processes. 
3. The disintegration of traditional blocs (this does not involve Europe) and 
progressing the decay of existing governments. 
4. Starting with an era of small, middle-intensity wars the results of which will 
develop new geopolitical formations. 
5. The threat of planetary chaos will force the varied blocs to accept the 
necessity of creating new international institutions possessing huge author 
that actually denotes the establishment of a World Government. 
6. The final establishment of a global government under the aegis of a new 
international events (World Government). (13) 
This model is in the middle between globalist optimism of Francis Fukuyama 
and the Atlanticist pessimism of Samuel Huntingdon.  
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Part 4: The Geopolitical Future of Russia, Section 4: The 
Redistribution of the World 
  
4.5 An Empire of Many Empires 
The New Empire, the construction of which would be a global response, is 
the planetary civilizational mission of the Russian people—a super-project having 
many sublevels. This New Empire, the Eurasian Empire, will have completely 
differentiated structures within which consisting of separate parts of varying 
degrees of interdependence and integration. It is completely clear that the New 
Empire will not be the Russian Empire, nor the Soviet Empire. 
The foundational integrative moment of this New Empire will be a battle 
with Atlanticism and a strong rebuff to market liberals, the “Naval,” “Carthaginian” 
civilizations, which today are embodied in the USA and the planetary politics, 
economic, and military structures, which serve Atlanticism. For this battle to be a 
success, it is necessary to establish a gigantic geopolitical continental bloc having 
strategic unity. The strategic unity of the continental borders of the New Empire 
will be united and organized indivisibly in military-strategic thought and will 
impose political constraints under which all blocs that will become a part of the 
New Empire will be politically organic in one category, with the one prohibition 
against serving Atlanticist geopolitical interests, leaving the strategic alliance, 
harming continental security. On this and only on this level will the New Empire 




At the next, lower level the New Empire will itself be represented in “a 
Confederation of Large Spaces” or Secondary Empires. From between these, four 
foundational empires should be highlighted. The European Empire in the West 
(around Germany and Central Europe), the Pacific Empire in the West (around 
Japan), the Central Asian Empire in the South (around Iran), and the Russian 
Empire in the Center (around Russia). It is completely logical that the central 
position is the chief one in this project, since the territorial cohesion and 
uniformity of the remaining constituent gigantic continental blocs depends on it. 
Moreover, separate independent large spaces will exist—apart from the specific 
Indian bloc, the Pan-Arabic world, a Pan-African union, and possibly the specific 
region of China—whose status is hard to determine. Each of the Secondary 
Empires will be based on the particular racial, cultural, religious, political, or 
geopolitical integrative factors, which in each case might differ. The degree of 
integration of the empires themselves will vary by amount depending on the 
concrete ideological basis on which this or that empire will form. 
Inside these Secondary Empires there also will be lesser ethnic, national, 
and religious units functioning on a confederative principle that, big or small, 
might be roughly called “countries” or “states.” Naturally, sovereignty in these 
“countries” will have significant limitations, first and foremost in strategy (arising 
from all the principles of the continental New Empire), and secondly in the 
connections established and entered into by specific large spaces—and in this 
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question the principle will be extremely flexibly applied to differentiations 
accounting for the historical, spiritual, geographical, and racial features of the 
region.  
Greater Russia, for example, can be considered like a separate people or 
even “country” within the framework of the Russian Empire together with 
Ukrainians, Belorussians, possibly the Serbs, and so on, but at the same time all of 
these are closely connected with the jurisdiction of Slavic-orthodox types incarnate 
in these governmental systems. The Russian Empire will simultaneously hinge on 
the Eurasian Empire, the New Empire, the strategic interests of which will be 
above the national-racial and confessional interests of the Eastern Orthodox Slavs. 
The same might be said, for example, about the French, who will remain a 
nation or “country,” within the framework of the European Empire, together with 
Germans and Italians. Connecting them is the general European imperial 
traditions, the Christian religion, and belonging to the Indo-European race. But 
that same European Empire, in its turn, will be subordinate to the strategic 
imperatives of the great continental New Empire. 
The same thing will take place in Middle Asia, in the Pacific space, in the 
Arab world, in Black Africa, in India, and so forth. 
While at the global level, for the construction of a planetary New Empire 
the chief “scapegoat” will namely be the USA—the undermining of whose power 
which (up to the complete destruction of its geopolitical constructs) will be 
realized systematically and uncompromisingly by the participants of the New 
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Empire. The Eurasian Project presupposes in this its relationship of Eurasian 
expansion in South and Central America to remove its output from under the 
control of the North (here, the Hispanic factor could be used as a traditional 
alternative to the Anglo-Saxon) and also to provoke every kind of destabilization 
and separatism within the borders of the USA (it might be possible to lean on the 
political forces of the African-American racists). The ancient Roman formula of 
“Carthage must be destroyed,” will become the absolute motto of the Eurasian 
Empire, because itself will absorb the essence of all geopolitical planetary strategy 
awakening to its continental mission. 
The specifics in clarifying the status of this or that people, one “country” or 
another, one or another “Empire of a Large Space,” in the framework of the general 
continental bloc will actually become realized only after geopolitical unification, 
after, the establishment of necessary pivots, and only then European peoples and 
states can decide their own internal problems with total freedom, without pressure 
from Atlanticist forces, which are principally interested only in not allowing 







Part 5: The Interior Geopolitics of Russia, Section 5: The 
Threat of the West 
 
5.1 The Two Wests 
The problem of organizing space in Western Europe is that topic which 
composes basic geopolitics as like the sciences. Western Europe is the Rimland of 
Eurasia, and the Rimland is the most complete, single-valued, and historically 
identifiable. In relation to Russia itself the Heartland’s West, on the whole, itself 
represents the chief planetary protection from the sector of “Coastal Civilizations,” 
which fully accepts its functions as a complete Talassocracy and identifies its fate 
with the Sea. At the vanguard of the process was England, but every remaining 
European country has taken the baton of industrialization, technological 
development, and normative values of “Free Trade,” more or less entering into the 
Talassocratic ensemble. 
In the course of developing historically the final geographical picture of the 
West, the championship was passed from England’s Island to the continental 
America, especially the USA. Thus, the maximal incarnation of a talassocracy in its 
strategic, ideological, economic, and cultural aspects has become the USA and its 
control of NATO. 
This fully geopolitical fixation of planetary power helps the pole of 
Atlanticism and talassocracy move across the Atlantic to the American continent. 
Europe itself (even the West, with the exception of England) from the center of 
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Talassocracy becomes a “buffer zone,” “coastal belt,” and “strategic appendage” of 
the USA.  
This transfer of the talassocratic pivot from the ocean somewhat changes 
the geopolitical configuration. A century ago Europe (England and France) was the 
main enemy of Russia, but after World War II this region lost meaningful strategic 
autonomy having transformed into strategic colonies of the USA. This 
transformation strictly corresponds with that “view from the sea,” which 
characterizes the typical colonial relationship to the motherland like in any 
talassocracy. If early “coastal countries” had their potential character, active in the 
geopolitical formation of “Islandic England,” but now it accurately corresponds to 
the allocation of power. The American geopolitical reality has become a 
completely independent pole of the West, with Europe a cultural projection. In the 
absolute sense of the word, Western Europe has transformed from a metropolis to 
a colony. Everything is situated in correspondence with the classical logic of 
talassocratic geopolitics.  
Thus, in the present time, the geopolitical problem of the West in its wider 
sense for Russia is the disintegration in two—the West of America and the West of 
Europe. From the geopolitical perspective, these two realities have different 
meanings. The West of America is the total geopolitical enemy of Russia—the pole 
of the direct opposite of Eurasian tendencies—the headquarters and center of 
Atlanticism. The geopolitical position of war with America constituted and 
constitutes the essence of all Eurasian geopolitics, starting in the middle of the 
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twentieth century when the role of the USA became evident. In its relations from 
the Heartland position, it is clearly necessary to actively oppose the USA’s 
Atlanticist geopolitics at every level, in all regions of the Earth, striving to unleash 
maximum demoralization, deception, and in the final account, the defeat of the 
enemy. It is generally important herewith to introduce geopolitical chaos within 
the American daily experience by encouraging all manner of separatism, ethnic 
diversity, social and racial conflict, actively supporting every extremist dissident 
movement, racist sectarian groups, and destabilizing the political processes within 
America. While simultaneously having the essence of supporting isolationist 
tendencies in American politics, theses of those circles (often right-wing 
Republicans), which believe the USA should confine itself to its own internal 
problems. That position Russia has been placed in is supremely favorable, even if 
“isolationists” will be undermined by the framework of the original version of the 
Monroe Doctrine, such is the organic influence of the USA in the two Americas. 
This does not mean that Eurasia should refrain from destabilizing the Latin 
American world to withdraw individual regions from under the USA’s control. 
Every geopolitical level of the USA should be involved simultaneously, similar to 
the anti-Eurasianism of the Atlanticists: “sponsoring” the disintegration of the 
strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), governmental unity (USSR), and furthering ethno-
territorial problems under the guise of regionalism, Russia accomplished its 
progressive disintegration up to its complete destruction. The Heartland will force 
the Sea Power to pay in the same coin. This is basic symmetrical logic. All this 
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constitutes to the objective of Russian “external politics,” relative to the USA, 
therefore more detailed analysis goes beyond the scope of this work. 
The second reality, although denoted by the term “West,” has another 
meaning. This Europe, the geopolitical essence of which in the last decades has 
sharply changed. Having been traditional metropolises for different parts of the 
world, was first strategically, culturally, economically, politically, etc. colonial. 
American colonialism differed from the more explicit and cruel forms of the past, 
but its essence remained the same. In the present moment Europe does not have 
geopolitical and geographical volition of its own. Functionally, it is confined to 
following the USA on an ancillary basis and being the most likely setting in a 
probable conflict with Eurasia. This position automatically leads to the anti-
American line becoming the general geopolitical alternative to European states, 
uniting them in a single project, which never could have existed earlier. The 
unification of Europe in Maastricht is the first signal of the emergence of Europe as 
a whole and self-sufficient organism pretending so as to return historical 
significance and geopolitical sovereignty. Europe does not want to be Russia or 
America. Its will is manifested in all capacities.  
Then stands the question: what in broad terms is Eurasia’s relationship to 
its western peninsula? 
From simply the geopolitical perspective, Eurasia is uniquely interested in 
bringing Europe out from under the USA’s Atlanticism. It is the priority task. In 
the West, Russia should have Sea Borders—it is a strategic geopolitical imperative 
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in the development of Eurasia. The absence of these borders, together with their 
land line crossing Europe in the middle, artificially and forcibly led to the final 
outcome of the geopolitical loss of the USSR. Accordingly, the task is not to repeat 
the mistakes and rectifying the position. Only then will Eurasia be free from Sea 
Power, when its strategic borders in the North, East, South, and West will become 
Oceans, like in America’s case. Only then can a civilizational duel take place on 
equal terms. Therefore, Russia has two paths—a military occupation of Europe, or 
a strategic reorganization of the European space, which will be made in the 
geopolitical sector by a secure strategic alliance with Moscow –preserving its 
sovereignty, autonomy, and its autarky. The first variant is so unrealistic it cannot 
be discussed seriously. The second variant—complex, but feasible—has been 
carried out on in Europe’s transition to a colony over the past half century, having 
left the track of serious European consciousness.   
A friendly Europe might arise in this case only if it is unified. In the case of 
the Atlanticist opposition, the enemy finds greater freedom in carrying out 
fragmentation and schism in the European bloc, provoking conflict analogical to 
World War II. Therefore, Moscow should contribute maximally to European 
unification and generally support Central European states, and in the first place, 
Germany. The alliance of France and Germany, the Paris-Berlin axis (de Gaulle’s 
project) is the spine around which its altogether logical to build a new Europe. In 
France and Germany there are persistent anti-Atlanticist political traditions (in 
currents on both the left and right). For the time being, they are latent and 
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potential, and at some point, they will declare themselves in one voice. Moscow 
should orient to this line now, and not await the final events to develop.  
Moscow’s objective of wresting control of Europe from the USA (NATO), 
contributing to its unity strengthening integrative connections with central 
Europe under the sign of a basic external political axis of Berlin-Moscow. Eurasia 
needs an alliance with a friendly Europe. From a military perspective, it still should 
not be able to defend itself (without the USA) from serious threats, and economic 
cooperation with Central Europe can solve the great majority of Russian and Asian 
technological problems in exchange for resources and a strategic military 
partnership. 
Proceeding from these external political objectives to analyzing the infernal 













Part 6: Eurasian Analysis, Section 3: Geopolitical Problems of 
the Near Abroad 
 
6.3.1 Laws of Great Spaces 
The foundational law of geopolitics is the “Principle of Great Spaces,” 
detailed by Mackinder and Haushofer and developed by Carl Schmitt. According 
to this principle the national sovereignty of the state depends not only on its 
military power, technological development, and economic bases, but on the 
dimensions and locations of its lands and territories. Classical geopoliticians have 
written hundreds of volumes proving that problems of sovereignty depend directly 
on geopolitical independence, self-sufficiency, and autarkical regions. Those 
peoples and states which truly strive towards sovereignty should first and foremost 
decide the problem of territorial self-sufficiency. In our epoch, that self-sufficiency 
can only be possessed by very major states, located in regions protected from 
possible attacks (militarily, politically, and economically) by different state 
formations. 
During the period of confrontation between capitalism and socialism and 
the necessary Blocs—the Great Spaces were obvious. No one doubted that a 
country might be “non-aligned,” but only at the expense of eliminating itself from 
the sphere of global geopolitics and marginalization to the periphery. However, all 
“non-aligneds” still made a choice in favor of one camp over the other, although 
less radically than directly supporting capitalism or socialism. The destruction of 
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one superpower certainly altered the Earth’s geopolitical spaces, but at the same 
time the Principle of Great Spaces by no means lost its power. Oppositely, it is 
more and more common today of the geopolitical project of “Globalism,” an idea 
which boils down the transformation of the earth’s surface under the Principle of 
Great Spaces—controlled from the American center.  
6.2.2 Pax Americana and Geopolitical Globalism 
The project of pro-American “Atlanticist” Great Spaces is the creation of the 
global Pax Americana or the establishment of a “New World Order,” with a single 
“World Government,” these, in fact, are geopolitical synonyms. Precisely such a 
plan is being developed and realized today in the West’s international politics, and 
chiefly, in the United States. It is obvious that the globalist concept of Great Spaces 
excludes any forms of authentic governments and political sovereignty of any kind 
for any people or state. Moreover, a bipolar world gave an incomparably greater 
degree of freedoms (sovereignty) to states included in the spheres of influence of 
one of the two Great Spaces, than in the planned globalist project—even if only 
because a global confrontation compels not only the suppression of satellite-states, 
but also their purchase. The single large global space of the globalists-futurists will 
mean the extinction of any weak shades of sovereignty so that power (military or 
economic) to suppress, fragment, and atomize “small spaces” will become the only 
way of control (the need for bribery and deception falls away on its own from the 




The actual situation is set in front of each people and state (and specially to 
states and peoples formerly included in the geopolitical bloc that opposed the 
Atlanticists of the West) integration in a single Great Space under the rule of 
Atlanticists, or a vital alternative, organize new Great Spaces capable of resisting 
the last remaining superpower. The question of geopolitical sovereignty having an 
immediate alternative relationship, but at the same time some peoples or states 
cannot have complete sovereignty in either one of the two cases. In making the 
globalist model any sovereignty at all is generally, wittingly excluded since the 
“World Government” grows without alternatives and only one center of power—
and sovereign in this case is only a global pseudoempire—the “New World Order.” 
Under it, all its parts become colonies. In the organization of a new Great Space, 
we have to deal with the matter of relative sovereignty within the framework of 
large geopolitical formations, because this possible Great Space will be 
comparatively free in determining a dominant ideology and worldview. This means 
peoples and states which enter that bloc, could expect, at the least, ethnocultural 
sovereignty for direct participants in the creations and design of a new macro-
ideology; whereas the geopolitical variant of the “New World Order,” is already 
fully elaborated and offering to the Earth’s peoples as in the colonial analogue of 






Book 2, Part 5: The Khazarian Question 
 
The Jew and Eurasia 
The Inadequacy of Explanatory Schemes (1) 
The Eurasian question has continued to excite the minds of our 
contemporaries. Neither its artificial silence, nor its hasty apologetic cry, nor 
primitive Judeophobia cannot address these problems. The Jewish people are a 
unique phenomenon in world history. They clearly have an absolutely special 
quality, giving them a religious-ethnic path to fulfill a mysterious and ambiguous 
mission across millennia.  
On what basis is this mission? How to unravel the enigma of the Jew? What 
lies in the so many evocative rumors of the mission des juifs?308 
It is a risk to cover this very extensive topic as a whole. Therefore, we turn 
only to the role of Jews in twentieth century Russian history, which has harmfully 
impacted many peoples, regardless of whichever ideological camp they belonged. 
Immediately pay attention to the fact that no convincing, fully satisfactory 
interpretation exists on this topic in today’s day and age. A part of historians is 
generally inclined to deny the importance of the Jewish factor in Russian and 
Soviet history—that is crude violence over truth. It stands to only look over the 
lists of the main Bolsheviks and political elite of the Soviet state and a 
disproportionately large share of the names will before your eyes. Ignoring this 
                                                
308 Taken verbatim from Dugin, who switches to French for this phrase.  
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fact—dismissing all as meaningless phrases—it has been dismissed even from the 
simple, scientific-historical perspective. 
The second function is concerning the functions of Jews in Russia (USSR) in 
the twentieth century in relation to the character of national-patriotic circles. Here 
there is a representation that the role of the Jew was negative, subversive, and 
disruptive. This notable theory of the “Jewish Conspiracy,” which were generally 
popular in Black-Hundredist, and later White Guard, circles. From this 
perspective, the Jews, following their unique ethno-religious traditions and 
believing itself a single community, convinced of messianic status, knowingly 
organizing the destructive Bolshevik movement, occupying prevailing roles in 
them, and shaking and rattling the last bastion of conservative Christian 
governments, cultures, and traditions. The inveterate conservative Judeophobia 
transfers over to the USSR’s collapse, in which also the Jews are accused, referring 
to the huge portion of representatives of that nation in the ranks of the reformers. 
The weakness of this conception is that Jews are simultaneously accused of 
creating the USSR and destroying it; that they are the main proponents of 
socialism, its anti-bourgeoisie concept, and they are presented as the main 
apologists for capitalism. Moreover, an un-biased observer acquainted with the 
destinies of the Jewish-Bolsheviks, would prove that they fully, genuinely believed 
in communist ideology, long donating their actual lives to it which be unthinkable 
if accepting the all-powerful version of the group as “cynical and deceitful 
saboteurs.” In general, the anti-Semitic version is unconvincing, although 
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somewhat closer to the truth, because unlike the first, it recognizes the unique role 
of Jews in the historical process. Curiously, this acknowledgement brings together 
anti-Semites and the most conscientious followers of Zionism.   
The third version belongs to Judeophilic (in the ultimate example, Zionist) 
circles. They insist that the Jews are always on the right side, victims of unjust 
persecutions from other peoples, carriers of all positive, moral, socialist, and 
cultural values. This position recognizes the leading role Jews have had in all the 
important historical processes in Russia, but knowingly affirms that in Revolution, 
for Soviet history, and in Perestroika Jews have been exactly a positive pole, 
embodying in themselves a secret and eternal truth, goodness, wisdom, and 
humanism. If an anti-Semitic Jew appears to be unequivocally evil and that 
diagnosis is subject to doubt, even in those cases when it leads to a fully logical 
and historical absurdity, so that the Judeophile observes a strict reverse image: 
here the Jew is always good, even if it categorically opposes the objective real 
picture. Accordingly, this extremely apologetic approach cannot be exhaustive, 
since it is initially constructed on a structure a priori.  
New Version (2) 
Note that the anti-Semitic and Zionist versions of explanations for the role 
of Jews in modern Russo-Soviet history, springing from some implication in the 
deep unity of Jews, a unity of historical reflection and purpose. In other words, the 
tendency to discuss Jews on the face of it as simply an ethnos with friends, but as a 




Another opposing version, arising out of no unity existing among Jews and 
that in national examples Jews in history are separate and actually, “I, like a 
personality only in the background,” psychological thought is determined 
secondarily by ethnic factors and accordingly its own term, “Jewry,” as understood 
by anti-Semites and Zionists, has no right to exist. 
Excluding all these approaches because of their almost obvious inadequacy, 
we turn to another version. If we do not arrange a personalist approach, nor a 
group approach, nor one that is an undefinable multiple conception, nor a 
conception of cohesive unity, we are naturally assuming some intermediate model. 
It is sensible to speak of the inner duality of the Jew, about the presence of a 
unique ethnos, of not one, but two: two “organizations,” two “orders,” two centers 
of historical reflection, two scenarios of messianic paths. This dualistic approach 
gives us a completely new, in many ways unexpected, perspective in writing on 
this complex phenomenon.  
Easterners and Westerners in the Ranks of the Jews (3) 
The famous Eurasianist author Yakov Bromberg309 put forward in his time a 
very similar idea in his article, “On Jewish Orientalism.” It is about the fact that in 
the Russian environment Jews clearly divided into two antagonistic groups, 
                                                





themselves representing psychological roles and cultural archetypes. One of these 
is the traditional-Hasidic orientation. It has the character of mysticism, religious 
fanaticism, extreme idealism, and a deep contempt for the materialist way of life, 
greed, and rationalism. In some extreme cases the mystical type of Jew crossed 
over from their ethno-religious particularity to universalism, disseminating ideals 
of national messiah to other peoples. But apart from orthodox religion, the 
medium of the same psychological type was used by secularists, fervent 
revolutionaries, Marxists, communists, and populists. The mystical Jew differs 
from other branches, not simply in abstract Marxism, but in a deep sympathy and 
heartfelt solidarity with the Russian people, generally with the Russian peasants 
and workers, those unofficial elements—Tsarist, but radical, earthy—at the 
bottom of a parallel Russia, a Russia of Old Believers and Mystics, the “enchanted 
Russian wanderers.” It is from here the classical type of Jewish-SR310, who very 
often had overt characteristics of Russian nationalist tendencies as deep followers 
of national bolshevism.  
Bromberg united these Hasidic-Marxist, mystical-socialists into one 
group— “Jewish Orientalism.” This was a “Eurasian fraction” of the Jewry. Another 
distinguished Soviet historian, Mikhail Agursky311, came to a similar conclusion in 
his epochal work “The Ideology of National Bolshevism,” where he identifies the 
                                                
310 Abbreviation for Revolutionary Socialist 
 
311 Another mysterious figure, emigrated to Israel in 1975 (b.1933-d.1991): Bromberg could not 
properly be regarded as a Soviet historian and he apparently did not support the Whites or Reds. 
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origins of the dissemination of Russophilia in Jewish-revolutionary circles, which 
was characteristic of multitudes of Soviet National Bolshevist figures of Jewish 
origin—in particular for giant ideologues of these currents, Isiah Lezhneva and 
Vladimir Tan-Bogoraz, many Jews saw bolshevism as possibility to finally merge 
with a large nation, abandoning the ghetto and the Pale of Settlement, to 
eschatologically bridge the messianic Russian with the messianic Jew under the 
general aegis of Eurasian revolution. The destruction of the alienating laws of 
capital and exploitation. Thus, extremist circles of Eastern European Jews of a 
mystical orientation (from Hasidim to Sabbateanists) themselves presented a 
growth medium for Bolshevism, SR and Marxism, and not accidentally the 
majority of leaders of the Reds came from families of Hasidim and mystics, taking 
on a mystical eschatological messianic pathos, despite the external paradox, this 
convergence of typological and psychological relations between Hasidic types of 
Jewish fundamentalists and the ardent atheist builders of Bolshevist society was 
intimate, since they both belonged to the “Eurasianism,” “orientalism,” and the 
irrational-mystical sects of Judaism.  
The opposite group is totally united in another type of Jew—the rationalist-
Jewish, bourgeoisie type, cool regarding religion, but on the opposite, are 
overloaded with elements of greed, personal enrichment, of accumulation, and 
rationalist economic activity. This, per Blomberg, is “Jewish Westernism.” And 
again, as is the case with Jewish Orientalism, we see here the combination of outer 
polar positions, with one way belonging to the category of extreme religious 
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circles, the Talmudists (“The Rabbanites”), inheriting the orthodox lineage of 
Maimonides—that is the Aristotelian-rationalist lineage of the Jewish religion. In 
its time, this Talmudist camp actively fought against the spread of Kabbalists, 
passionate mystical tendencies, contradicting in its spirit the dry and mythological 
creationist form of Judaic theology (for more detailed analysis see the gorgeous 
analysis of Gershom Scholem’s “The Kabbala and Its Symbolism,” “The Origins of 
Kabbala,” and so on).312 Later, its chieftains spoke against the pseudo-messiah 
Sabbatan Zevi, the messiah leader of mystical Jewish hetero-orthodoxy. In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a party was drawn up from these 
environments, the so-called “Mitnagedov” (verbatim “The Opponents” in Hebrew), 
who desperately fought against Hasidism and the renaissance of extreme 
mysticism among Eastern European Jews. This camp was based in religious 
rationalism, in Talmudic traditions, purifying them of all mystical-mythological 
stratifications. Curiously enough, to this same category of Jew belongs the figures 
of “Haskalah” and “the Jewish Enlightenment,” who belonged to the modernizing 
and secularizing Jews, the rejection of religious ceremonies and traditions in the 
name of “humanism” and “assimilation” into the “progressive peoples of the West.” 
In Russia, this type of Jew, although extremely opposed to the nominally 
monarchical-Orthodox regimes, occupied Westernizing, liberal positions. The 
peak of this group’s aspirations was the February Revolution. The “Jewish 
                                                
312 Regarded as founder of modern Jewish mysticism (1897-1982) 
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Westernists” as a whole supported the “white cause,” despite their racial closeness 
with the Bolshevik leaders as they did not identify with universalist, mystical 
orientation of “Jewish Orientalism.”  
Like the splitting up of Russians into “Whites” and “Reds” in the revolution, 
the Jewry also broke in political thought and in profound archetypical features of 
their rationales on deep lines, planned much earlier, into two camps within 
Judaism—Hasidic-Kabbalists (Bolshevists) in one, and Talmudist-rationalists (the 
Enlightenment, bourgeoisie-capitalists) in the other.  
So, the typology of Blomberg-Arusky is supported by historical examples, 
the conclusions to which we arrive at by a simple, logical path: the Jewry that 
presents itself as an ethno-religious whole (which is still not so obvious!), is 
essentially divided into two camps, in two “orders,” into two “communities.” In two 
types, which in specific critical situations will demonstrate not only a difference, 
but a fundamental hostility. Each have their religious poles and secular 
expressions, remaining unified. “Jewish Orientalism,” (per Blomberg) or “Jewish 
National-Bolshevism,” (per Agursky) at its religious level includes Hasidim, 
Sabbateans, Kabbalists and at the secular level Marxism, revolutionary socialism, 
populism, and Bolshevism.  
“Jewish Westernists” are also a duality; in their religious plane coinciding 
with Maimonides’ rationalistic Talmudism (after the “Gaons” of Vilnius, the 
Mitnagedov centers, and the anti-Hasidic circles) and the secular versions 
expressing themselves as liberal-democratic, “enlightened” humanism. 
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Two Examples (4) 
The fundamental duality revealed to us instantly explains a great deal of 
factors, remaining incomprehensible in other interpretative methodologies. In 
particular, the logical explanation for the cryptic phenomenon of so-called “Jewish-
anti-Semitism.” This criticism of Marx by Lassalle, that Marx used extremely 
Judeophobic phrases and also many radically anti-Jewish passages generally 
matched Judaism with capitalism, becoming completely understood since in his 
own character the Jew, Marx belongs uniquely to the mystic-Hasidism of the 
messianic type, who typically viewed in the bourgeoisie and capitalism, where the 
main role—and in philosophical and practical thought—played by the Jew is as its 
own chief enemy. In the article, “On the Jewish Question,” Marx writes: 
What is the secular basis of the Jewry? Material consumption and self-
interest. What are the Jews’ earthly ideals? Trading. What is their earthly 
god? Money…Money is the fervent deity of the Israelites. Empirically, the 
being of the Jew is trading. 
 
Note the emphasis on the terms “secular” and “empirical.” Marx could be 
hinting at two things. One is their materialism and immanency, which he, not 
embarrassed at the expression, impressed and concluded on each the embodiment 
of a negative (remember that truly demonic, anti-Christian role Marx attributes to 
Capital). In the second non-secular, non-empirical, transcendentalist way we can 




Another example. In its time a group of Kabbalist-Zoharists (enthusiasts of 
the Kabbalist books “the Zohar”), followed the mystical-Sabbatist Yakov Frank, 
who carried over into the group aspects of Christianity, and in parallel “exposing” 
the misanthropic rites of the Talmudists (Rabbanites)—their eternal enemies. The 
Jewish historian G.L. Shtrak in his book “Blood in the Beliefs and Superstitions of 
Mankind” wrote on the conflict between followers of Frank and the Talmudists:  
In 1759 they (Frankists—A.D.) declared to the Archbishop Vratislav 
Lubensky that they craved baptism, like deer for a source of water, and 
offered to prove that the Talmudists shed more innocent Christian blood 
than the Pagans, thirsting after it and using it. At the same time, they asked 
for an area of settlement to be approved for them east of Lemberg, so they 
could live by their own labor, where Talmudist-innkeepers breed 
drunkenness, sucking dry the Christians and robbing them to their last 
thread…soon after this dispute, at the insistence of the Polish clergy, around 
1,000 baptisms were administered to the Cossacks. 
 
In these two examples, we see a unified spiritual confrontation at different 
levels. The atheist Marx identifies Capital with Jewish figures and in this lies the 
basis for the curse of the Jews and their “empirical deity.” The mystic “Frankists” 
curse the Talmudists on a completely different basis, reproaching them—in 
accordance with the level of all controversies—of “drinking the blood of 
Christians.” Strikingly, these Zoharists had social motives: “Rabbanites rob 
Christians to the last thread” and the assembling of the Zoharists to “live by their 
own labor.” The spiritual conflict of the mystical-contemplators, mythmakers, 
Gnostics, fanatics, and spiritualists versus the religious moralists, supporters of 
simple rites, cults of formalists somehow unnoticeably and naturally transfers over 
to the confrontation of socialists and capitalists, Bolsheviks and liberal-democrats.  
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Jew vs Jew (5) 
Now we project the scheme we have received onto Soviet history and 
identifying through it the Jew’s role. 
In general, the Jewry, on the verge of the revolution, was unified in 
opposing the existing system. Seemingly in both sectors. The Jewish-orientalist 
opposed capitalism and religious conservatism, alienated in formal cultural 
spheres, craving a revolutionary change and the opening of a magic era of 
messianic fulfillment. The Jewish-westernists did not accept Czarism for 
completely opposite reasons, believing that it remained an insufficiently capitalist, 
civilized, and humanist regime, in need of an adjustment to the level of Western 
Civilization. All Jews had solidarity in the necessary overthrow of the dynasty and 
revolution. In this they had an alliance, as among the periphery of Russian 
nationalists, dreaming of the destruction of the “prison of nations,” and the “leftist 
nationalists” among these same Russians perceived the Romanov-Peterburgist 
order as an anti-nationalist, anti-populist, anti-spiritual parody of the true Holy 
Rus. Moreover, there were sufficient westernists among the Russian nobility and 
merchants, active in building the Russian capitalism of the time and cutting 
through the last “cherry orchards” of the rapidly degenerating aristocracy. 
The cumulative activity of all these forces at the approach of a favorable 
situation was implemented through the February Revolution. But, immediately 
after it irreconcilable contradictions appeared in the victors’ camp. After the 
overthrow of the regime, with clarity it discovered within itself a second line of 
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division (this time, internal) and it has predetermined all that followed. After the 
February Revolution, the first plan was opposed by revolutionist and evolutionist 
forces, leftist orientalists and leftist westernists, and Eurasianists and europeanists. 
In the same environment. the fundamental dualism of the Jewry was exposed with 
clarity.  
The Bolshevist pole combined in itself the exact representatives of “Jewish 
orientalism,” the Hasidic-Sabbateanist type, the Jewish communist, and the Jewish 
socialist—the same as those who at the end of the eighteenth century wanted “to 
live by their own labor.” This labor, eschatologically, universally most Russophilic 
in its Jewish solidarity with the National-Bolshevist current of Russian “leftist 
imperialism,” seeing in the October Revolution not the end of nationalist dreams, 
but the beginning, a new red dawn, the second arrival of the Soviet Rus, the secret 
Old Believers’ Rite—lost in the gloomy bicentenary of the graceless parody of the 
synod in St. Petersburg. Bolshevism gradually soaked up not only orthodox-
Marxists, but a huge number of SRs, especially leftists SRs, who might be called 
quite the Russian analog for national-revolutionaries. In a word, the Jewish 
undercurrent in Bolshevism is logically and triumphantly the completion of a 
historical path largely organized by a sector of the Jewry, the roots of which go far 
back in the faded religious controversies of the Middle Ages. 
The enemies of the eschatological community of “Jewish-orientalists” came 
from all over the capitalist world and especially the Jewish bourgeoisie, Whites, 
empiricists (per Marx), an incarnation of the ancient Rabbanites. Here, the 
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paradoxical Bolshevist “anti-Semitism,” was not unfamiliar to a great deal of 
Jewish-communists. Agursky brings up an interesting case in his work, when the 
Jew Vladimir Tan-Bogoraz interceded on behalf of the Russian Bolsheviks, not only 
interceding himself, but allowing anti-Semitic tirades and generally justifying 
them. This recalls the history cited with the Zoharists! By this same token, we find 
something analogical in different spheres. Take for example, the famous founder of 
the Bavarian Lodge of “Thule,” present for the birth of the National-Socialist 
Workers Party in Germany, Baron Von Sebottendorf was in his own time dedicated 
to “Egyptian Masonry” in Turkey. The matrimonial couple of Jewish-Sabbateanists 
receiving the basics of their own esoteric sciences. But, he himself (not to mention 
the ordinary Nazis) differed from the uncovered anti-Semitism. The Jewish 
(especially Sabbateanism) trace can be found in several different emphatically 
nationalist, and at times, frankly racist or anti-Semitic organizations of the 
europeanists (Masons) and the westernists (Young Turks). In different forms, anti-
Semitism could be directed in opposing ways and in cases the bearers of it could 
altogether be the Jew, or their mangers and political leaders. For example, take the 
fairly extensive anti-Semitic sayings of Churchill, who pointed out the Jewish 
origins of the majority of the Bolshevik leaders, speaking on the “Jewish danger 
threatening civilization from the East.” While Churchill based his own political 
career in the rightist-Zionist circles of Great Britain and the USA, as convincingly 
demonstrated by Douglas Reed. Accordingly, just as there exists something like a 
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“right” and “left” in Jewry, there is a “right” and “left” in anti-Semitism. Thus, in 
this question we arrive at a more complex model.  
From February and October, we come to the parting of the waters of the 
two halves of world Jewry and from this certain moment they acquired there 
cruelly opposed forms. In extreme cases, representatives from both of these camps 
acquire in their polemics and arguments, not dissimilar crass, vulgar anti-Semitic 
discourse. But, that is not all. The peak of this confrontational collision acquired 
the character of war in physical destruction, so that we see in history Stalinist 
purges of the ranks of Soviet leadership.  
To Live by Their Own Labor (6) 
There is no doubt that the Jew differs in having unique capabilities in some 
social, economic, and cultural fields. Their scattering over a great deal of centuries, 
teaching the small, but stubborn nation, not wishing to give up on their ancient 
dreams. Over many thousands of years of religion from an ancient covenant. 
Gazing at all that surrounds them as temporary, detached, and transitory. Jews 
have developed a number of striking, dynamic features permitting them a great 
deal of orienting themselves to the social dynamics of the fast-flowing processes of 
governing and national rule taking place in the environment of “great nations,” 
who “always have a sense of being at home,” with a specific delay from a slower, a 
posteriori reflection. But, these skills could be used differently in various 
situations. Thus, the Jewish-Bolshevists affixed all their efforts, all national talents, 
and all spiritual forces towards the creation of a mighty Soviet state, an empire of 
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social righteousness, a land-based bastion of Eurasian geopolitics. And many 
numbers of the elements of the Jewish diaspora in Europe, America, and Asia, the 
offspring of the same religious-spiritualist, mystical, “orientalist” spirit, and a 
“Eurasianist” medium, were the ongoing leaders in the structural opera of the 
Soviets, geopolitical agents of influence for a Greater Eurasia, and the vessels of 
messianic Bolshevism. They formed exactly the basis of the Third International, 
later the Comintern, composing a powerful Eurasian network as subtle agents in 
all corners of the planet. But, to reiterate, it was not just a matter of the Jews, but 
of specific categories of Jews, of certain Jewish camps, and of “Jewish-Eurasianists.” 
Along these lines, at a certain precise stage these “red-brown” Jewish-Eurasianists 
created and prepared the State of Israel, having begun under the leadership (and 
with the sanction of) Moscow, but in a tough fight with English-Atlanticists, with 
the forces of capital and liberal-democracy. They composed an axis of leftist forces 
in Israel, the fruits of their efforts were the famous Kibbutzim. Just like the 
Zoharists— “to live by their own labor.” 
Apologies for the Jews, such as the representation that all Jews are included 
as innocent victims cannot be reconciled with the fact in the epoch of severe 
repression, as during the Leninist and Stalinist purges, Jews were not only the 
victims, but also the executioners, not in an individual, purely personal, but in the 
group, party, and factional sense. This was not set in anti-Semitism, but in fact is 
actually explained by the Judeophilic framework in place at the time as the internal 
battle of Soviet forces in Judaism did not cease, the fact that the Bolshevist, 
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“Hasidic,” “Zoharist” elements were well known for their skills and the changing 
manner of their own tribesmen, their propensity for intrigue and conspiracy, 
chameleon-like, mercilessly battling with the bourgeoisie elements of the Jewry, 
with residual “Jewish-westernists,” the heirs of the Rabbanite spirit, with the 
ideological currents of the “Mitnegedov.” Here the paradox is clearly expressed, the 
anti-Semitic purges were very often committed by the Jews themselves. The 
classical case of this position is Lazar Kaganovich, the most faithful of Stalin’s 
companions, a committed, die-hard National-Bolshevik, who Russian nationalists, 
in a misunderstanding, unreasonably turned into a figure of the “Jewish 
conspiracy.” Greater “anti-Semites” would be difficult to invent.  
From Fracture to Collapse (7) 
The critical point in the history of Jewish-Eurasianists is 1948. At that 
moment Stalin and his associates came to the conclusion that the creation of the 
State of Israel, which was initially supported (as in the Hasidic-Socialist construct) 
had turned out to be an instrument of the bourgeoisie West because the capitalist-
Misnagedim line had gained the upper hand. Zionist tendencies became awakened 
in the Soviet Jewry and this meant a transfer of initiative to the remnants of the 
“westernist” sector, whose total extirpation turned out to be only superficial, 
whose ability to survive surprised even the vigilant suspicion of Jewish-
Eurasianists.  
This moment was fatal—as demonstrated by the later events at the close of 
our century—for the entire Soviet state and for socialism around the world. When 
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the anti-Semitic tendencies in the Soviet leadership crossed certain defined 
boundaries—especially glaring was the destruction of the Jewish anti-fascist 
committee, consisting of practically one hundred percent committed Eurasianists 
and direct agents of Lavrentiy Beria (who spoke only in their favor)—only the 
committed Jewish-National-Bolshevists themselves could remaining unwavering in 
their Russophilic, Soviet-Imperial position. Generally, in the eyes of the Jewish 
masses, the influence of Eurasianists were gradually undermined, discrediting 
their fundamental ideological and geopolitical line. In their own ways, from party 
and military areas, to the heights of power, Great and Small Russia elements drew 
closer to those who did not totally comprehend the messianic pathos of left wing 
nationalism, messianic National-Bolshevism, that underlies the basic spiritual 
union of Jewish and Russian Eurasianists going back to the beginning of the 
century. This new generation felt themselves to be greater statesmen, who were 
prophets of a “New Truth,” following absolutely the army’s “Romanov” spirit of a 
Czarist castes within the military leadership, and finally uprooted the Bolshevists 
with common nativism, worker-peasant chauvinism, and with a certain 
unreflective share of instinctual anti-Semitism. These army cadres did not know 
the revolution and higher spirituality, historically concomitant, and this was 
accompanied by not delving into the details of nationalist politics. The natives of 
Ukraine were distinguished by being especially deaf to this question, they together 
with Khrushchev, plotted to occupy the USSR’s top posts. Although, in the 
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environment that existed after Stalin’s death, Beria fully ceased the anti-Semitic 
“Doctor’s Cases,” the irreparable damage was complete.313  
There is more to this fatal turning point. The Russian Jewry, Eurasianist-
continentalists, international-imperialists, messianic and revolutionary currents, 
who had become the backbone of Soviet power, were undermined, broken, and 
disfigured at its foundation. The state and economic power organisms became 
functionally inert. The purges, in general, were basically always invariably lying 
hidden the ideological, meta-political, fundamental causes, once completed in 
their place arrive a clash of clans, a gradual “bourgeoisization” of socialism, 
backsliding into philistinism, and Babbitry. The revolutionary eschatological 
pathos faded. The Soviet State maintained its inertia. The eschatological basis of 
the worldwide Eurasian revolution crossed over into an ordinary government 
entity. Powerful and gigantic, but peculiarly devoid of the glow of the original, 
universal mission.  
At the level of the Jewry, this signified the complete defeat of the “Hasidic-
Sabbateanists” camp and the gradual emergence of the leading role of Jewish-
rationalists, Kantians, humanists, Mitnagedov, and westernists. The secret alliance 
of the National-Bolshevists was dissolved, Jewish-orientalists accelerated the 
tempo of marginalization and their influence and position fell catastrophically.  
                                                
313 More widely known as the Doctor’s Plot in the USA.  
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Eventually this same type of Jewish-Bolshevist was moved to the periphery 
and to the head of the Jewish community in the USSR advanced those 
representatives with the sensibilities of Maimonides and the Talmudists. Even 
more often this happened with the secular, as humanist-liberal versions irradiated 
outwards. 
This bourgeoisie, Zionist-rightist flank from then on worked only for the 
breakup of Soviet structures, preparing for the collapse of socialism and grinding 
down from within the gigantic geopolitical construction. By this token, in unison 
with these destructive anti-Eurasianist tendencies, they worked with certain anti-
Semitic circles of the KGB, who only aggravated the spiritual-cultural 
disintegration of the ideological synthesis and were a secret divisionary force in the 
origins of Bolshevism and National-Bolshevism.  
Be that as it may, the ruin of the Soviet Government is the direct result of 
the retreat of the Jewish lobby from the constructive state building of the 
Bolshevist position and its direct or indirect complicity in aiding the hostile, Anti-
Soviet, Atlanticist capitalist West.  
Towards a Eurasianist Future (8) 
This model, the general contours of which we have written about, allows 
man problems to be seen anew and connected to the mysterious levers of Soviet 
history. Note, that this approach could be transferred to other geopolitical 
systems, since something analogical could be produced in other countries and 
political contexts. Incidentally, on the topic of the fundamental dualism of the 
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Jewry, the work of the great writer Arthur Koestler can be applied, who offered a 
controversial, from the ethnological perspective, but altogether impressive, from 
the typological perspective, thesis on “Turkish” racism originating from the 
Eastern European Jews, “Ashkenazim,” existing as the heirs of the religiously 
Jewish Khazars, whence the famous dualism between Ashkenazim and Sephardim 
(pure Semites). In the case of the Karaites, that is another anti-Talmudist direction 
among the Jewry, the fact of their descending from the Khazars was considered 
especially proven (see L.N. Gumilyov). Curiously enough, the Turkish theories on 
the origins of the “Ashkenazim” (in Hebrew this word means “northern”) adheres 
with Douglas Reed, who considered this type of Jew an offshoot of the “Turko-
Mongolian race!” 
It is important for us to underline another aspect. Jewish orientalism is not 
a strictly, exclusively modern phenomenon. It is deeply rooted in national history. 
Perhaps some kind of terrible religious or racial secrets are behind it. Be that as it 
may, it does not raise a doubt over the victory of the “Mitnagedov” lobby and the 
Jewish westernists are not, and cannot be a totally irreversible fact. It is impossible 
to deny that the position of the Jewish orientalists is now more marginalized and 
weaker than ever. But, this may only be just for the time being. There is itself 
national identification of certain parts of the Jewry, not conceivable without 
sacrifices, great compassion, a painstaking and idealistic quest for truth, without 
deep mystical contemplation, without disgusted contempt for the slavish dark laws 
of “This World”—to laws of the market and egoistical benefit. Jewish orientalists 
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have teased out humility and exultation from the first legendary Tzadiks, 
genuinely compassionate to neighbors regardless of their racial and religious 
membership, having a fanatical faith in righteousness and a fairly constructed 
society, and finally a vague solidarity can be guessed at with the tragic and 
beautiful God-carrying peoples of history, the Russian people, all this is 
indestructible of certain parts of the Jews, inseparable from their unique destiny.  
Squeezed between (a partially justified) anti-Semitism of the Russian 
patriots and that of the westernists, rationalists, free-marketers, and subversive 
anti-statist masses, sits the Russian Jewish-liberals, the Jewish orientalists are 
experiencing tough times. 
But, do not despair. The lives of these peoples are being tested also. It is 
only important to choose, to comprehend one’s place in history, not opposed to 
discovering its geopolitical and spiritual orientation. And in their own ways the 
Eurasianists must with all accountability and considering all the tragic historical 
experiences declare a place for them among the ranks of the builders of a Great 
Eurasian Empire, the Last Empire that will be found.  
But, as representatives of the Great Idea we will simply never forget 
anything. Not of our own, nor of strangers. 
